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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MUTUAL FUNDS
Hongxun Ruan
Jules van Binsbergen
In the first chapter, “Social Capital and Innovation: Evidence from Connected Holdings”,
I investigates how social capital affects innovation. I measure a firm’s social capital with
connected holdings, which is the fraction of equity of a particular firm held by mutual
funds whose managers are connected to the firm’s board members through educational
networks. I use plausibly exogenous variation in the size of board members’ networks as an
instrument for connected holdings. I find higher connected holdings lead to larger number of
patents granted, more patent citations, and higher firm value created by patents. Connected
holdings foster innovation by helping to reduce short-term capital market pressures and to
increase management job security.
The second chapter, “Marketing Mutual Funds”, co-authored with Nikolai Roussanov and
Yanhao Wei, we investigate marketing and distribution expenses’ impact on the allocation of
capital to funds and on returns earned by mutual fund investors. We develop and estimate
a structural model of costly investor search and fund competition with learning about fund
skill and endogenous marketing expenditures. We find that marketing is nearly as important
as performance and fees for determining fund size. Restricting the amount that funds can
spend on marketing substantially improves investor welfare, as more capital is invested
with passive index funds and price competition decreases fees on actively managed funds.
Average alpha increases as active fund size is reduced, and the relationship between fund
size and fund manager skill net of fees is closer to that implied by a frictionless model.
Decreasing investor search costs would also imply a reduction in marketing expenses and
management fees as well as a shift towards passive investing.
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CHAPTER 1 : Social Capital and Innovation: Evidence from Connected Holdings
1.1. Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the impact of social capital on economic outcomes.
In the literature, there are two conflicting views: on one hand, Putnam (1993) argues
that “associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-
spiritedness”. The cooperative attitude and trust among group members could mitigate
informational frictions and enable welfare-improving transactions.1 On the other hand,
Olson (1982) argues that associational activities foster emergence of self-serving interest
groups such as cartels, colluding elites and lobbies which distort markets and hurt economic
growth.2 The goal of this paper is to shed new light on the relative importance of these
two conflicting views. Using a measure of social connections between board members of
publicly traded firms and mutual fund managers, I find that more social capital leads to
more innovation at the firm level. The evidence suggests that the positive aspects of social
capital dominate the potential negative ones, at least with respect to corporate innovation.
There are two major challenges associated with empirically estimating the effect of social
capital on economic outcomes. The first one is measurement of social capital. The second
is identification, as purely exogenous variation in social capital is rare. Previous empirical
research on the question usually has focused on country-level measures of trust and has
used cross-country variation to identify the impact on economic outcomes (e.g., Knack and
Keefer (1997); Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009)).
To address the first challenge, I construct a firm-level measure of social capital: connected
holdings, which is defined as the fraction of equity of a particular firm held by mutual
funds whose managers are connected to the firm’s board members through educational
networks. To address the second challenge, I exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in
1See Knack and Keefer (1997), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2008), Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012).
2See Fisman (2001), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Haselmann, Schoenherr, and Vig (2017).
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connected mutual fund managers’ entry and exit of asset management industry and use
it as an instrument for connected holdings. Since innovation is important in generating
long-term economic growth, I examine the impact of connected holdings on innovation.
In a frictionless economy, social capital should not matter because financial markets can
allocate the efficient amount of capital to innovative firms. In the presence of frictions
such as asymmetric information, communication costs, incomplete contracting, etc., social
capital could either encourage or impede firm innovation. On one hand, social capital could
promote innovation by alleviating short-term capital market pressures. This might be the
case if capital market investors value short-term growth in firm profits or find it hard to
evaluate long-term innovative projects.3 In such an environment, management chooses to
underinvest in research and development (R&D). Social capital in the form of connected
holdings could alleviate capital market pressures by acting like long-term investment and
supporting firms in adverse situations (“the insurance effect”). On the other hand, social
capital might hurt innovation (and, more generally, firm value) because connected holdings
could increase management entrenchment and weaken capital market’s disciplinary effects.
Classical moral hazard models inform us that under weaker monitoring, management could
enjoy private benefits (e.g., through shirking or a quiet life) at the cost of firm value,
which can hurt innovation (Holmstro¨m (1979), Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003)).
Identifying the effect of social capital on firm actions is complicated by potentially endoge-
nous selection. Connected mutual fund managers might select firms to invest in based on
the information that is observable to them, but not to the econometrician. An omitted
factor could be the quality of inventors at the firm, the long-term innovation plans, or the
prototypes of unpatented inventions.
I classify a firm and a mutual fund as “connected” if a fund manager and a board member
attended the same university at the same time and received the same type of degree. I
3See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Stein (1989), Bebchuk and Stole (1993), Narayanan (1985).
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address the potential selection issues by instrumenting the connected holdings with the
total number of connected mutual fund managers (including those who do not hold any
shares of the firm in their portfolio). More specifically, the instrument is defined as follows:
in each year, for each firm in my sample, I count the number of mutual fund managers who
are currently working in the asset management industry and connected to the firm. The
main idea behind the instrument is that the time-series changes of the number of connected
mutual fund managers affect connected holdings, but are not affected by firm innovation.
For an instrument to be valid, it needs to satisfy both the relevance condition and the
exclusion condition. I formally test for the relevance condition. First-stage F-statistic
estimates indicate that the instrument is highly correlated with the endogenous variable
connected holdings. For the exclusion condition to hold, the instrument should not affect
firm innovation through any channel other than connected holdings. After teasing out the
average number of connected mutual fund managers for each board member using university
fixed effects, the time-series variation in the instrument comes from the within variation of
each board member’s individual connections to the mutual fund managers. And the time-
series variation of each board member’s individual connections to the mutual fund managers
is generated by the entry and exit of mutual fund managers, which is plausibly exogenous
to firm innovation due to the fact that each connected firm on average constitutes less than
50 bps of the connected mutual fund manager’s portfolio.
Using the instrumental variable approach, I establish a causal link between connected hold-
ings and innovation. First, I investigate the impact of connected holdings on innovation
outcomes. A one standard deviation increase in connected holdings causes a 10.61% in-
crease in the total number of patents granted, a 14.86% increase in the total number of
citations, and a 2.21% increase in firm value created by patents that equates to about 23
million dollars for the average firm. Two factors affect innovation outcomes: input into
innovation (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984)) and innovation efficiency (Hirshleifer,
Hsu, and Li (2013)). A one standard deviation increase in connected holdings translates
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into a 12.61% increase in firm’s input into innovation as measured by R&D expenditure.
This result suggests that more connected holdings enable firms to pursue riskier innovative
projects, a finding consistent with the insurance effect of connected holdings. Relationship
between connected holdings and commonly used measures of innovation efficiency, such
as the ratios of either patents or citations to R&D capital, is not statistically significant.
This result indicates that the negative effects induced by connected holdings are offset by
positive effects, otherwise we should see a significant drop in innovation efficiency. More
interestingly, innovation efficiency as measured by the ratio between the value created by
patents and R&D capital is positively associated with connected holdings. This implies
that connected holdings might incentivize firms to produce more valuable patents, but not
more cited patents.
The impact of connected holdings on innovation is heterogeneous across firms and funds.
I find that firms in industries that most rely on patents (such as pharmaceutical and IT
industry), their innovations more sensitively react to the change in connected holdings.
This suggests that firms in more innovative industries might be more constrained by capital
market pressures. Consistent with Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), I find that
the connected holdings coming from relatively passive funds have no impact on innovation,
whereas connected holdings from truly active funds positively affect innovation. This result
is intuitive: in bad situations, active funds have more degree of freedom to support the
firm while passive funds need to follow some exogenously set rules which might restrain
them from supporting the firm. In addition to innovation, I check how connected holdings
affect other dimensions of the firm performance. I find that higher connected holdings
predict higher firm growth in profits, output, and the number of employees. This finding is
consistent with Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017).
How do connected holdings encourage innovation? Based on previous theories, I focus on two
explanations: (1) connected holdings alleviate short-term capital market pressures (Stein
(1989)) and (2) connected holdings increase management’s job security (Manso (2011); Stein
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(1988)). Capital market pressures force firms to focus excessively on short-term earnings
at the cost of long-term investment, such as innovation. I hypothesize that connected
holdings could potentially reduce firm short-termism through loyal investments. Meanwhile,
connected holdings could increase job security of the management by reducing takeover risk
through their deterrence to corporate raiders. Consistent with both theories, I find that,
first, after a firm misses their quarterly earnings target, connected mutual funds stick with
the firm, whereas non-connected funds divest significantly. Second, I find that, after firms
miss their quarterly earnings targets, the stock returns (as measured by one-month-ahead
abnormal returns) drop less for the firms with connected holdings. Third, I find connected
holdings reduce firm’s takeover exposure which increases job security of the board members.
In addition, I also find that, on average, connected funds are more likely to vote against
shareholder-initiated proposals on various governance issues than are non-connected funds.
My findings have two broad implications. The literature on corporate governance typically
views management entrenchment as harmful to shareholder values. In this paper, I show
that, when the firm wants to incentivize management to be more innovative, the firm should
allow for some degree of management entrenchment. The increase in job security could
increase management’s incentives to take on more risks associated with innovation. My
paper also sheds new light on the role of active funds in the economy. Previous literature
holds the view that active funds cannot deliver outperformance to investors, despite charging
high fees. Aggregate welfare might be higher in a counterfactual world without active funds.
In this paper, I show that some active funds (the connected ones) can encourage firms to be
more innovative. Since innovation can promote long-run economic growth. Without those
connected active funds, the economy as a whole might be worse off.
1.1.1. Related Literature
This paper links to several strands of the literature. First, it is related to papers exam-
ining the impact of social capital on economic outcomes. Putnam (1993) finds that local
government performance is positively associated with people’s participation in public ac-
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tivities in Italy. Knack and Keefer (1997) use trust as a measure of social capital and
find that social capital fosters economic growth in a cross-country regression. Similarly, La
Porta et al. (1997) examine the effect of trust on the performance of large organizations
in a cross-country setting and find a positive relationship. In the finance setting, Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2008) document that trust affects stock market participation
and international trade. In explaining the positive relationship between social capital and
economic growth, Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) show that high social capital in
an area increases decentralized decision-making within firms. To the best of my knowledge,
this paper is the first to examine the role of innovation as a potential channel by which to
explain how social capital affects aggregate economic growth. And I provide identification
for this mechanism.
Second, my paper links to the literature on managerial short-termism. Theoretical papers
argue that managers are biased toward short-term gains because of reputation concerns
(Narayanan (1985), Holmstro¨m (1999)), takeover threats (Stein (1988)), and concerns about
stock price (Stein (1989)). Empirical paper finds that the majority of financial executives
would give up positive net present value (NPV) projects to avoid missing their quarterly
earnings target (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). Also, some papers call into ques-
tion the existence of “short-termism” (Kaplan (2017)). I contribute to this literature by
showing that social capital, as measured by connected holdings, could alleviate short-term
capital market pressures, increase management job security, and lengthen firms’ planning
horizon.
Third, this paper also contributes to a voluminous literature that explores the impact
of financial market on corporate innovation. Bernstein (2015) investigates the impact of
going public on innovation. Seru (2014) examines the effects of mergers and acquisitions
on innovation. He and Tian (2013) show that financial analyst coverage causes firms to
innovate less. Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2017) demonstrate how hedge fund activism
reshapes innovation. My contribution to this literature is to show how the social networks
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of the board members could influence innovation. Or, more broadly, how important is
external investor’s trust to innovation?
Lastly, this paper links to a growing literature investigating the real impact of institutional
investors on corporate policies, such as leverage (Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent (2014)),
dividends (Grinstein and Michaely (2005)), R&D (Bushee (1998), Aghion, Van Reenen,
and Zingales (2013)), and governance (Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016)). The closest
paper to mine is Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013). The authors study the total
impact of institutional investors on innovation outcomes. I deepen the understanding of
institutional investors’ role on innovation by showing that among all institutional ownership,
connected mutual fund ownership matters a lot for innovation. And surprisingly, for some
innovation measures, after accounting for connected holdings, institutional ownership is not
statistically significant anymore, which indicates that connected holdings might be the part
of the institutional ownership that drive innovation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the data and the mea-
sures. Section 1.3 presents the identification strategy. Section 1.4 shows the results. Section
1.5 discusses the potential mechanisms. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2. Data and Variable Constructions
I use several sources to collect data on patents, mutual fund holdings, the educational
background of corporate officers and mutual fund managers, and firm-specific and fund-
specific characteristics.
1.2.1. Patent Data
1.2.1.1. Innovation Measures
To measure firms’ innovative activities, I construct three measures. The first measure is the
firm’s total number of patent applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted.
There are two important dates for a patent, the filing date and the issue date. The filing
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date issued by the USPTO on a patent application is of critical importance to an inventor
or patent owner because it determines who has priority over the right to file a patent
application for an invention. Once the original or amended claims of a patent application
have been approved by the examiner, the patent is granted and the specific date of grant
is called the issue date. Here, I use the patent’s filing year because it allows me to capture
the actual time of innovation.4
However, not all patents are of equal importance. Simple patent counts cannot distinguish
between groundbreaking innovation and incremental discoveries (e.g., Griliches (1990)).
Hence, I construct the second measure, which is a firm’s total number of citations for
patents filed in a given year. For example, suppose IBM filed for 10 patents in 1990. Then I
track all the citations that those 10 patents received in subsequent years (until the end of the
sample) and aggregate those citations together to obtain IBM’s total number of citations
for 1990.
The above two measures mainly utilize the patent data. The last measure I used is based on
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017) ( KPSS, hereafter). Kogan, Papanikolaou,
Seru, and Stoffman (2017) propose a new measure of the private, economic value of new
innovations that is based on the stock market’s reaction to patent grants. The basic idea is
to first compute the abnormal stock returns that can be attributed to patent issuance and
then multiply the return with the market cap to get the value of the patent. This measure
can assess the importance of each patent but also label each patent with its economic
value. This measure helps me better investigating more quantitative questions related to
innovation, such as how much value is created by innovative activities for a given firm.
Another advantage of this measure is that, because of the forward-looking feature of the
stock market’s reaction, I don’t need a long period of time to accumulate citations to access
the importance of the patent. (For more details on how Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and
Stoffman (2017) construct their measure, please refer to their paper.)
4For the reasons to use the filing date, see Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1986).
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1.2.1.2. Patent Data Source
I downloaded the patent data from Professor Noah Stoffman’s Web site.5 A detailed de-
scription of this dataset can be found in Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017).
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017) begin with all patents downloaded from
Google Patents. They matched patents to Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
firms by the assignee’s name. In their final dataset, they have 1,928,123 matched patents,
of which 523,301 (27%) are new compared with the commonly used NBER patent dataset
(see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) for more details).
The patent data contain truncation problems that arises because patents appear in the
database only after they are granted. There is a lag between the patent filing date and
the patent issuing date. We can see from Table A.2 that the mean lag days in the 1980s
and in the 1990s is approximately 2 years. But it significantly increases to more than 3
years in the 2000s with the 99th percentile reaching almost 8 years. In Figure A.1, I plot
the total number of patent applications that are eventually granted by year. We can see
a significant drop starting from year 2003. This drop is due to the lag days: a lot of the
patents applied for after 2003 are still under review and had not been granted by 2010,
which is the last year of the patent data. To deal with this problem, I choose 2003 as
the last year of my sample. This will guarantee that 99% of patents applied for before
2003 (including 2003) have been issued before 2010. I also check the growth rate of the
total number of patent applications, and find that it is relatively stable from 1980 to 2003.
Starting from 2003, it significantly decreases. For robustness, in the result section, I also
rerun all the exercises with 2004 or 2005 as the last year of the sample. All the results are
quantitatively the same. The truncation problem for the patent citations arises as patents
tend to receive citations over an extended period of time (e.g., 20 years), but I only observe
the citations up to 2010. Then patents issued near the end of the dataset have no time
to accumulate citations. To deal with this problem, I follow Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg
5https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents
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(2001) and Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005). I estimate the citation-lag distribution for
different technology categories. For patents that haven’t received 20 years of citations, I use
a citation-lag distribution to infer the total number of citations that those patents should
receive.6 Other methods can be used to address the citations truncation problem. For
example, one can only count the total number of citations a patent received in the first N
(N = 0, 1, 2, 3) years after it is granted. For robustness, I also check this measure, and all
the results are qualitatively the same.
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017) measure of the value of patent is based
on the stock market’s reaction on the patent issue date. As discussed before, the patent
filing date is more informative about the actual time the innovation occurred. So I move
the KPSS measure to the patent application year.
Following the innovation literature, I set the patent and citation counts to zero for firms
without available patent or citation information from the patent database. The distribution
for both patent applications and patent citations is right skewed, with its median at zero.
To deal with skewness, first I winsorize those variables at the 99th percentile, and, second,
I take the natural logarithm of both patent applications (LnPatApp) and patent citations
(LnPatCite). This creates another problem: a lot of the observations with zero patents
become missing values after taking the natural logarithm. I take two approaches: (1) I drop
the observations with missing values (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) also takes
this approach), and (2) to avoid losing observations, I add one to the actual values before
calculating the natural logarithm. I denote those cases as (Ln˜PatApp) and (Ln˜PatCite).
I also apply the above procedures to the KPSS measure of the patent value. I performed a
similar transformation, which I denote as LnKPSS and LnK˜PSS.
6For more details, see Appendix A1.6, where I provide the citation-lag distribution and adjustment
methods.
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1.2.2. Mutual Fund Holdings and Fund Manager Data
My data on mutual fund holdings come from the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum S12
database, which includes all registered mutual funds filing with the SEC. I only include
common stock holdings of mutual funds (i.e., a stock with the share code 10 or 11 in
CRSP).
I obtain portfolio managers’ biographical information from Morningstar, Inc. For each mu-
tual fund manager, Morningstar provides the manager’s name, all college and graduate
degrees he or she received, the year in which the degrees were granted, and the granting in-
stitution. Morningstar also provides the employment history for each mutual fund manager,
including the fund name, starting date, and end date. I first merge Morningstar dataset
with CRSP mutual fund dataset, then I use MFLINKS data link provided by Wharton
Research Data Services to merge it with Thomson Reuters fund holdings dataset (see Wer-
mers (2000) for details on how to merge these two databases). My final mutual fund sample
includes survivorship-bias-free data on holdings and biographical information for 3,094 U.S.
mutual funds and 5,369 mutual fund managers between January 1980 and December 2003.7
[INSERT FIGURE A.3 HERE]
1.2.3. Company Officers Data
The senior biographical information of company officers (defined as Chief Executive Officer
[CEO], Chief Financial Officer [CFO], Chief Technological Officer [CTO], Chief Operat-
ing Officer [COO], and Chairman) and board of directors was obtained from BoardEx of
Management Diagnostic Limited, a private research company specializing in collecting and
disseminating social network data on company officials in U.S. and European public and
private companies and other types of organizations (e.g., charity). For each senior company
7Notice that I keep all the matched funds instead of only active domestic equity mutual funds because
I assume all kinds of funds’ holdings could potentially affect firm’s innovation. Out of those 3,094 mutual
funds, 2,037 are domestic, well-diversified equity mutual funds. The domestic, well-diversified equity mutual
funds compose about 90% of all the Asset Under Management (AUM) in the final dataset. The time series
of total AUM of domestic active funds as a fraction of all funds can be found in Figure A.3.
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officer and board of directors, the Boardex database provides all the college and graduate
degrees received, the year in which the degrees were granted, and the granting institution.
Boardex also provides the employment history for each company official. This information
includes his or her current and past roles with a start date and end date, as well as a dummy
indicating whether the individual serves (served) on the board of directors in the current
(past) employment position. Given this paper’s focus, I restrict the sample to U.S. public
firms.
1.2.4. Connections and Connected Holdings
Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), I define the social networks over educational
institutions. I group the degrees for mutual fund managers, senior company officers, and
board of directors into six categories: (1) undergraduate, (2) Master of Business Adminis-
tration (MBA), (3) general graduate (MA or MS), (4) doctorate (PhD), (5) law school (JD),
and (6) medical school (MD).8 The broad connection dummy equals 1 if the fund manager
and a senior officer of the firm and/or a board member of the firm attended the same uni-
versity. The narrow connection dummy equals 1 if the fund manager and a senior officer
of the firm and/or a board member of the firm attended the same university at the same
time and received the same type of degree (from the above-defined six groups of degrees).
In terms of connectedness, narrow connections should dominate broad connections.
After I define the connection, connected holdings for a firm in a given year is defined by the
following formula:
ConHoldki,t =
∑Nt
j=1 CONNECTED
k
i,j,t·Si,j,t
S¯i,t
k = narrow, broad, (1.1)
where CONNECTEDki,j,t is a dummy variable that indicates whether fund manager j is
connected to firm i through a type k connection in year t. Si,j,t is the shares held by the
mutual fund manager j in firm i at time t. S¯i,t is the total shares outstanding for firm i
8I correct the inconsistencies in the educational institution names. The appendix provides the details.
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at time t. Nt is the total number of mutual fund managers at time t. ConHold
k
i,t measures
the fraction of a firm’s equity that is held by connected mutual fund managers.
1.2.5. Other Data and Control Variables
Following the literature, I control for a set of variables that may affect a firm’s innovation.
To calculate the control variables, I collect financial statement items from Compustat, in-
stitutional holdings data from Thomsons CDA/Spectrum database (Form 13F), stock price
information from CRSP, and institutional investor classification data from Brian Bushee’s
Web site.9 The control variables include firm age, firm sale, ROA, asset tangibility, R&D
stock, R&D investment intensity, leverage, Tobin’s Q, investment intensity, institutional
investor’s ownership, dedicated institutional holdings, transitory institutional holdings, and
quasi-indexed institutional holdings. I provide detailed variable definitions in Table A.1.
[INSERT TABLE A.1 HERE]
1.2.6. Summary Statistics
Table A.3 reports the number of connections for the top 15 educational institutes according
to the definition of CONNECTED(broad) and CONNECTED(narrow), respectively. Har-
vard University and the University of Pennsylvania have the most connections under both
definitions.
[INSERT TABLE A.3 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE A.4 HERE]
To mitigate the impact of outliers, I winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table A.5, Panel A, reports the summary statistics for the full sample. Panel B sepa-
rately shows statistics for those with positive CONNECTED(narrow) holdings and those
with no CONNECTED(narrow) holdings. A salient feature in the data is that the firm-
year observations with positive CONNECTED(narrow) holdings have significantly higher
9http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee
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innovation outcomes as measured by the total number of patent applications (which were
eventually approved), the total patent citations, and the KPSS value. Firms with positive
CONNECTED(narrow) holdings also have a higher ROA, higher R&D stocks, and a higher
Tobin’s Q. But across the measures regarding routine investment, such as PPE or CAPX,
the firms with positive CONNECTED(narrow) holdings have lower values.
The previous literature (Bushee (1998); Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013)) doc-
uments that among all different types of institutional investors, dedicated investors are
important in terms of encouraging R&D investment and fostering innovation. The ratio be-
tween ConHold(broad) and dedicated institutional holdings in the sub-sample with positive
CONNECTED(narrow) holdings is about 62.8%. And the ratio between ConHold(narrow)
and dedicated institutional holdings is about 6.7%. So connected holdings constitute a siz-
able fraction of the dedicated holdings. In the following sections, without special notice, all
the connected holdings are ConHold(narrow).
[INSERT TABLE A.5 HERE]
1.3. Empirical Strategy
1.3.1. Specification
To explore the relationship between connected holdings and innovation, my baseline speci-
fication is as follows:
yi,t = α+ βConHoldi,t +X
′
i,tγ + ηi + µt + Ui,j,t + i,t, (1.2)
where the indices i, j, and t correspond to the firm, the university, and the year, respectively.
yi,t is various measures of innovation for firm i in year t. ConHoldi,t is the fraction of the
firm’s equity held by connected mutual funds as defined in equation (1.1). X ′i,t is a vector
of firm and industry control variables that may affect a firm’s innovation output. ηi is firm
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fixed effects. µt is the time fixed effects, and Ui,j,t is a vector of dummies for each university
in my sample. It equals 1 if one of the board members from firm i graduated from university
j at time t. I cluster standard errors at the firm level. The appendix examines the other
specifications, such as the Poisson model.
1.3.2. Identification
To establish the causal link between connected holdings (the proxy for social capital of
the firm) and innovation is challenging. There are two selection issues. The first one is
the endogenously chosen level of connected holdings. Connected mutual funds might select
firms in which to invest based on the information observable to them, but not to me, the
econometrician. An omitted factor could be the quality of inventors at the firm, the long-
term innovation plan, or the prototype of some unpatented inventions. Such factors clearly
affect innovation and are correlated with connected holdings. Apparently, constructing
direct measures of those factors is difficult. But without the appropriate control, my results
will be biased.
The second selection issue is that the educational network could be endogenous. People
often self-select into groups (Manski (1993); Angrist and Pischke (2008)). In my setting,
mutual fund managers and corporate officers might choose to attend a university based on
characteristics that are unobservable to the econometrician. For example, the average risk
appetite of Harvard graduates might be different from that of Stanford graduates. And
those unobserved characteristics might affect the connected holdings and the innovation
and, in doing so, would cause omitted variable bias.
To tackle the first selection issue, I use an instrumental variable (IV) method. To address
the second issue, I include university fixed effects as a control. I will first discuss the IV
method, and in the exclusion section of my IV method, I discuss the importance of using
university fixed effects and how they address the second selection issue.
My IV is the total number of connected mutual fund managers to the firm (including mutual
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funds that do not hold shares in the firm). More specifically, it is defined as follows: in
each year, for each firm in my sample, I count the number of mutual fund managers who
are “active” (i.e., working) and connected to the firm through an educational link. In the
following two subsections, I discuss the necessary assumptions that need to hold for the
instrument to be valid.
1.3.2.1. Relevance Condition
For the instrument to be valid, it must strongly affect connected holdings. This point has
been partially established in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008). There, the authors show
that mutual fund managers place larger bets on connected firms. Everything else equal, a
firm with more connected mutual fund managers should have higher connected holdings.
To formally test the relevance condition, I estimate the following first-stage regression:
ConHoldi,t = δzi,t +X
′
i,tγ + ηi + µt + Ui,j,t + i,t, (1.3)
where zi,t stands for the number of mutual fund managers connected to firm i at time
t. For the IV to be valid, we need δ 6= 0. In Table 1.1, I show the first-stage results.
I find that the coefficient of the number of connected mutual fund managers is positive
and significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic equals 48.44 and exceeds the threshold
of F = 10, suggesting that the instrument is strong (Stock and Yogo (2005)).10 Using
results from column 2, I show that an increase of one standard deviation in the number of
connected mutual fund managers translates into an about 0.28-standard-deviation increase
in CONNECTED(narrow) holdings. For robustness, I also check the first-stage regression
for CONNECTED(broad). The results are similar.
[INSERT TABLE 1.1 HERE]
10Here, since I assume that the error term  is allowed to be correlated within cluster, the standard
Cragg-Donald-based weak instrument test is no longer valid. Instead, I report the corresponding robust
Kleibergen-Paap-Wald rank F-statistic. For more details, refer to Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
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1.3.2.2. Exclusion Condition
The instrument not only needs to affect connected holdings, but importantly, it must satisfy
the exclusion restriction. That is, it should be uncorrelated with the residual in equation
(1.2). In other words, the instrument should influence the outcomes of firm-level innovation
only through its effect on connected holdings. To validate the exclusion condition, I check
the following dimensions:
Endogenous Choice of University Does Not Affect Time-Series Change in IV
The network used in this paper is based on the institutions that corporate officers and
mutual fund managers both attended. There is a concern that agents (CEO or mutual
fund managers) endogenously choose to attend a university based on unobserved charac-
teristics. And those unobserved characteristics will be correlated with my instrumental
variables, subsequently biasing my results (omitted variable bias). In this section, I ana-
lyze this possibility and show how to use university fixed effects to control for unobserved
characteristics.
In my setting, my IV is the total number of mutual fund managers who are connected to the
firm’s board members. A connection is defined as people who attend the same university at
the same time to obtain the same type of degree. Along three dimensions that determine
connections, university choice is the one most likely to be endogenous.11 From now on, I
will focus on the endogeneity problem induced by the agent’s choice of the university.
Assume the true data-generating process for firm-level innovation is as follows:
yi,t = α+ βConHoldi,t +X
′
i,tγ + ηi + µt +
−→
λ i,t + i,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
ui,t
,
where all the other variables share the same definition used in Section 1.3.1.
−→
λ i,t is a vector
11I admit that the choice to attend university in a specific year also might be endogenous. But the time
fixed effects should be able to control for this concern.
17
that includes all the individual fixed effects for the board members for firm i at time t. In
the simplest case, suppose there is only one CEO on the board. Then
−→
λ i,t is equal to the
CEO’s individual fixed effects. Notice that if, throughout the sample, the firm has only that
CEO, then the firm fixed effects and
−→
λ i,t cannot be separately identified, because there is
no time variation in either variable at the firm level. But if the firm replaces their CEO
at some time, then
−→
λ i,t captures the CEO’s fixed effects at the corresponding periods. We
can generate it to multiple person’s case. i,t is an error term that is uncorrelated with any
regressors. I denote
−→
λ i,t + i,t as the composite error ui,t that could be correlated with my
IV.
The instrumental variable I used is the total number of mutual fund managers who are
connected to firm i at time t. To make the IV invalid, we should have
E[zi,t · ui,t] = E[zi,t · (−→λ i,t + i,t)]
= E[zi,t · −→λ i,t]
6= 0,
where the second equality comes from the fact that i,t is an error term that is uncorrelated
with any regressors. Because of the way zi,t is constructed, the only possible way
−→
λ i,t is
correlated with zi,t must be the endogenous choice of universities of the board members
based on
−→
λ i,t. But
−→
λ i,t, at most, should be correlated with zi,t, which is the sum of
the average network size for each network of the board member. In other words, the
manager’s individual fixed effects might affect his or her choice to attend Harvard University
versus Stanford University. This could affect his or her average network size . But these
individual fixed effects should be uncorrelated with the time-series variation of the network
size. In other words, the CEO’s individual fixed effects could not affect how many mutual
fund managers are currently working in the mutual fund industry at any period in time.
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I should find that (zi,t − zi,t) is uncorrelated with −→λ i,t. The proof is as follows: given
E[(zi,t − zi,t)|−→λ i,t] = 0 because (zi,t) is the mean of zi,t.
E[(zi,t − zi,t)|−→λ i,t] = E[E[(zi,t − zi,t) · −→λ i,t|−→λ i,t]]
= E[
−→
λ i,tE[(zi,t − zi,t) · −→λ i,t]]
= E[
−→
λ i,t · 0]
= 0
This shows that the demeaned instrument is uncorrelated with the individual unobserved
characteristics. The university fixed effects could capture this demeaning effect. I create
a full set of dummies for each university and set it to 1 if any company officer receives a
degree from this university.
Board Members Cannot Affect Mutual Fund Manager’s Career In the last sec-
tion, I argue that the board members’ individual fixed effects will not affect the time-series
change in the number of connected mutual fund managers after controlling for the university
fixed effects. But if board members could affect the career path of the mutual fund man-
ager, then this point could invalidate my IV. For example, board members could lengthen
the tenure of connected mutual fund managers by feeding them insider information. I check
this story by investigating the relationship between fund manager’s termination and their
connectedness. In the appendix, I provide the results. There is no statistically significant
relationship between fund manager’s connectedness (defined as the number of board mem-
ber connections) and their termination (defined as not working in the current fund in the
next year). The potential reason is that, usually, fund managers don’t hold a lot of equity
from connected firms because of the diversification restriction imposed by the fund family.
So even if they could profit from connected holdings, those outperformances only marginally
contribute to their total performances.
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Dynamic Formation of Network Might Not Exist Agents might form social ties
in anticipation of future economic benefits (Manski (1993)). If the links are dynamically
formed (Jackson (2010)), then there could be an endogenity problem. For example, assume
the mutual fund manager A wants to know more information about firm F. And fund
manager A endogenously formed a link with firm F through CEO B. If this sort of thing
happens in the data, then the IV (the number of connected mutual fund managers) could
be possibly driven by the profitability of the firm, a finding that could be correlated with
both the IV and the innovation. But according to my network definition, this scenario is
not possible because whether A and B attended the same school for the same degree at
the same year is determined many years in the past. To investigate this point, I check the
age distribution for the company officers and the mutual fund managers. In my data, the
median age for the fund manager and company officers is 45 and 54, respectively. Most
likely, they have passed the age for education. This evidence rules out the story that maybe
a mutual fund manager or a company officer would endogenously choose their education to
form the link.
[INSERT TABLE A.5 HERE]
1.4. Result
In this section, I examine the impacts of connected holdings on firm innovation using the
instrumental variable approach described in Section 1.3.2. Throughout all specifications, I
control for firm, year, and university fixed effects. I also control for the following variables:
log sales, firm age, asset tangibility, leverage, Tobin’s Q, ROA, and investment rate. Table
A.1 provides the variable definitions.
1.4.1. Innovation Output
In this section, I examine the relationship between connected holdings and various measures
of innovation outcomes. In brief, I use three sets of dependent variables to measure the
outcome of innovation: (1) the total granted patents for a firm in a given year; (2) the total
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number of citations received by those patents; and (3) the value created by those patents
for the firm as measured by KPSS.12
Table 1.2 reports the results. I find a statistically significant positive relationship between
connected holdings and various measures of innovation output. With more connected hold-
ings, firms produce more patents and these patents receive more citations. Meanwhile, more
firm value is created by these patents. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard-
deviation increase in connected holdings causes a 10.61% (= (42.46 × 0.0025 × 100)%) in-
crease in the number of patents generated by the firm, a 14.86% (= (59.47×0.0025×100)%)
increase in the number of citations, and a 2.21% increase in the firm value created by the
patents. To put those results into perspective, a 10.61% increase in the number of patents
for the average firm is equal to 6 more patents. And a 2.21% increase in firm value for the
average firm is equal to 23 millions dollars (= 2.21%× 1, 089).
[INSERT TABLE 1.2 HERE]
1.4.1.1. Innovative Industries versus the Rest
Innovations do not equally spread across industries.13 Connected holdings could potentially
have heterogeneous impacts on firms in different industries. I split my sample into two
groups by innovativeness. To begin with, I use Fama-French 12 industry categorization. For
the high innovation group, I pick the Business Equipment industry, which covers Computers,
Software, and Electronic Equipment. I also pick the health care industry because this
industry traditionally puts more emphasis into inventions (think about all the new drugs).
I put the remaining industries into the low innovation group. I find that for the high
innovation group, the impact of connected holdings is much more pronounced. For patent
12For detailed variable definitions, see Table A.1.
13According to Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017), “developments in computing and
telecommunication have brought about the latest wave of technological progress in the 1990s and 2000s,
which coincides with the high values of our measure. In particular, it is argued that this is a period when in-
novations in telecommunications and computer networking spawned a vast computer hardware and software
industry and revolutionized the way many industries operate. We find that firms that are main contributors
to our measure belong to these sectors with firms such as Sun Microsystems, Oracle, EMC, Dell, Intel, IBM,
AT&T, Cisco, Microsoft and Apple being the leaders of the pack.”
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applications, the coefficient doubled, and for patent citations, the coefficient tripled. This
means that the connected holdings are much more important for the innovation process
in the industry in which innovation is important. One way to interpret this result is that
the firms in the high innovation group might be more constrained. When they have more
support, they are more free to innovate. But for the firms in the low innovation group,
the incentive to innovate is low. So even if the firms have more connected holdings, the
production of innovation still could be low. In an untabulated table, I repeat this above
analysis using the Fama-French 30-industry portfolio, and the results are quantitatively
similar.
[INSERT TABLE 1.3 HERE]
1.4.1.2. Active Funds versus Closet Indexers
In the previous sections, I examine the impact of total connected holdings on innovation.
However, there exists significant heterogeneity across the fund types, that is, active funds
versus passive funds. Active funds can influence firms’ behaviors through their actions in
the public equity market, for instance, investment and divestment (Edmans (2009)). Passive
funds don’t have the divest option. They mainly influence firms through the “voice” channel
(Levit and Malenko (2011), Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016)).
In terms of passive funds, there are mainly two types: (1) “true” passive funds (their goals
are to replicate some existing indexes, e.g., S&P 500 Index Funds.) and (2) closet indexers
(they don’t claim they are index funds, but their investment styles are similar to those of
index funds). I first check the presence of index funds in my sample by mainly focusing on
the number and total asset management. Table A.17 in the appendix provides the results.
Because MFLINKS from WRDS mainly focus on matching active funds between CRSP and
the Thomson Reuters dataset, there are very few index funds in my sample. In terms of
fund numbers, the time-series average of passive funds is below 3%. In terms of total AUM,
the time-series average of passive funds is below 2%. So within passive funds, I focus on
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closet indexers.
Currently, there is no universal way to detect closet indexers. Cremers and Petajisto (2009)
argue that a fund with active shares between 20% and 60% are more likely to be a closet
indexer.14 I choose the cut-off as 50%; that is, I label the funds with active shares lower
than 50% as closet indexers. The time-series average of the AUM of closet indexers versus
the total AUM in the data is 7.27%.
I redo the analysis regarding innovation by including both active funds’ connected holdings
and closet indexers’ connected holdings:
yi,t = α+ β1ConHold
a
i,t + β2ConHold
c
i,t +X
′
i,tγ + ηi + µt + Ui,j,t + i,t,
where ConHoldai,t is the connected holdings for firm i in year t from active funds, and
ConHoldci,t is the connected holdings from closet indexers. All the other variable definitions
are similar to those in the main specification in equation (1.2). The instrumental variable
for ConHoldai,t is the connected mutual fund managers for firm i in year t from active funds,
and the instrumental variable for ConHoldci,t is the connected mutual fund managers for
firm i in year t from closet indexers.
Table 1.4 reports the results. I find that the impact of connected holdings mainly comes from
active funds instead of closet indexers. This result is similar to that of Aghion, Van Reenen,
and Zingales (2013), who find quasi-indexed institutional investors have no impact on firms
innovation. This result indicates that, quantitatively, active funds exert more impacts on
firm’s innovation policy than passive funds.
[INSERT TABLE 1.4 HERE]
14Active shares are the shares of portfolio holdings of a fund that differ from benchmark index holdings.
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1.4.2. Innovation Input
Potentially, there could be two factors contributing to the increase in innovation outcomes
following an increase in connected holdings. Connected holdings cause (1) an increase
in innovation input (i.e., R&D expenditure increases) and (2) an increase in innovation
efficiency (i.e., patents per R&D dollar). There are three sets of combined reasons to
explain the increases in innovation outcomes: (1) an increase in input, but a decrease or no
effect in efficiency; (2) an increase in efficiency, but a decrease or no effect in input; and (3)
both an increase in efficiency and in input.
It has long been recognized that input into R&D matters for the production of patents
(Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984)). Because of the skewness of R&D, I take the natural
logarithm of R&D expenditure. There are two problems with the R&D data: (1) because
of firms’ incentives to disguise their behaviors, a lot of firms choose not to report R&D.
In Compustat, they are missing numbers. I drop these observations.15 And (2) for some
observations, the value of R&D is zero. After calculating the natural logarithm, these values
become missing values. I take two approaches: (1) I drop the observations with missing
values (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) also takes this approach), and (2) to avoid
losing observations, I add one to the actual values before calculating the natural logarithm.
I denote those cases as (LnR˜&D).
In Table 1.5, I report the results. In columns (1) and (3), I report the baseline results. I find a
statistically significant positive relation between connected holdings and firm’s investment in
R&D. In columns (2) and (4), after controlling for the university fixed effects, the coefficients
are still significant and only marginally decrease in magnitude. The results are robust to
using either LnR&D or LnR˜&D. Since I use a log-level specification, the interpretation of
the coefficient is semi-elasticity. A one-standard-deviation increase in connected holdings
leads to a 12.61% (= (50.46 × 0.0025 × 100)%) increase in firms’ R&D expenditure. This
15In an unreported analysis, I replace all the missing values for R&D with zero, since my sample is
post-FASB 1975 R&D reporting requirement. The results are quantitatively similar.
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increase is economically sizable. To put the results in context, the average annual growth
rate of R&D in my sample is 21.37%. So the increase in R&D for the firm that experiences
a one-standard-deviation increase in connected holdings is about 59% of it.
To explore an interesting question about how persistent these impacts are, I relate R&D
expenditure in the next 2 years (R&D in year t + 2, not the cumulative R&D from year t
to year t + 2) to connected holdings. And I find a positive significant result. This means
that the connected holdings have a long-term impact on the firm’s R&D policy. And those
long-term impacts align with the long-term project feature of the innovation process, which
could lead to more innovation.
[INSERT TABLE 1.5 HERE]
1.4.3. Innovation Efficiency
In this section, I check for innovation efficiency. The null hypothesis is that connected
holdings have no impact on innovation efficiency. There are two alternative hypotheses.
Hypothesis A1: Connected holdings encourage management to take on more risk. This does
not mean that management takes on the risk in a discrete way. They could invest in a lot of
projects, both promising and unpromising ones. Doing so leads to a decrease in innovation
efficiency.
Hypothesis A2: Connected mutual fund managers provide useful information to manage-
ment regarding innovation. Doing so could induce management to pick the right projects.
In this case, innovation efficiency increases.
I construct three proxies for innovation efficiency: The first measure is the ratio between
total patents and R&D expenditures. The second measure is the ratio between citations and
R&D expenditures. The third measure is the ratio between KPSS and R&D expenditures.
Following Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013), I define innovation efficiency (IE) in the following
way:
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IEi,t =
Innovationi,t
(R&Di,t + 0.8×R&Di,t−1 + 0.6×R&Di,t−2 + 0.4×R&Di,t−3 + 0.2×R&Di,t−4) ,
where the numerator is the total number of patents, the total number of citations, and
the value created by patents (KPSS) for firm i in year t. The denominator is R&D capital,
which is the 5-year cumulative R&D expenses, assuming an annual depreciation rate of 20%
like in Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013).
Table 1.6 reports the results. There is no statistically significant relationship between
connected holdings and the first two measures of innovation efficiency: patents granted
scaled by R&D capital and the total number of citations scaled by R&D capital. But
there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between connected holdings and
the value created by patents scaled by R&D capital. The results are mixed. To draw a
conservative conclusion, connected holdings don’t improve firms’ innovation efficiency . So
the observed increases in innovation outcomes are mainly due to more input into innovation.
[INSERT TABLE 1.6 HERE]
1.4.4. Patent Natures
Connected holdings might potentially affect the nature of the patent. I check the impact
of connected holdings on the properties of the patents. Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe
(1997) develop the originality and generality measures based on the distribution of citations.
A patent that cites diversified technological classes of patents is viewed as more original.
On the other hand, a patent that is cited by diversified technologically classes is viewed as
more general.
I find that the generality of patents increases when there are more connected holdings. This
means that the patents produced by the firms are cited by patents coming from different
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technological classes. This evidence is consistent with the higher citation results.
[INSERT TABLE 1.7 HERE]
1.4.5. Real Outcomes
Numerous endogenous growth models imply that firm growth is related to innovation. Since
results in the previous sections demonstrate that connected holdings cause an increase
in innovation, here I explore whether connected holdings can lead to firm growth. One
important caveat is that innovation doesn’t have to be the only channel through which
connected holdings affect firm’s growth. Connected holdings might affect the cost of capital
of the firm or the firm’s contracting environment. But it is still interesting to investigate
whether, besides innovation, connected holdings affect firm’s growth?
I focus on growth of (a) profits, (b) the nominal value of output, and (c) the number of
employees. I estimate the following specification:
logYi,t+τ − logYi,t = α+ βConHoldi,t +X ′i,tγ + ηi + µt + Ui,j,t + i,t, (1.4)
where all the variables on the right-hand side are the same as those in the main specification
equation (1.2). τ is the length of the horizon. Here, I explore τ = 1, 3, 5.
Table 1.8 reports the results. I find that future firm growth is strongly related to connected
holdings. This result is related to Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017). Lins, Servaes, and
Tamayo (2017) measure firm social capital by corporate social responsibility (CSR) intensity.
They find that during a crisis, high-CSR firms experience higher profitability, growth, and
sales per employee relative to low- CSR firms. Here, my finding shows that for a given firm
that has more connected holdings, another measure of social capital, they also have higher
profit growth, output growth, and employment growth. The results show that connected
holdings are, in general, good for the firm.
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[INSERT TABLE 1.8 HERE]
1.4.6. Robustness
1.4.6.1. Alternative Specification
The patent applications and patent citations for a firm in a certain year are count data, in
other words, non-negative integers. To explain count data, linear models have shortcomings:
the predicted value of a linear model might be negative, whereas the dependent variable
is always positive. For count data, in the literature, people also use a Poisson regression
model. My Poisson model specification is as follows:
E(yi,t|xi,t) = exp(βConHoldi,t +X ′i,tγ + ηi + µt + i,t). (1.5)
Different assumptions about the error term will generate alternative estimators even though
equation (1.5) remains the same. A Poisson model assumes the mean equals the variance,
but I also consider alternatives, such as a negative binomial regression.
Following Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), I implement the instrumental variable
estimator by using the control function approach for the Poisson regression models. For
details, please see the appendix.
Table A.6 reports the results. The results are qualitatively similar. Connected holdings
lead to more innovation as measured by patents granted and patent citations.
1.4.6.2. Only Focus on the Senior Management
For all the previous analysis, I include all board members. If I restrict my attention to only
top management team (defined as CEO, CFO, COO, CTO, and Chairman), do the results
hold? Table A.8 reports the results. Comparing columns (1) to (3) with (4) to (6), it is
clear that the results are quantitatively similar.
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1.4.6.3. Dot-Com Bubble
I explore whether the results are mostly driven by the Internet bubble, since, in those years,
the number of patents jumped. Meanwhile, it is the latter part of my sample, so there are
more connected holdings (because more people in my data became CEO or a mutual fund
manager). So all the results potentially could be driven by those years. Following the
literature, I define the Dot-com bubble years as those from 1999 to 2003. I rerun some of
the regressions in the two sub-periods (1980 to 1998 and 1999 to 2003), and the results (in
untabulated table) are both positive and statistically significant.
1.4.6.4. Management Ownership
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) demonstrate that management ownership affects the
market valuation of the firm. Innovation, as an important constitute of firm value, might also
be influenced by management ownership. Meanwhile, management ownership might also be
correlated with connected holdings. To avoid omitted variable bias, I include management
ownership as a control variable. I gather management ownership data from the Execucomp
Annual Compensation dataset. I construct two measures for management ownership: (1)
total ownership by all directors and (2) ownership by CEO. Ownership is defined as the
ratio between the shares owned by management and the total shares outstanding.
I include the two additional control variables in the main regression with the total number
of patents as the dependent variable. In untabulated tables, I find that the coefficients of
connected holdings are still positively statistically significant. And management ownership
is also positively statistically significant. These results show that management ownership
also matters for innovation.
1.4.6.5. Are Connected Mutual Funds Local Investors?
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) document that local investors have an informational advantage
in trading local firms. If all the connected holdings are also local holdings, then it is difficult
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to argue that it is the connected mutual fund managers, instead of the local mutual fund
managers, who affect the firm’s innovation .
To address this concern, I first compute the localness of the holdings. I obtain the head-
quarters’ ZIP codes for mutual funds using the CRSP Mutual Fund dataset from WRDS.
I obtain the corporate headquarters’ ZIP codes from Compustat. I obtain the mapping be-
tween ZIP codes and the corresponding latitude and longitude information from the United
States Postal Service (USPS). The location of headquarters is used as opposed to the state
of incorporation for the simple reason that firms tend to incorporate in a state with favor-
able tax, bankruptcy, and takeover laws, rather than for operational reasons, and typically
do not have the majority of their operations in their state of incorporation. I use ’Haver-
sine’ formula to calculate the great-circle distance between two points-that is, the shortest
distance over the earth’s surface.
d = 2R arctan 2
(√
a,
√
(1− a)
)
a = sin2
(
lat2 − lat1
360pi
)
+ cos
(
lat2
180pi
)
cos
(
lat1
180pi
)
sin2
(
lon2 − lon1
360pi
)
,
where d is the distance between two coordinates. R is the earth’s radius, equals 6,371 km.
lat stands for the latitude, whereas lon stands for the longitude. The subscripts {1, 2} stand
for the places.
[INSERT FIGURE A.4 HERE]
In the data, among all the connected holdings, the local holdings (i.e., a distance of less
than 100 km between firms and funds) compose about 9.8%. The distant holdings compose
the remaining 90.2%. Next, I repeat the main analysis with the distant connected holdings,
and all the results are quantitatively similar.
30
1.5. Potential Mechanisms
The empirical findings thus far show that more connected holdings lead to more input in
R&D and more innovation output, and those effects are stronger in the more innovative
industries.
In this section, I discuss several potential explanations for my findings. Since social cap-
ital, as measured by connected holdings, might affect multiple dimensions of the firm, all
potential stories may co-exist. I focus on three such explanations. First, the literature on
corporate short-termism argues that short-term capital market pressure could be detrimen-
tal to innovation (Holmstro¨m (1989), Stein (1989), and Terry (2016)). I check the impacts of
connected holdings on capital market pressures. Second, Manso (2011) predicts that higher
job security enables management to take on more innovative projects. Firm exposure to
a takeover could be a major job risk to management. I explore the relationship between
connected holdings and takeover risks. Third, besides capital market and corporate control
market, I investigate the behavior of connected mutual funds in the corporate governance
market, especially voting behaviors. If connected funds are more likely to vote in favor of
management, this could ease management’s plan in pursuing innovative plans for the firm.
1.5.1. Capital Market Pressures
1.5.1.1. Hypotheses Development
Earning targets matter a lot to the firm. Each fiscal period, public firms must disclose their
earnings. Before a disclosure, financial analysts forecast the earnings and the financial press
widely reports a consensus forecast for a given firm. This consensus forecast (or earnings
target) works as an externally set performance benchmark for the firm. Whether firms
beat, maintain, or miss the earnings target matters a lot. Actually, around 90% of surveyed
U.S. executives report pressure to meet short-term earnings targets (Graham, Harvey, and
Rajgopal (2005)). But why would management care so much about those earnings targets?
Previous research (Kasznik and McNichols (2002); Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002)) demon-
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strates that missing quarterly earnings benchmarks leads to significantly lower abnormal
returns (quarterly and annual). And because of management’s stock-based compensation
scheme, low stock returns have a significant impact on management’s compensations.
How does meeting an earnings target matter for innovation? The previous literature shows
that firms sacrifice their long-term investments, such as R&D, to meet the short-term earn-
ings targets. It is because the benefits of R&D appear much later, whereas the costs show
up in the current quarter through lower earnings. Almost half of surveyed U.S. executives
report that they would prefer to reject a positive net present value project over missing
their analyst target (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). The opportunistic cuts to
meet short-term targets can be detrimental to innovation.
The role of institutional investors in creating short-termism is mixed. Some institutional
investors might exuberate to the managerial myopia behavior because the institutional
investors will dump a company’s stock as soon as its earnings are not quite up to par (Stein
(1988)). Divestments encourage management to meet targets. However, I hypothesize that
the connected mutual fund managers should behave differently. The social capital between
the connected mutual fund managers and the firm’s management should encourage the
connected mutual fund managers to stay with the firm through adverse situations. So,
in this section, I examine the investment behavior of connected mutual funds versus non-
connected institutional investors following a missed earnings target.
1.5.1.2. Trading Behaviors
Utilizing the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (IBES) dataset, I document two new
stylized facts: (1) when a firm misses its earnings expectations, connected mutual funds
stay, whereas non-connected institutional investors divest. (2) Compared with firms with
no connected holdings, firms with connected holding see their returns drop less.
My data on analysts’ forecasts come from the IBES database. I focus on the quarterly
earnings forecasts because it is widely studied in the finance and accounting literature.
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Following the literature, I define an earnings surprise as:
ESi,t = EPSi,t −median{EPSfi,k,t},
where i indexes firm, t indexes time, and k indexes analyst. EPSi,t stands for the realized
earnings per share. EPSfi,k,t is the forecast made by analyst k for firm i quarter t’s earning.
median{EPSfi,k,t} serves as the consensus forecast for all the analysts.
First, I examine the trading behaviors of connected mutual funds and non-connected funds.
To investigate the trading behaviors of different types of investors, I follow a standard
event-study methodology. I define trading as the change in the fraction of firm equity from
quarter t− 1 to quarter t. For connected holdings, it is
T ci,t = ConHoldi,t − ConHoldi,t−1.
For non-connected institutional holdings, it is
Tnci,t = nonConHoldi,t − nonConHoldi,t−1.
For the difference between connected holdings and non-connected institutional Holdings, it
is
T diffi,t = (ConHoldi,t − nonConHoldi,t)− (ConHoldi,t−1 − nonConHoldi,t−1).
My empirical specification is
yi,t = MISSi,t−1 + γX ′i,t−1 + ηj + µt + i,t,
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where y stands for trading by different types of investors and the difference between con-
nected holdings and non-connected holdings. MISSi,t−1 is a dummy variable that equals
1 if firms miss their quarterly earnings target (i.e., ESi,t−1 < 0). X ′i,t−1 is a vector of con-
trol variables that includes firm size, book-to-market ratio, and lagged 12 month returns.
ηj stands for industry fixed effects. µt stands for time fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. Table 1.9 presents the results. I find that missing the earnings
target triggers a sell off from non-connected institutional investors. The average magnitude
is 35 basis points and is statistically significant. For the connected mutual funds, there is
no evidence that their trading is affected by these events. And, as a natural result, for the
difference between connected holdings and non-connected holdings, the gap becomes wider
after firms miss their earning targets. The above evidence shows that after firms miss their
earning targets, connected holdings stay and non-connected holdings divest. The results
are robust when controlling for firm-level characteristics, as well as time and industry fixed
effects.
[INSERT TABLE 1.9 HERE]
1.5.1.3. Return Behaviors
The previous section demonstrates that connected holdings are “loyal” to the firm when bad
shocks are realized. In this section, I investigate whether connected holdings can actually
alleviate the drop in stock price when firms miss their earnings target.
My empirical specification is as follows:
yi,t = α+MISSi,t +AnyConi,t +MISSi,t ×AnyConi,t + i,t,
where y stands for the next month’s abnormal returns estimated by the following models:
CAPM, the Fama-French 3-factor model, the Fama-French-Carhart model, the Fama-French
5-factor model, and the characteristics- adjusted model (DGTW).
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The variable of interest is the interaction term MISSi,t × AnyConi,t, which captures the
cross-sectional difference between the firm with connected holdings versus the firm without
connected holdings conditioned on firms experiencing a negative earnings surprise.
Table 1.10 presents the result. It is clear that across all kinds of measures of the abnormal
return, the coefficient in front of the interaction term is greater than 0. This means that
the firms’ return drops less when they are invested with connected holdings. The evidence
supports the argument that the presence of connected holdings could actually alleviate the
price drop when firms miss the earnings target.
[INSERT TABLE 1.10 HERE]
1.5.2. Management Job Security and Takeover Exposure
In the last section, I show that missed earnings targets lead to lower subsequent stock
returns, possibly leading to a reduction in management’s compensation. Another risk as-
sociated with missed earnings targets is takeover risk. Stein (1988) argues that “Relatively
patient stockholders may not be discouraged by a low earnings report; they may attribute
it to a policy of long-term investment by the firm .... Impatient shareholders, on the other
hand, may become very distressed by low earnings reports and may try to dump a stock as
soon as such a report is issued.... managers will be more fearful of undervaluation and the
accompanying possibility of rip-off by a raider”.
Along the chain of reasoning, at its origin, the attitude of the institutional investor is very
important. In the last section, I demonstrate that connected mutual funds are more patient
with the firm. In this section, I examine whether relationships with connected holdings
would lead to lower takeover risk.
I measure the probability of a firm being acquired (i.e., takeover exposure), following Cre-
mers, Nair, and John (2008). I use the expected probability of a firm being acquired instead
of actual takeovers because, according to Stein (1988), it is the threat (or likelihood) of a
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takeover that affects management’s incentives to invest in innovation.
First, I estimate the firm’s takeover exposure by running a logit model:
Targeti,t+1 =
1
1 + e−Ki,t ,
where Ki,t = α+ β1Qi,t + β2PPEAsseti,t + β3LnCashi,t + β4BLOCKi,t + β5LnMVi,t
+ β6IndMAi,t + β7Levi,t + β8ROAi,t + Indj + Y eart + i,t,
where i indexes firm, j indexes industry, and t indexes time. The dependent variable Target
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a target of an acquisition. All the independent
variables are constructed following Cremers, Nair, and John (2008).16 The acquisition data
are obtained from the Securities Data Corporations (SDC) database.
After estimating the model using maximum likelihood, I calculate takeover exposure as the
predicted probability of the model. Next, I use takeover exposure as the dependent variable
in my main specification, like in equation (1.2). I find that connected holdings are statis-
tically negatively associated with takeover exposure. A one-standard- deviation increase in
connected holdings leads to a 0.09 (= −0.8278∗0.0025/0.0222) standard deviation decrease
in takeover exposure. This is economically sizable.
According to Stein (1988), if there is less takeover exposure, there is less incentive for
management to sacrifice long-term investment for short-term gains. So my findings show
that connected holdings could benefit innovation through reducing takeover risk channel.
[INSERT TABLE 1.11 HERE]
16For detailed variable definitions, see the footnote of table 1 in Cremers, Nair, and John (2008).
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1.5.3. Connected Funds’ Voting Behaviors
Voting is an important dimension of corporate governance. To continue exploring the idea
that connected mutual funds are “supportive” of the board members, I examine connected
mutual funds’ voting behaviors. I find that, on average, connected funds are more likely
to vote against shareholder-initiated proposals on various governance issues than are non-
connected funds.
1.5.3.1. Empirical Test
In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced a new rule requiring
mutual funds to report their votes on all shares held. I gather the data from the Institu-
tional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) Voting Analytics database. This database covers U.S.
mutual fund voting records for all institutions filing the SEC N-PX form. It also contains
company vote results. I focus on the period from 2005 to 2011.17 Funds have the option
of voting “for”, “against”, “abstain”, “withhold”, or “do not vote”. To better assess voter
preference, I only focus on the vote with either “for” or “against”.18 Among all the different
types of proposals, I focus on four types of shareholder proposals: (1) requires independent
board chairman; (2) requires a majority vote for the election of directors; (3) amends arti-
cles/bylaws/charter -- calls for special meetings; and (4) restores or provides for cumulative
voting. I choose these proposals for two reasons: (1) the board’s attitude is clear; for
almost all above mentioned proposals, management recommend the shareholders to vote
against it.19 (2) Besides proposals on director election, auditor appointments and executive
compensations, these four types of proposals are the most frequently voted proposals.20 I
17I start with 2005 instead of 2003 because only after 2005 (inclusive) can I reliably merge ISS mutual
fund voting data with the CRSP mutual fund database. The appendix provides the matching methods . I
stop the sample at 2011 because 2010 is the last year in which innovation data are available, and I don’t
want to extend the voting analysis in a fashion that might not be relevant for my main (firm innovation)
results.
18“For” and “against” votes compose 95.07% of all mutual fund votes.
19See the tables in the appendix for management recommendations for these four proposal types.
20For proposals on director election, please check Iliev and Lowry (2014), Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010),
and Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009). For proposals on executive compensation, see Malenko and Shen
(2016) and Butler and Gurun (2012).
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merge the voting dataset with the CRSP mutual fund dataset to obtain the fund’s size,
expense ratio, turnover ratio, and fund family size. For each firm, I obtain the financial
information from CRSP and Compustat. I also obtain institutional holding data from the
Thompson Reuters 13F dataset. Lastly, in each year, I label the fund-firm pair connected
or not according to the connection definition in Section 1.2.4. The final dataset contains
219,040 mutual fund votes that cover 164 public firms on 250 proposals. There are 8,289
different funds voted.
I explore the impact of connectedness between fund and firm on fund voting behavior.
Following the literature, I employ a probit model. Table 1.12 reports the results. The
dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if a mutual fund’s vote is consistent with the
board recommendation and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is Connected(broad).
It is a dummy that equals one if a mutual fund is connected to firm. For a detailed
definition of the connection types, refer to Section 1.2.4. The control variables include ISS
recommendation, firm size, book-to-market ratio, the previous year’s total stock return, fund
size, fund turnover ratio, fund expense ratio, and fund family size. In some specifications, I
also include year and industry fixed effects. To avoid the incidental problem in estimating
non-linear model, I use the Fama-French 12-industry classification instead of the 4-digit SIC
industry. I cluster standard errors at the fund level.
[INSERT TABLE 1.12 HERE]
Column (1) reports the results for the case without a control. There is a significant positive
relationship between connection and support to the management. In column (2), I control
for both firm and fund characteristics, as well as industry and year fixed effects. The con-
nection coefficient becomes larger and more statistically significant. In terms of magnitude,
the marginal effect of Connected(broad) is 6.8% (column (2)). This means that if a fund
is connected with the firm, it is 6.8% more likely to vote with management on shareholder
proposals. In the sample, only 48% of the votes support the management. Holding the
marginal effects fixed, if all the funds are connected, the supporting rate increases by 20%.
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In columns (3) to (6), I split the sample by specific proposals. The coefficient in front
of Connected(broad) is positive and statistically significant for the first three proposals:
requires independent board chairman; requires a majority vote for the election of directors;
and calls for special meetings. But it is not significant for the proposal restores or provides
for cumulative voting.
In the appendix, I also report the results of the impact of connectedness on firm’s “say-on-
pay” proposals in 2011. I find that connected funds, on average, are more likely to vote in
favor of management’s proposals on compensation issues.
1.6. Conclusion
In this paper, I provide evidence that firm-level social capital, as measured by connected
holdings affect innovation. In particular, I find that more connected holdings lead to more
patents, higher patent impacts, and larger firm value as created by the patents. I also
find that the above effects are more pronounced for firms in high-tech industries and for
connected holdings coming from “truly” active funds. I also find that social capital im-
proves innovation outcomes by encouraging investment in R&D. Connected holdings foster
innovation by helping to reduce capital market pressures and to increase management job
security.
This work has many exciting future directions. One would be to investigate how institutional
investors affect other corporate policies, such as investments and capital structures utilizing
the identification strategy developed here. Another would be to investigate the asset pricing
implications of social capital. Third, the current setting could be used as a laboratory to
examine the impacts of different kinds of networks (neighbor networks, club networks,
religion networks, etc.) on corporate real outcomes.
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Table 1.2: Connected Holdings and Innovation
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Ln˜PatApp Ln˜PatCite LnK˜PSS
ConHold 42.26*** 59.47*** 8.83***
(12.83) (22.60) (2.10)
Year FE yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
University FE yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes
R-squared 0.84 0.77 0.59
Observations 110,663 110,663 110,663
This table reports the results of regressions of the innovation outcomes on connected hold-
ings and other control variables. Table A.1 provides variable definitions. Control variables
include annual institutional holdings, log sale, log firm age, R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, lever-
age, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. University FE are defined in Section 1.3.2.2. The estimated
model is two-stage least-squares model with firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors were calculated and are provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Disaggregating Industry: High-Tech Industry versus the Rest
High-tech industry Non-high-tech industry
Dependent Variable Ln˜PatApp Ln˜PatCite Ln˜PatApp Ln˜PatCite
ConHold 101.55*** 172.97** 28.29** 31.83
(37.88) (70.29) (11.62) (20.27)
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
University FE yes yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.79 0.71 0.86 0.80
Observations 35,534 35,534 75,126 75,126
This table reports regressions of the innovation outcome on connected holdings for high-tech
industries and the remaining industries. In this table, I use the Fama-French 12-industry
categorization. The high-tech industry contains: the Fama-French Industry 6 industry clas-
sification (Business Equipment -- Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment) and the
Fama-French 10-industry classification (Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs). Table
A.1 provides variable definitions. Control variables include annual institutional holdings,
log sale, log firm age, R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, leverage, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. Uni-
versity FE are defined in Section 1.3.2.2. The estimated model is a two-stage least-squares
model with firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors were calculated and are
provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
42
Table 1.4: Disaggregating Fund Type: Active versus Closet Indexers
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Ln˜PatApp Ln˜PatCite LnK˜PSS
ConHold of active funds 51.85*** 77.10*** 12.06***
(16.53) (28.56) (3.09)
ConHold of closet indexers -9.97 -196.05 -94.43**
(204.76) (386.82) (43.55)
Year FE yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
University FE yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes
R-squared 0.84 0.77 0.55
Observations 110,663 110,663 110,663
This table reports regressions of the innovation outcomes on different types of connected
holdings and other control variables. Active funds are those funds with active share higher
than 0.5. Closet indexers are those funds with active shares lower than 0.5. For the definition
of active share, please refer to Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Table A.1 provides variable
definitions. Control variables include annual institutional holdings, log sale, log firm age,
R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, leverage, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. University FE are defined
in 1.3.2.2. The estimated model is a two-stage least-squares model with firm and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors were calculated and are provided in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Connected Holdings and Innovation Efficiency
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Patent/RD Citation/RD KPSS/RD
ConHold 1.96 7.00 20.82***
(2.43) (9.41) (7.31)
Year FE yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
University FE yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes
R-squared 0.41 0.55 0.62
Observations 110,663 110,663 110,663
This table reports the results of regressions of the innovation efficiency. Definitions of
dependent variables can be found in section 1.4.3. Table A.1 provides variable definitions.
Control variables include annual institutional holdings, log sale, log firm age, PPE/Asset,
leverage, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. The estimated model is a two-stage least-squares
model with firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors were calculated and are
provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Table 1.7: Connected Holdings and Patent Nature
Dependent variable Originality Generality
ConHold 1.21 4.37*
(2.29) (2.42)
Year FE yes yes
Firm FE yes yes
University FE yes yes
Control variables yes yes
R-squared 0.41 0.44
Observations 24,927 23,456
This table reports regressions of the patent Originality and Generality on connected holdings
and other control variables. Table A.1 provides variable definitions. Control variables are:
annual institutional holdings, log sale, log firm age, R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, leverage, Q,
ROA, CAPX/Asset. University FE are defined in Section 1.3.2.2. The estimated model
is a two-stage least squares with firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors were
calculated and are provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Connected Holdings and Firm Growth
Panel A: Profit
τ = 1 τ = 3 τ = 5
5.57 8.70 6.74
(3.55) (3.08) (2.45)
Panel B: Output
τ = 1 τ = 3 τ = 5
5.93 8.17 5.89
(4.14) (3.31) (2.41)
Panel C: Employment
τ = 1 τ = 3 τ = 5
3.23 6.63 5.75
(2.94) (2.65) (2.11)
This table reports regression results for equation 1.4. The dependent variables are firm
profit growth, sales growth, and employment growth. τ is the length of the horizon, in
unit of years. Table A.1 provides variable definitions. Control variables include annual
institutional holdings, log sale, log firm age, R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, leverage, Q, ROA,
and CAPX/Asset. The estimated model is a two-stage least squares model with firm and
year fixed effects. t-statistics were calculated and are provided in parentheses.
Table 1.9: Trading Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable T c Tnc T diff T diff T diff
MISS -0.1359 -35.03*** 34.89*** 13.09*** 15.94***
(0.1490) (3.531) (3.537) (3.665) (3.504
Control variables no no no yes yes
Time FE no no no no yes
Industry FE no no no no yes
R-squared 0.0000 0.0008 0.0008 0.0093 0.0998
Observations 127,879 127,879 127,879 107,858 105,964
The dependent variable in column (1) is the quarterly change of connected holdings; in col-
umn (2), it is the quarterly change of non-connected institutional holdings; and, in columns
(3) to (5), it is the difference between the quarterly change of connected holdings and the
quarterly change of non-connected institutional holdings. MISS is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if firms miss their quarterly earnings targets. Control variables include market
cap, book-to-market ratio, and the lagged twelve-month total returns. Industry refers to
the Fama-French 48-industry classification. Coefficients are reported in basis points. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.10: Return Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable αCAPM αFF3 αFFC αFF5 αDGTW
MISS -267.44*** -270.33*** -259.53*** -266.28*** -269.46***
(8.92) (8.44) (8.21) (8.33) (9.28)
AnyCon 14.67 7.66 80.39 0.87 -31.43
(11.69) (11.07) (17.86) (10.98) (11.90)
MISS ×AnyCon 90.59*** 83.70*** 80.39*** 79.57*** 93.63***
(19.58) (18.36) (17.86) (17.92) (19.56)
R-squared 0.0074 0.0083 0.0079 0.0083 0.0081
Observations 147,226 147,226 147,226 147,226 147,226
The dependent variable in columns (1) to (5) is the monthly alpha estimated by the following
models: CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor model, Fama-French-Carhart model, Fama-French
5-factor model, and the characteristics-adjusted model (DGTW). Dependent variables are
in basis points. MISS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firms miss their quarterly
earnings targets. AnyCon is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is positive connected
holdings for firm i in quarter t. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.11: Connected Holdings and Takeover Exposure
Dependent variable Takeover exposure
ConHold -0.8278***
(0.1986)
Year FE yes
Firm FE yes
University FE yes
Control variables yes
R-squared 0.8841
Observations 109,574
The dependent variable is a firm’s takeover exposure. It is computed as the predicted value
of the following logit regression:
Targeti,t+1 = α+ β1Qi,t + β2PPEAsseti,t + β3LnCashi,t + β4BLOCKi,t + β5LnMVi,t
+ β6IndMAi,t + β7Levi,t + β8ROAi,t + Indj + Y eart + i,t.
The specification of the regression is the main specification in the paper and can be found
in Section 1.3.1. ConHold is the annual connected holdings of the firm. Control variables
include annual institutional holdings, log sale, log firm age, R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, lever-
age, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. University FE are defined in Section 1.3.2.2. Standard
errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2 : Marketing Mutual Funds
(with Nikolai Roussanov and Yanhao Wei)
2.1. Introduction
In 2016, active mutual funds in the U.S. managed a total of 11.6 trillion dollars. This
industry’s annual revenue is on the order of $100 billion, with over one third of this
amount representing expenditures on marketing, largely consisting of sales loads and dis-
tribution fees (known as 12b-1 fees). Although the relation between mutual fund size,
performance, and fees has been actively debated in the academic literature (e.g., Berk and
Green (2004), Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2012), Berk
and Van Binsbergen (2015), Pa´stor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015)), the role of marketing
and distribution expenditures in steering investors into particular funds is not fully under-
stood. Positive relationship between funds’ marketing efforts and flows is well-documented
(e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998a), Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005), Gallaher, Kaniel, and
Starks (2006), Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto
(2013)). Yet marketing expenses contribute substantially to total fund costs, thus reducing
returns earned by investors for a given level of fund manager’s skill. Is marketing a purely
wasteful rat race, or does it help imperfectly informed investors find attractive investment
opportunities more easily (as argued, for example, by Stigler (1961))? Does it enable capital
to flow towards more skilled managers or, instead, distort allocation of assets by channeling
them towards underperforming funds?
We start with a benchmark model based on Berk and Green (2004), which describes alloca-
tion of assets to mutual funds by rational investors in a frictionless market. By estimating
the model, we document substantial differences between such an efficient allocation and
the observed distribution of fund size. The vast majority of funds are “too big” relative to
the model and deliver substantially negative abnormal returns to investors, while the top
50
decile of funds are actually smaller than is “efficient,” and thus are able to outperform.1
To explain these differences, we introduce information frictions by generalizing the frame-
work developed by Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) in the context of index funds. We allow
funds’ marketing activities, as well as exogenous characteristics, to affect their inclusion
in the investors’ information sets. In our setting, both the expense ratios (fees paid by
investors) and the marketing/distribution costs (components of these fees related to broker
compensation) are endogenous choices of each fund. By estimating our structural model
we find that marketing expenses are nearly as important as price (i.e., expense ratio) or
performance (i.e., the Bayesian estimate of manager skill based on historical returns) for
explaining the observed variation in fund size. Even though marketing in our model is
informative, and indeed complementary with fund skill, counterfactual analysis indicates
that it reduces welfare due to a positional arm-race that it entails.
We follow Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) and model the impediments to optimal allocation of
capital to mutual funds as a search friction, whereby investors randomly sample and evaluate
funds until deciding to invest in one of the funds drawn. Heterogeneity in search costs faced
by different investors captures the wide variation in financial sophistication (and perhaps
even cognitive ability) required to consider and analyze the different investment alternatives.
This approach is intuitive, at least when applied to retail investors: the task of choosing
among thousands of funds can be daunting even for the most sophisticated individuals, and
far more so for those lacking even basic financial literacy.2 Mutual fund performance is
determined by managerial skill as well as decreasing returns to scale. Investors care about
funds’ expected performance and expense ratios, but must learn about latent fund skill from
past performance. Hence, our model nests Berk and Green (2004) as a limiting special case
where search costs go to zero. Our key innovation is allowing mutual funds to influence
the likelihood of being observed by investors through costly marketing (e.g., via broker
1The bulk of empirical evidence of performance persistence among mutual funds indicates that consistent
underperformance is much more prevalent than outperformance - e.g. Carhart (1997).
2Indeed, Bronnenberg, Dube´, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2015) find that informed retail consumers are less
likely to pay the brand premium that is associated with heavily-marketed products.
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commissions). Thus, mutual funds choose their expense ratios and marketing expenses,
which increase a fund’s probability of being sampled but decrease its profit margin.
We estimate our structural model using data on well-diversified U.S. domestic equity mutual
funds. Our estimation results reveal sizable information frictions in the mutual fund market.
The average investor implicitly incurs a cost of 39 basis points to “sample” an additional
mutual fund. This friction’s magnitude is about 2/3 of the mean annual gross alpha in
our sample. The large magnitude of the estimated search cost is a manifestation of the
asset misallocation problem that we document. The intuition is simple: high search costs
prevent investors from sampling more funds. Less intensive search leads to an inferior
allocation, as many investors are forced to “settle” for high-cost, low-skill funds since it is
too costly for them to search further (in practice, this could mean investors who lack financial
sophistication following a broker’s recommendation without questioning it, consulting other
sources, etc.). In comparison, Hortasu and Syverson (2004) find the mean search cost for
an average S&P 500 index fund investor is between 11 and 20 basis points. This difference
should not be surprising since it is far easier for investors to evaluate index funds (which
are essentially identical in terms of the returns they deliver, at least before fees) than
actively managed funds. It is also possible that the index fund market is dominated by
more sophisticated investors (i.e., those who know to look for them rather than, say, rely
on a recommendation of a broker or financial advisor). Our higher estimated search cost
indicates that asset misallocation problem is more severe in the mutual fund industry as a
whole (including both active funds and passive index funds) than it is within the S&P 500
index fund sector.
Our estimates imply that marketing is relatively useful as a means of increasing fund size.
On average, a one basis point increase in marketing expenses leads to a 1% increase in a
fund’s size. This effect is heterogeneous across funds. For high-skill funds, it amounts to
a 1.15% increase in assets under management, while for low-skill funds it generates only a
0.97% increase. This result is intuitive: since, conditional on being included in an investor’s
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information set, a high-skill fund is more likely to be chosen, such funds benefit more
from a higher probability of being sampled than low-skill funds. We find that marketing
expenses alone can explain 10% of the variation in mutual fund size; this explanatory power
is comparable to both fund manager skill and fund price.
We use our model to quantify the importance of marketing expenses and search costs in
shaping the equilibrium distribution of fund size as well as its impact on investor welfare
via counterfactual experiments. We simulate the impact of preventing funds from doing
any marketing by solving for the equilibrium size distribution and funds’ fees choices using
the estimated model parameters. We find that if the cap on marketing is set to zero, the
mean expense ratio drops from 160 bps in the current equilibrium to 83 bps. Interestingly,
funds lower their expense ratios by more than the original amount of marketing costs. The
observed average marketing cost is 62 bps, but in the no-marketing equilibrium the average
fund price drops by 77 bps. This result indicates that preventing funds from competing on
non-price attributes (such as marketing) significantly intensifies price competition. We also
find the total share of active funds drops from 74% to 68%. This drop is accompanied by
an increase in average fund performance as measured by mean gross alpha. The increase
in alpha is due to the effect of decreasing returns to scale on fund performance. In the
no-marketing equilibrium, the “index fund” takes up the market share lost by active funds.
Total investor welfare increases by 57% in the counterfactual equilibrium. Three factors
contribute to this increase: in the no-marketing equilibrium, (i) active funds are cheaper, (ii)
more investors invest in the passive index fund, (iii) active funds’ alpha is on average higher
due to the decrease in fund size. The increase in investor welfare is substantially greater
than the decline in aggregate mutual fund profits (or even total fee revenue). Thus, in the
aggregate marketing reduces welfare. The reason for this inefficiency is that funds engage
in a wasteful “arms race” as they compete for the same pool of investors via marketing. For
the parameter values that we estimate this effect dominates the positive effect of marketing
(steering investors towards more highly skilled funds), even though in general this need not
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be true in our model.
In order to further understand the large increase in investor welfare, we examine the cross-
section of investor search costs implied by our model. Naturally, high search cost investors
search less and pay higher expense ratios than those with low search costs, while the funds
they invest in have high marketing fees and lower alphas. Comparing investor welfare in
the two equilibria, we show that the bulk of the welfare gain of eliminating marketing is
driven by such high search cost investors. The intuition is simple: these are the investors
who are “stuck” with the worst funds (unless they happen to be lucky to “find” the index
fund or a high-skill active fund). In the no-marketing equilibrium, even the worst funds are
much cheaper than in the current equilibrium. This leads to a significant welfare gain for
the high-search-cost investors.3
In addition, we examine the impact of search costs on equilibrium market outcomes. With
the advancement in information technology and development of services enabling more
transparent comparison between funds, we would expect the search frictions to decrease
over time. We conduct counterfactual experiments where we set the mean search cost to
35 bps and 20 bps respectively. Given a new search cost distribution, funds reoptimize
their prices and marketing expenses. We find that as mean search costs decreases from
39 bps to 35 bps, mean marketing expenses drop from 61 bps to 44 bps. But when mean
search cost further drops to 20 bps, the equilibrium marketing expenses fall to zero, even
though we maintain the regulatory cap at 100 bps. Thus, low search costs render marketing
unprofitable. In the model with a high mean search cost, a subset of funds specifically
exploit the high search cost investors. Those funds invest aggressively in marketing so as
to enter more of the high search cost investors’ choice sets. Since high search cost investors
3A potential caveat is that a drastic reduction in marketing expenses could reduce access to financial
advice, especially for small investors. If the role of financial advisors is in establishing investors’ trust, as
argued by Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015), then investor welfare could be reduced, as would their
allocation to the mutual fund sector and, potentially, the equity markets generally. However, empirical
estimates by Linnainmaa, Melzer, and Previtero (2018) suggest that net gains to financial advice that trade
off certainty equivalent benefit of increased risky asset holdings against the cost of advise are likely to be
small.
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will not search much, they will invest with those funds. But when mean search cost drops
to a sufficiently low level, this strategy is no longer effective. This suggests that our model’s
mechanism is consistent with the observed decline in fees charged by active mutual funds
along with the growth in passive index funds over the last two decades highlighted by
Stambaugh (2014).
While we abstract from the specifics of the interaction between the mutual fund sales force
(such as brokers and financial advisors), our model of marketing effort is motivated by a
growing literature examining the role of financial advice. Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tu-
fano (2009) study broker-sold and direct-sold funds and find little tangible benefit of the
former to fund investors. Guercio and Reuter (2014) show that the relationship between
fund flows and past performance is muted among funds that are sold through brokers, pre-
sumably because such funds are targeting investors with higher search costs. Chalmers and
Reuter (2012) show that broker recommendations steer retirement savers towards higher-
fee funds yielding lower investor returns; Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012) provide
similar evidence from an audit study of retail financial advisors. Christoffersen, Evans,
and Musto (2013) find that the broker incentives impact investor flow to funds, especially
for brokers not affiliated with the fund family. Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2016) exhibit
the potentially severe conflict of interest between brokers/financial advisors and their re-
tail investor clients, as exemplified by repeat incidence of misconduct in the industry (only
about 5 percent of reported misconduct involves mutual funds, however). An alternative
to the conflict of interest view is presented by Linnainmaa, Melzer, and Previtero (2016),
who show that financial advisors tend to commit common investment mistakes in their own
portfolios.
More closely related to our work, Hastings, Hortac¸su, and Syverson (2016) study the role
of the sales force on observed market outcomes in the Mexico privatized retirement savings
systems. In their model, a fund’s sales force can both increase investors’ awareness of the
product and impact their price sensitivity. In our data we cannot distinguish between these
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two effects. We thus assume that the observed marketing expenses are purely informative
(rather than persuasive). Egan (2017) uses a search-based structural framework similar to
ours to study the conflict of interest between brokers and retail investors in the market for
structured convertible bonds.
Our paper is related to the literature that aims to understand the observed underperfor-
mance of active funds. Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2012) develop a tractable model of the active
management industry. They explain the popularity of active funds despite their poor past
performance using two components: decreasing returns to scale and slow learning about the
true skill level. In our model of the active management industry, we also include decreasing
returns to scale and investor learning about unobserved skill (at the fund level). However,
our model largely attributes the popularity of active funds to the information friction that
prevents investors from easily finding out about index funds.4
This paper is also related to those studying the role of advertising and media attention
in the mutual fund industry. Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2006), Reuter and Zitzewitz
(2006), and Kaniel and Parham (2016) study the impact of fund family-level advertising
expenditures and the resulting media prominence of the funds on fund flows. In our model,
we capture some of these effects parsimoniously by allowing fund family size to impact
fund’s probability of being included in investor’s information set.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our model. Section 3
describes the data used to estimate the model. Section 4 discusses the estimation methods.
Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 conducts the counterfactual analysis.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
4Huang, Wi, and Yan (2007) argue that differences in mutual fund prominence as well as heterogeneity
in the degree of sophistication across investors help explain the observed asymmetry in the response of
flows to fund performance. Garleanu and Pedersen (2015) incorporate search costs in their model of active
management and market equilibrium, but assume that a passive index is freely available to all investors
without the need to search.
5We follow this simple approach to incorporating advertising since the latter constitutes a very small
fraction of fund expenditure, compared to the distribution costs that we focus on. Advertising can be
potentially quite important for steering consumers into financial products - e.g., Honka, Hortac¸su, and
Vitorino (2016) and Gurun, Matvos, and Seru (2016).
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2.2. Model
Every period, heterogeneous investors conduct costly search to sample mutual funds to
invest their (identical) endowments. Investors care about expected fund performance and
expense ratio (i.e., its price). Mutual fund performance is determined by managerial skill as
well as the impact of decreasing returns to scale. Mutual funds choose their expense ratios
and marketing expenses to maximize profits. Marketing expenditures can increase a fund’s
probability of being sampled but decrease its profit margins.
We proceed by first describing how fund’s performance is determined and then the investor’s
problem and lastly describe the funds’ behavior.
2.2.1. Fund performance
In a time period t, the realized alpha rj,t for an active fund j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} is determined
by three factors: (i) the fund manager’s skill to generate expected returns in excess of
those provided by a passive benchmark in that period, denoted by aj,t. (ii) the impact of
decreasing returns to scale, given by D(Mtsj,t; η) where Mt is the total size of the market
and sj,t is the market share of the fund j, and Mtsj,t denoting fund size, η is a parameter
measuring the degree of decreasing returns to scale, and (iii) an idiosyncratic shock εj,t ∼
N (0, δ2).
rj,t = aj,t −D(Mtsj,t; η) + εj,t, j = 1, ..., N, (2.1)
An important question in the mutual fund literature concerns the relative size of active
funds vis-a-vis passive funds (e.g., Pstor and Stambaugh 2012). To be able to address this
important extensive margin, we include a single index fund j = 0 into our model, and thus
abstract from competition between index funds. We assume that the alpha of the index
fund is zero, in that it neither has skill nor affected by the decreasing returns to scale. The
total market size Mt includes both active funds and the index fund. We treat Mt as an
exogenous variable in the model.
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Our specification is very similar to Berk and Green (2004) with one exception: the manager’s
skill is allowed to vary over time. We assume manager’s skill follows an AR(1) process:
aj,t = (1− ρ)µ+ ρaj,t−1 +
√
1− ρ2 · vj,t, (2.2)
where vj,t ∼ N (0, κ2). When a fund is born, its first period skill will be drawn from the
stationary distribution N (µ, κ2). Parameter ρ captures the persistence of the skill level. As
with other parameters, its value will be estimated from data. In the limiting case, when
ρ = 1, skill is fixed over time, which is what Berk and Green (2004) assume.
Following Berk and Green, we assume the manager’s skill is not observable to either the
investor or fund manager herself: it is treated as a hidden state. Let a˜j,t be investor’s belief
about the manager’s skill in that period. Since equation (2.2) can be regarded as describing
how the hidden state aj,t evolves over time, and equation (2.1) says that rj,t +D(Mtsj,t; η)
is a signal on the hidden state, one can apply Kalman filter to obtain the following recursive
formulas for the belief on manager’s skill and the variance of that belief:
a˜j,t ≡ E (aj,t|rj,t−1, sj,t−1, rj,t−2, sj,t−2, ...)
= ρ
{
a˜j,t−1 +
σ˜2j,t−1
σ˜2j,t−1 + δ2
[rj,t−1 +D(Mt−1sj,t−1; η)− a˜j,t−1]
}
+ (1− ρ)µ, (2.3)
σ˜2j,t ≡ V ar (aj,t|rj,t−1, sj,t−1, rj,t−2, sj,t−2, ...)
= ρ2
(
1− σ˜
2
j,t−1
σ˜2j,t−1 + δ2
)
σ˜2j,t−1 + (1− ρ2)κ2. (2.4)
and a˜j,t = µ, σ˜
2
j,t = κ
2 for the period t when j was born. In the special case of ρ = 1
these coincide with the expressions derived by Berk and Green (2004) in their Proposition
1. The difference between our updating rule and theirs is that in the Berk and Green
(2004) model, all the historical signals receive the same weight in determining the investor’s
belief, whereas in our case, when ρ is smaller than 1, the signals in the more recent periods
receive greater weight. This allows us to capture the fact that fund managers and/or their
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strategies change over time, and that investors might therefore rationally overweight the
recent history.6
2.2.2. Investor search
Each investor allocates a unit of capital to a single mutual fund identified as a result of
sequential search (conducted at the beginning of each period t). Investors are short lived,
in the sense that they derive utility from their investment in the fund of their choice, and
the capital they invest in the funds dissipates at the end of the period. A new population
of investors enters in the subsequent period t + 1 with new capital endowments that they
allocate to the funds, and so on. Let pj,t be the expense ratio charged by fund j. An
investor’s utility derived from investing in fund j is given by
uj,t = γr˜j,t − pj,t, (2.5)
where
r˜j,t = a˜j,t − η log(Mtsj,t).
Recall that a˜j,t is the investors’ belief on the manager’s skill for fund j for this period t
and r˜j,t is the fund j
′s expected alpha in period t implied by these updated beliefs as well
as the size of the fund, given the decreasing returns to scale function parameterized as
D(Mtsj,t; η) = η log(Mtsj,t). The coefficient in front of the expense ratio is normalized to
1. If γ = 1 then investors simply care about the expected outperformance net of of fees
(net alpha), as assumed by Berk and Green (2004). We allow the more general formulation
to account for the potential difference in salience of fees vs. performance as well as the
investors’ imperfect ability to estimate manager skill. The utility derived from investing in
the index fund is given by u0,t = −p0,t, where p0,t is the expense ratio charged by the index
fund in period t; the alpha of the index fund is set to be zero.
6There is evidence that investors “chase” recent performance, potentially more actively than would be
justified from a purely Bayesian perspective. Our framework could be used in quantitatively assessing the
degree to which this behavior is driven by irrational over-extrapolation - e.g. Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011),
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014).
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Fix a time period t. Investor i pays search cost ci to sample one fund from the distribution
of funds (this distribution is known to all investors, while specific fund identities are not).
The search costs are different across the population of investors and follow a continuous
distribution G (which we parameterize as exponential, with its mean given by λ.). As
in Hortasu and Syverson (2004), we endow investors with one free search, so that every
investor will invest in a fund (even if his search cost is very high). Let Ψt(u) be the
probability of sampling a fund that delivers the investor an indirect utility smaller or equal
to u. Standard Bellman equation arguments imply that it is optimal for the investor to
follow a cutoff strategy (see Appendix for details). Let u∗ be the highest indirect utility
among the funds sampled thus far. The investor continues searching iff u∗ ≤ u¯(ci), where
the threshold u¯ is defined by
ci =
∫ +∞
u¯
(u′ − u¯)dΨt(u′).
Since we have a finite number of funds, the above expression becomes
ci =
N∑
j=0
ψj,t(uj − u¯) · 1{uj > u¯},
where ψj,t is the probability of sampling fund j ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}. Intuitively, the left hand
side is the cost for an additional search, and the right hand side is the expected gain. Note
that the right hand side is strictly decreasing in u¯. So u¯(ci) is strictly decreasing in ci.
Intuitively, the bigger ci is, the smaller the cut-off u¯(ci) becomes, and the less persistent
the investor is in searching. Following Hortasu and Syverson (2004), we can solve for the
market share of each fund, sj,t, explicitly as a function of the utilities {uj,t}Nj=0, sampling
probabilities {ψj,t}Nj=1 and the distribution of search costs G(ci) (see detailed derivations in
the Appendix).
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2.2.3. Marketing and equilibrium market shares
Fund sampling probabilities depend on fund characteristics and, crucially, on funds’ mar-
keting efforts. Let bj,t denote marketing expenses of fund j, xj,t denote a vector collecting
the (observable) exogenous characteristics of the fund, and ξj,t represent the unobservable
shock that affects the sampling probability of this fund. Vector xj,t includes year dummies,
fund age, and the number of funds in the same family. Then the probability that an investor
randomly draws fund j in year t is specified as
ψj,t =
eθbj,t+β
′xj,t+ξj,t
1 +
∑N
k=1 e
θbk,t+β
′xk,t+ξk,t
, (2.6)
ψ0,t = 1−
∑N
k=1
ψk,t. (2.7)
Thus, θ is a key parameter that characterizes the effectiveness of marketing expenditure as
a means of attracting investors. As long as θ is positive, an increase in bj,t increases the
probability that the fund is sampled by investors, all else equal. We assume that the index
fund does not engage in any marketing activities; thus, increasing marketing by all of the
active funds automatically reduces its sampling probability.
Importantly, marketing expenditures are only incurred by the fund when it attracts invest-
ment. This is intuitive if we think of marketing as a commission paid to a broker or advisor
- while a promise of a kickback might increase the probability the fund is recommended,
if the client chooses not to invest in the fund, the commission is not paid. While we do
not model this intermediated relationship between investors and funds in detail, our speci-
fication of the sampling probability function is meant to capture it in a somewhat reduced
form.7 In addition, it captures other aspects of marketing that are not directly tied to the
marketing expenses that reported a part of the fund expense ratio, such as “brand,” which
might be captured by both observed and unobserved characteristics of the fund.
7The role of commissions/kickbacks in investment management is analyzed theoretically by Inderst and
Ottaviani (2012) and Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner (2011).
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We use pt to denote the vector that collects pj,t for j = 1, ..., N ; similar notation applies to
other fund-specific variables in the model. With the specifications in (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7),
the search model in Section 2.2.2 implies a mapping from pt, bt, r˜t, xt, ξt, and p0,t to a set
of market shares. Let us write this mapping as
sj,t = Fj,t (pt, bt, r˜t,xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ) , j = 1, ..., N, (2.8)
where Θ collects the relevant parameters, which in this case include γ, β, θ, and the
parameter λ for G. The share for the index fund is given by s0,t = 1 −
∑N
j=1 sj,t. We use
vector st to collect sj,t for j = 1, ..., N .
Decreasing returns to scale imply that r˜t depends on the funds’ market shares:
st = F t [pt, bt, a˜t − η log (Mtst) ,xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ] . (2.9)
As in Berk and Green (2004), investors understand that their returns depend on the size
of the fund they invest in, and therefore the equilibrium vector of fund market shares st is
a fixed point of the above relation. We can write the fixed point as a function of the other
inputs on the right hand side of (2.9),
sj,t = Hj,t(pt, bt, a˜t,xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ), j = 1, ..., N, (2.10)
with Θ now also including parameter η. In the appendix, we show that this fixed point is
unique. Unlike Fj,t, we do not have a closed-form expression for Hj,t and so it requires fixed
point iteration to compute.
Profits for an active fund j in period t are given by
pij,t := Mt ·Hj,t(pt, bt, a˜t,xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ) · (pj,t − bj,t). (2.11)
We assume a Nash equilibrium, where each fund chooses pj,t and bj,t to maximize pij,t, given
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other funds’ choices p−j,t and b−j,t (as well as its own and other funds’ estimated skills and
exogenous characteristics).8 Because the SEC currently imposes a one-percent upper bound
on the 12b-1 fees, we restrict bj,t ≤ b ≡ 0.01 in equilibrium.
In sum, in our model mutual funds choose their fees and marketing efforts to maximize
profits each period while taking into the equilibrium distribution of fund size (and therefore
expected outperformance of each fund).
2.3. Data
The data come from CRSP and Morningstar. Our sample contains 2,285 well-diversified
actively managed domestic equity mutual funds from the United States between 1964 and
2015. Our dataset has 27,621 fund/year observations. In the data appendix, we provide
the details about how we construct our sample. We closely follow data-cleaning procedures
in Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) and Pstor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2015).
To compute the annual realized alpha rj,t, we start with monthly return data. We first
augment each fund’s monthly net return with the fund’s monthly expense ratio to get the
monthly gross return rGrossj,t . Then we regress the excess gross return (over the 1-month
U.S. T-bill rate) on the risk factors throughout the life of the fund to get the betas for each
fund. We multiply betas with factor returns to get the benchmark returns for each fund at
each point in time. We subtract the benchmark return from the excess gross return to get
the monthly gross alpha. Last, we aggregate the monthly gross alpha to the annual realized
alpha rj,t. We use 4 different benchmark models: CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model,
Fama-French and Carhart four-factor model and Fama-French five-factor model. For our
main results, we use the Fama-French five-factor model as the benchmark, but our results
are robust to other risk adjustments. In our sample, the average annual realized alpha for
Fama-French five-factor model is 54 bps. This result is very close to Pstor, Stambaugh and
8Our notion of profits most closely approximates management fees paid to the fund’s investment advisor.
We can think of this either as profits accruing to the fund family or as compensation paid to the fund manager,
although in reality the latter is a much more complicated object, e.g., see Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh,
and Vestman (2017).
63
Taylor (2015)’s estimates, where they find the monthly alpha is 5 bps, which translates to
60 bps of annual alpha.
Since our focus is on the efficient allocation of assets across active funds, we choose to
minimize the details related to modeling index funds.9 We aggregate all index funds from
Vanguard to build a single index fund. We choose Vanguard because, as argued by Berk and
van Binsbergen (2015), Vanguard index funds have been the most accessible index funds for
retail investors historically. Specifically, we compute its assets under management (hereafter
AUM) by summing AUM across all funds; we compute the combined fund’s expense ratio
by asset-weighting across all included index funds. We count the combined index fund’s age
from the inception year of Vanguard, which is 1975.
We define the total mutual fund market Mt as the sum of AUMs of all the active funds and
the combined index fund in year t. We define market share sj,t as the ratio between fund
j’s AUM and the total fund market. Mtsj,t gives the fund j’s AUM in millions of dollars
in year t. We exclude fund/year observations with fund’s AUM below $15 million in 2015
dollars. A $15 million minimum is also used by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001), Chen,
Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Yan (2008), and Pa´stor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015).
In our dataset, there is a huge skewness in fund’s AUM. From the summary statistics, we
can see the mean of fund’s AUM is much larger than the median. The funds at the 99
percentile is over 1,100 times larger than the funds at the 1 percentile. This skewness could
potentially affect our estimates. Following Chen et al (2004) we use the logarithm of a
fund’s AUM as our measure of fund size.
In taking our model to the data, we use the reported distribution costs (sales loads and
12b-1 fees, which are typically used to compensate brokers for directing client investment
to funds) as our combined proxies for marketing costs (rather than using, for example,
advertising expenditures). The reason is that in the U.S., many investors purchase mutual
funds through intermediaries such as brokers or financial advisors. Among all the expenses
9For a detailed study of search frictions within the index fund market, see Hortasu and Syverson (2004).
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that mutual fund companies categorized as marketing, advertising expenses constitute only
a tiny portion (according to the ICI). The bulk of the marketing costs is compensation paid
to brokers and financial advisors, albeit we do not observe this compensation directly.
In the mutual fund industry, a single mutual fund may provide several share classes to
investors that differ in their fees structures (typically, the difference is in the combination
of front loads and 12b-1 fees). Following much of the literature (with some exceptions,
e.g., Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano 2009), we conduct our analysis at the fund level
instead of the share class level. To be able to do so, we need to aggregate the share class
level expense ratios, 12b-1 fees and front loads up to the fund level. We define the marketing
expense bj,t as the “effective” 12b-1 fees that includes amortized loads (see appendix for
details).
2.4. Estimation
Our estimation proceeds in two steps. We first estimate the set of parameters governing
mutual fund investment performance: µ, κ, δ, ρ, and η, using the observed panel of fund
returns and market shares: {rj,t, sj,t|j = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T} using maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE). This also gives us the posterior beliefs on the funds’ skills in every
period. Then we estimate the other parameters (which are related to the search model)
using generalized method of moments (GMM) by relating the observed sj,t to the fund
characteristics, as well as making inferences from the equilibrium restrictions on the fee-
setting behavior of funds, taking the Bayesian posterior beliefs about funds’ skills as given.
2.4.1. Fund performance
From expression (2.1), we can write down the probability of observing rj,t conditional on
observed market shares and realized outperformances up to t:
Pr
(
rj,t
∣∣∣sj,t, rj,t−1, sj,t−1, rj,t−2, sj,t−2, ...) ∼ N [a˜j,t − η log(Mtsj,t), σ˜2j,t + δ2] .
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In writing down the above conditional likelihood, note that the current market share sj,t does
not provide further information about the skill aj,t beyond {rj,t−1, sj,t−1, rj,t−2, sj,t−2, ...},
because it is a function of a˜j,t but not aj,t directly. Neither does sj,t provide any information
on εj,t for the same reason.
We can use the above conditional probability to construct a partial log likelihood function
(see Wooldridge (2010), § 13.8):
N∑
j=1
∑
t
log Pr
(
rj,t
∣∣∣sj,t, rj,t−1, sj,t−1, rj,t−2, sj,t−2, ...) .
The first summation is across all funds. The second summation is across all periods in
which fund j exists. We maximize this likelihood with respect to µ, κ, δ, ρ, and η to obtain
the estimates. Our MLE estimation does not rely on the assumptions and structure of
our search model - only on the specification of the exogenous skill process. Therefore our
estimates of skill and decreasing return to scale parameters are valid even if fund market
shares are determined by some other model, for example Berk and Green (2004), which we
use as a benchmark.
2.4.2. Search model
The parameters in the search model are estimated using (i) a set of moment conditions
constructed with ξj,t and (ii) the optimality of the funds’ behaviors. For (i), we first need
to back out the ξj,t’s from the data given any set of parameter values. This amounts to
finding the ξt that equates the model-predicted market shares Ht(pt, bt, a˜t,xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ)
to the observed shares st for each period t. Since the fixed point of Ht is observed as st
in the data we can achieve this by solving F t [pt, bt, a˜t − η log (Mtst) ,xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ] = st
(which is described in equation (2.9)) for ξt (given a set of parameter values and observed
fund choices).10.
10The solution to this equation can be found by iteration similar to the contraction mapping approach in
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
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The definition of ξt gives us our first set of moment conditions: E(ξj,t|xt, a˜j,t) = 0. This
condition states that ξj,t is mean independent of the xj,t, the exogenous variables that affect
fund’s sampling probability in addition to marketing expenses, and a˜j,t, the posterior belief
about the fund skill at the beginning of period t. Let j ∈ t denote any active fund j that is
alive in period t. The sample version of the moment conditions is
∑T
t=1
∑
j∈t ξj,t
 xj,t
a˜j,t
 = 0.
Following Hortasu and Syverson (2004) and Chen et al. (2004) we include in xj,t both
log age and the number of funds in the same fund family to capture the fund level social
learning effects, as well as advertising that is conducted at the family level. Importantly, we
do not include lagged fund size into xj,t. In the data, fund size is persistent over time, so
including lagged fund size creates an over-fitting problem, where sj,t is almost mechanically
explained by sj,t−1. From the point of view of the moment conditions, such a problem arises
due to the fact that lagged size depends on ξj,t−1, which is also likely persistent, and so
lagged size sj,t−1 is likely correlated with ξj,t.
In contrast to this first set of moment conditions, we do not require E(ξj,t|pj,t, bj,t) =
0 because pj,t and bj,t are endogenous outcomes of the model and thus depend on ξj,t.
One typical approach that the literature explores to deal with such endogeneity is using
instruments for firms’ pricing or marketing choices. Another common approach, which we
follow here, is to rely on the optimality of the observed firm choices. Intuitively, the levels
of fees and marketing expenses that are optimal for different funds will depend on the
elasticities of demand. Therefore, as long as the observed choices are optimal, they help to
identify the demand function.
The first order condition for the price for fund j at period t is
sj,t + ∂Hj,t/∂pj,t · (pj,t − bj,t) = 0.
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In order to exactly align the behaviors predicted by a model with the observed behaviors
of each individual fund in the data, one must either introduce unobserved heterogeneity in
costs or allow for the first-order conditions to be satisfied with error.11 In our estimation,
we implicitly allow decision errors as each fund chooses its price and marketing expense.
Specifically, we allow the first-order condition above to be satisfied up to an error:
sj,t +
(
∂Hj,t
∂pj,t
· eζj,t
)
(pj,t − bj,t) = 0, (2.12)
where ζj,t represents the fund’s “error” in setting its price (e.g., due a to mis-assessment
of the slope of the demand curve). We will assume that ζj,t has a mean of zero across all
periods and funds. In other words, while discrepancies are allowed at the individual fund
level, we still ask the average behavior to be consistent with the model.
The first order condition for the marketing expenses is similar but sightly more involved
because of the corner restrictions 0 ≤ bj,t ≤ b. We let
−sj,t +
(
∂Hj,t
∂bj,t
· eωj,t
)
(pj,t − bj,t)

≤ 0, if bj,t = 0;
≥ 0, if bj,t = b;
= 0, otherwise.
(2.13)
Here we again allow a mean zero error ωj,t. One interpretation of these decision errors is
inertia: if it is costly for funds to change the fees that they charge, including the component
that covers marketing costs, these will be sticky over time, typically deviating from the
level that is optimal at a particular point in time (we abstract from modeling the dynamic
fee-setting behavior here). Another source of errors would come from fund-family-related
constraints (e.g., some families have financial advisory arms and might choose to cross-
subsidize those by channeling marketing fees to the advisors they employ, even if it is
11See Baye and Morgan (2004), which shows that allowing only a small amount of bounded rationality in
players’ optimization behaviors can be of great use in reconciling the Nash hypothesis with the commonly
observed price patterns in the data.
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suboptimal from the standpoint of maximizing profits on some of the funds they manage,
while other families might eschew marketing altogether even if some of their funds might
benefit from it).12
Thus, we assume that fund choices of prices and marketing expenses are optimal on average,
so that the first order conditions are satisfied up to a fund-period-specific errors. Given
(2.12) and (2.13), this amounts to E(ζj,t) = 0 and E(ωj,t) = 0. Notice that these moments
do not impose any distributional or correlational assumptions on ζj,t or ωj,t. In sample
versions,
∑T
t=1
∑
j∈t ζj,t = 0, (2.14)∑T
t=1
∑
j∈t ωj,t = 0. (2.15)
The first error, ζj,t, can be directly backed out from the first order condition given any set
of parameter values:
ζj,t = − log
(−∂Hj,t/∂pj,t
sj,t
)
− log (pj,t − bj,t) .
The second error, ωj,t, can be computed exactly for j with 0 < bj,t < b, but unfortunately
not for the boundary cases:
ωj,t

≤ ω¯j,t, if bj,t = 0;
≥ ω¯j,t, if bj,t = b;
= ω¯j,t, otherwise,
12There is a connection between the decision errors that we introduce here and the notion of -equilibrium
in game theory, first introduced by Radner (1980). A set of choices constitutes an -equilibrium if the
difference between what a player achieves and what he could optimally achieve is less than . In other
words, it only requires each player to behave near-optimally, which turns out to be the same as what we ask
in (2.12) and (2.13). Specifically, there is a mapping from ζj,t and ωj,t to the loss that firm j incurs relative
to its optimal payoff. When both errors are zero, such loss is zero. More importantly, it can be shown that
this mapping is insensitive, in the sense that fairly large errors only lead to a relatively small loss reduction
in profits.
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where
ω¯j,t ≡ − log
(
∂Hj,t/∂bj,t
sj,t
)
− log (pj,t − bj,t) .
In principle, we cannot simply use the average of ω¯j,t as an estimate of E(ωj,t). A con-
ventional way to deal with this kind of truncation problem is to make an additional distri-
butional assumption and apply an MLE estimator. However, a key issue here is that the
truncation interval is not fixed but varies across funds endogenously, and thus it may be
correlated with ωj,t.
We take a simpler approach of comparing the estimates based on several subsample versions
of (2.15):
(i)
∑
0<bj,t<b
ωj,t = 0; (ii)
∑
bj,t=0
ω¯j,t = 0; (iii)
∑
bj,t=b
ω¯j,t = 0; (iv)
∑
all j,t
ω¯j,t = 0.
The first version (i) assumes that on average, the funds that choose an interior level of
marketing expenditure are right about the effect of marketing on market share. These are
the funds for which we can exactly calculate the ωj,t. We acknowledge that these funds are a
selected sub-sample of all funds; their average does not necessarily reflect the average across
all funds. However, these are the funds that choose the less extreme marketing expenses. In
addition, they make up a substantial portion (about 30%) of the funds in the data, so it is
reasonable to believe that their average assessment is not far from the population average.
The second version (ii) uses the truncated values (lower bounds) of the ωj,t of the funds that
choose zero broker marketing expenses. The third version (iii) uses the truncated values
(upper bounds) of the ωj,t of the funds that choose the highest possible marketing expenses,
b, which has been 1 percent imposed by the SEC. The last version (iv) uses all the values
for ωj,t. We use these three latter cases as robust checks. If the estimates based on these
four different assumptions are similar, then we can be confident that estimates based on
the full sample moment (2.15) are not too severely impacted by the truncation.13
13We analyze how sensitive our parameter estimates to the violations of these two key moment conditions
using the method proposed by Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017) in the Appendix. We show that
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Our GMM estimation is just identified, since there are five unknown parameters (not count-
ing the year fixed effects) and five moment conditions. The parameters are the average
search cost λ, the utility weight of outperformance γ, the sensitivity of sampling proba-
bility to marketing θ, and a two-dimensional vector of sensitivities β (for number of funds
in the fund family and fund age). There are three moment conditions for the sampling
probability residual ξ and two more moment conditions based on the first order necessary
conditions for the optimality of funds’ pricing and marketing behavior in equations (2.14)
and (2.15), respectively. We conduct this second-stage estimation in one step using the iden-
tity weighting matrix. Standard errors are estimated via parametric bootstrap (described
in the Appendix), which allows for arbitrary correlation between error terms, in particular
ζj,t and ωj,t.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Fund performance
Table 2.1 reports estimates of the fund performance-related parameters using our full sam-
ple.14 The magnitude of decreasing returns to scale parameter η is 0.0048, and it is sta-
tistically significant. Since one standard deviation of log fund size is 1.628, a one standard
deviation increase in log fund size is associated with approximately 78 basis points decrease
in mean annual alpha. This result is close to Chen et al. (2004). This magnitude is econom-
ically significant, in particular as compared to the mean gross alpha of 54 basis points. For
robustness, we also estimate the model using linear rather than logarithmic specification
similar to Pstor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2015) and obtain estimates broadly consistent
reasonable deviations from the assumption that these moment conditions hold with equality, even at the
boundaries, implies negligible changes in the estimated parameter values.
14In our dataset, the first period with non-missing data is the year 1964, so our full sample estimates use
the data from 1964 to 2015. It is important to use all the available information to estimate the learning
model that is the core of Berk and Green (2004). In the model, when a fund is born, it draws an initial
skill level from the prior skill distribution. Then investors use the entire history of subsequent realized
performance to update their beliefs about each fund’s skill level. If we were to start the sample at a later
date, for example, year 1995, we would lose the performance information for a lot of funds that were in
operation well before 1995. One way to circumvent the above truncation problem is to pick a starting year
and keep only the funds which are founded after this year. But this approach would bias the estimates
toward newer funds.
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with theirs.15
Existence of stock-picking skill among mutual fund managers is one of the oldest queries in
empirical finance. Early literature used persistence of fund-level performance as an indicator
of skill in active fund management, an approach that is called into question by Berk and
Green (2004), who argue that the lack of performance persistence does not imply absence of
fund manager skill, as long as capital flows to outperforming funds and if fund size erodes
performance. Here we take a different approach by estimating a version of the Berk and
Green model (2004) directly. We find that the mean of the prior distribution of managerial
skill is 3.05% (per annum). This number is positive and statistically significant, which
means that an average active mutual fund manager is skilled (we plot the prior distribution
of fund manager skill implied by the estimated parameters µ and κ in Figure A.8 in the
Appendix). Over 71% of the funds have fundamental skill levels that are higher than the
mean expense ratio, at least when applied to the first dollar of assets under management
(i.e., before any of the effects of decreasing returns to scale).
Another parameter of interest is ρ, the persistence of fund manager’s skill. Our empirically
estimated persistence is 0.94, which means past beliefs are quite useful in predicting future
performance. Our skill persistence result is consistent with Berk and van Binsbergen (2015)
who find that the cross sectional differences in value added persist for as long as 10 years.
One of the reasons that skill persistence is not perfect as assumed in the Berk and Green
model is managerial turnover. If we believe the skill of a mutual fund is partially due to
the mutual fund manager, then a change of management team might affect the skill level of
the fund. Fidelity Magellan fund manager Peter Lynch is a case in point: during his tenure
from 1977 to 1990, according to our measure of performance, Magellan fund achieved 14
15There is some disagreement in the literature regarding the role of fund size in eroding performance due to
decreasing returns to scale, since estimates of the latter can potentially suffer from omitted variable bias, since
both fund size and observed performance are correlated with underlying fund skill, which is unobservable -
e.g., see discussion in Pstor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2015) and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2015). We verify that
our estimation approach can recover the true value of the parameter that controls the strength of decreasing
returns without noticeable bias via Monte Carlo simulation. The apparent absence of a meaningful bias is
in part due to the fact that in the data, as we show below, fund size is only weakly related to fund manager
skill.
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consecutive years of positive alpha. After Peter Lynch’s departure, Magellan’s performance
becomes less impressive, reverting towards the mean.
[Insert Table 2.1 Here]
2.5.2. Asset misallocation
Equipped with estimated parameters of fund skill distribution, we compute the investor
beliefs about each fund’s skill level at each point in time. Then we can derive implied
fund size according to a benchmark frictionless model following Berk and Green (2004)
(henceforth BG). By comparing BG-implied fund size with the data, we can assess the
degree of asset misallocation in the mutual fund industry.
First, we compute the investor beliefs about each fund’s skill level a˜j,t using the recursive
expression derived in section 2.2.1. As an example, consider a fund j that was born in
period t = 1. At the fund’s birth, we assign the fund an expected skill level of µ, then we
use realized return rj,1 and fund size M1sj,1 to get the updated belief, a˜j,1. By iterating
forward, we can generate the whole series of fund’s expected skill levels. Next, we compute
the BG-implied fund size. Berk and Green’s model predicts that fund’s size (i.e., total
assets under management), which we denote by sBGj,t , should be such that the decreasing
returns to scale exactly offsets the investor belief less fund expense ratio, denoted as “net
skill”: D(sBGj,t ; η) = a˜j,t − pj,t. So, with a log specification for D(·), we have
log(sBGj,t ) =
a˜j,t − pj,t
η
. (2.16)
This expression is intuitive: the higher the net skill of a fund, the larger is the efficient fund
size; the stronger the effect of decreasing returns to scale, the smaller the fund’s size will
be.
To compare BG-implied fund size with data, we construct ten portfolios of mutual funds
sorted on net skill. We then compute mean of log size in the data and in the BG model
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for each portfolio.16 Figure 2.1 presents the result. First, we can see that in the data, the
mean fund size monotonically increases with net skill. This result is consistent with the
Berk and Green model’s prediction. But we also witness a discrepancy between the data
and the model. On the higher end, BG predicts the mean size of funds in portfolio 10 to
be 7.3 billion. In the data, the mean fund size in portfolio 10 is 936 million. On the lower
end, according to BG, the mean fund size in portfolio 1 is 0.7 million. And in the data, it
is 134 million. These differences are statistically significant as indicated by the 95-percent
confidence intervals. From this figure, we can draw the conclusion that asset misallocation
exists in both bad funds and good funds in the data.
[Insert Figure 2.1 Here]
The key prediction of Berk and Green (2004) is that asset inflows into funds that are
estimated to be skilled based on their past returns will erode their subsequent performance
due to decreasing returns to scale. In addition, fund managers who have been revealed as
skilled raise their fees. As a result the net alpha of these funds should be zero in the future.
We can test this prediction of the (generalized) model by looking at abnormal returns on
the portfolios of mutual funds formed on their net skill discussed above. Thus, using the
updated belief about fund skill as well as its fees in year t, funds are placed into portfolios,
and we track equal-weighted returns on these portfolios over the subsequent 12 months, until
the portfolios are re-sorted based on the updated information from t + 1. Estimated five-
factor alphas on these portfolios along with their 95% confidence intervals are displayed in
Figure 2.2. Consistent with much of the mutual fund literature, the vast majority of alphas
are negative (i.e., for all but the top two deciles of net skill). Perhaps more surprisingly,
funds in the top decile of estimated net skill actually do display statistically significant
outperformance. Overall, realized alpha is monotonically increasing with the estimated net
skill, ranging from close to −3% per annum for the funds in the bottom decile, to about 0.7%
for those in the top decile. This result indicates a stark rejection of the key prediction of
16We winsorize the belief a˜ at 1% and 99% level because there are some outliers in the estimated beliefs.
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the BG model. Not only don’t assets seem to flow out of unskilled and/or expensive funds
towards the relatively more skilled ones, as suggested by evidence in Figure 2.1 above,
but even the “best” funds that are “too small” relative to the BG model don’t raise their
prices sufficiently to fully capture their outperformance. Thus the observed allocation of
capital across equity mutual funds, combined with their price setting behavior, present a
quantitative puzzle for the frictionless BG model.
[Insert Figure 2.2 Here]
2.5.3. Search model parameters
Our search model is meant to bridge the gap between the efficient capital allocation de-
scribed by the Berk and Green model and the actual allocation of assets across mutual
funds observed in the U.S. data. Table 2.2 reports the estimated parameters of the struc-
tural search model. With the view towards conducting counterfactual analysis, we rely
on the more recent sample of the data for this part of the estimation, choosing 2001 as
our starting point (our estimation results are robust to various starting points, however).
As described in the estimation section, we estimate the model using four versions of the
moment conditions in (2.15). All the parameters other than θ are quite stable across the
four sets of estimates. This assures us that even though our identification of θ relies on one
subsample, it does not affect other parameters drastically.
[Insert Table 2.2 Here]
Our estimate of λ, the mean of search cost, is 39 basis points. Hortasu and Syverson
(2004) find that the mean search cost for the S&P 500 index fund market is from 11 bps
to 20 bps across different specifications.17 Our estimated average search cost is somewhat
higher than theirs since, presumably, investors in their sample have higher than average
17Hortasu and Syverson (2004) estimated two variants of their search model: one in which sampling
probabilities are different across funds, and another one where they are identical. We view our model as
being closer to the former. The estimation results for that version of the model are reported in Table III
of their paper. The log mean search cost is around -6.17 to -6.78, which implies mean search costs ranging
from 11 bps to 20 bps.
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level of financial sophistication (implying a lower level of search costs). This is because
they focus on investment in S&P 500 index funds in the late 90s, when these funds were
not as prominent as they are today. Alternatively, it may be the case that it is harder
to evaluate actively managed mutual funds (compared to index funds, which are relatively
simple products), and hence implied barriers to information acquisition that are implied by
the observed distribution of fund size are greater.
The magnitude of the mean search cost is quite significant. For the average investor, the
cost of drawing another sample fund is 39 basis points, which is comparable to the mean
alpha in our sample. The large magnitude of estimated search cost is a reflection of the
active fund under-performance puzzle. In the mutual fund literature, numerous papers
documented the (persistent) underperformance of (at least a large subset of) active funds
(e.g., Carhart (1997)). Since many under-performing funds enjoy sizable market shares, our
model requires a high search cost to rationalize those facts. In our model, high search cost
investors will find it suboptimal to continue searching for a better fund than those drawn
in the first couple of attempts. In the counterfactual case, if the search costs were low then
index funds would be much larger than observed in the data, and underperforming active
funds would be substantially smaller.
Our key parameter of interest is θ, the coefficient in front of marketing expenses in the
sampling probability function. First, we notice that the estimated θ is the smallest when
we use the moment conditions of the funds that choose to do no marketing, and the largest
for the funds that choose the upper bound of 1%. For the funds that choose the interior
levels, θ is in the middle. This is intuitive because θ measures the effectiveness of marketing.
The funds that are at the upper bound are more likely to be constrained in their ability
to increase their marketing in an effort to increase investors’ awareness. Consequently, the
first order condition (2.15) is likely to be satisfied with an inequality, and forcing it to be
zero in estimation biases the estimate upward. Similarly, the funds at the lower bound are
likely to find it optimal to receive a “rebate” on marketing in order to increase their profits,
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but since such rebates are not available their first order condition is also likely not to be
satisfied, biasing the estimate of θ downwards. In what follows, we rely on the estimates
obtained with funds in the interior of the marketing expenditures as our benchmark.
In the sampling probability function, besides marketing expenses, we include fund family
size, log fund age and year fixed effect. The coefficient of family size is positive and signifi-
cant, confirming the idea that larger fund families are better at informing investors about
their products. The fund age coefficient is positive and significant, which is intuitive, as
older funds also have more visibility than younger funds. This result is also consistent with
Hortasu and Syverson (2004) evidence from the S&P 500 index fund market.
In order to put these estimates into perspective, we conduct the following experiments. We
compute the percentage changes in fund size for various groups of funds when marketing
expense increases by 1 bp. Table 2.3 provides the results. Each column corresponds to
results computed using different values of the θ parameter - those obtained with the funds
on the upper bound (θ = 133.18), lower bound (θ = 111.22), and in the interior (θ =
113.11) of marketing expenditures, as described above. All the other parameters are fixed
at the benchmark levels (estimates from the “interior” funds). When we change fund j ’s
marketing, we fix all the other funds’ prices and marketing expenses and fund j’s price (i.e.,
this is a comparative static, not counter-factual analysis). Thus, holding total fees fixed, a
1 bp increase in marketing implies an equivalent reduction in profit margins.
[Insert Table 2.3 Here]
Overall, a 1 bp increase in marketing expenses leads to a roughly 1% increase in fund’s size,
but there is substantial variation across different types of funds, and this elasticity naturally
increases with θ. In panel A, we sort funds by their size. We find that as fund size decreases,
the sensitivity of size to a 1 bp increase in marketing rises. Using the benchmark estimates
(θ = 113.11) it goes from approximately 0.87% for large funds to 0.9% for small funds.
This is intuitive because as a prior, marketing investment should be much more effective
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for smaller funds because they have smaller probabilities of being known (e.g., typically,
they are younger). Investing in marketing is a good way for small funds to attract greater
investor attention. Interestingly, this sensitivity is higher both at the upper and at the
lower estimates of θ.
In panel B, we sort funds by their skill level a˜. We find that marketing is much more
useful for highly skilled funds. If high-skill funds can get into the consideration sets of more
investors they will be picked by more investors. But for the low-skill funds, even if they are
known to more investors, their size will not increase sufficiently to justify the extra expense.
In fact, in Figure 2.3 we show that, for a fund of average age and belonging to a fund family
of average size, with fund/year shock ξ = 0, the optimal level of marketing is increasing in
the posterior belief about its skill. This result indicates that marketing is complementary
to skill, yet it does not mean that it helps improve welfare in the presence of the search
friction, since high-skill funds may be forced to spend “too much” on marketing, leading to
a wasteful “arms race.”
[Insert Figure 2.3 Here]
Lastly, in panel C, we sort funds by their original marketing expenses levels. Lower Bound
funds are funds that originally choose zero marketing expenses. Upper Bound funds are
funds that originally chose 1% marketing expenses. Non binding funds are the rest of
funds, which choose interior marketing levels. We find that an additional 1 bp increase in
marketing is not very useful to funds at the upper bound (suggesting that many of these
funds are at suboptimally high levels of marketing, perhaps due to inertia). Similarly, for
funds at the lower bound extra marketing appears more worthwhile. Some of these funds
might belong to fund families that choose to sell their funds directly rather than through
brokers, for example, and as a consequence do not charge any 12b-1 fees, even though it
might be beneficial for some of their funds.
Next we analyze the impact of marketing on fund profits. Table 2.4 displays the results. In
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panel A, we sort funds by size; we find that for the small funds extra marketing increases
profits, if all the other funds’ strategies in pricing and marketing stay the same (since we
are not recomputing their best responses in this exercise). In panel B, we show that when θ
is at the higher level of estimates, it is profitable for high-skill funds to do more marketing.
In panel C, we find that essentially all of the funds are worse off if they increase their
marketing, which is not surprising given that the estimation procedure assumes that funds
are at their optimal levels of marketing (on average).
[Insert Table 2.4 Here]
2.5.4. Sampling probabilities and fund size
In this section, we quantify the impact of various components of the sampling probability on
explaining the size distribution of funds. Our method is as follows: we first set a particular
component in the sampling probability equation (2.6) to equal zero. For example, by setting
all funds’ marketing expenses b equal zero, we are effectively removing all the explanatory
power of marketing expenses from the model. Then we recompute the model-implied market
shares of all funds using equation (2.9), which captures investor demand side of our model.
Specifically, let
s∗t = F t [p
∗
t , b
∗
t , a˜
∗
t − η log (Mtst) ,x∗t , ξ∗t , p0,t; Θ] , (2.17)
where the the arguments with the asterisks are equal to their empirical values if the variable
is “included” in the specification, and otherwise set to zero (for fund skill a˜j and expense
ratio pj we use sample means when the variables are “not included” in the specification.
18
Importantly, in this exercise we are not recomputing the whole equilibrium, since we keep
other variables fixed (rather than solving for every fund’s best response).
We regress the log of market share of funds in the data sj,t on these reduced model-implied
log market shares s∗j,t and report the R-squared of these regressions in Table 2.5. The
lower the R-squared, the more important that component is in terms of explaining the size
18An explicit recursive expression for the market share function F is provided in the Appendix.
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distribution. Among all of them, the unobserved characteristics of the fund ξ is the most
important one (responsible for almost half of the R-squared). This is reasonable because we
only include a limited number of variables in our estimation; any other variables that could
potentially affect fund size would be subsumed by ξ. The second most important variable is
age. After controlling for fund’s age and other variables, the family size doesn’t add much
explanatory power.
What about the key features of mutual funds that have been the main focus of the literature
- skill and costs? Removing either variation in posterior skill or in the fund price (expense
ratio) reduces the R-squared to about 90% in each case. Importantly, removing instead the
marketing variable yields a very similar R-squared of 92%. This indicates that marketing
is nearly as important in terms of explaining the size distribution of mutual funds as price
or skill.
We are also interested in understanding how do various components of our model contribute
to the misallocation of capital to funds. We compute the correlation between the reduced
model-implied fund size s∗j,t and the BG-implied fund size s
BG
j,t , as defined in equation (2.16).
We can see that in the data (or, equivalently, our unrestricted model, which matches the
data by construction) the correlation is positive but small, at 0.09. If changing one of the
components of the model increases this correlation, that means that this change makes
capital allocation more efficient. This correlation is at its highest level of 0.59 if we only
include fund skill and price. Conversely, removing price or skill but including other (search
model) ingredients reduces this correlation, since these are the key elements of the Berk
and Green model. At the same time, removing marketing increases the correlation. This
means that marketing could potentially account for at least some of the misallocation that
we observe in the data. However, this analysis is only suggestive, since we do not compute
the optimal response of the funds to the induced change. In what follows, we describe
counterfactual experiments that fully take into account the equilibrium behavior of both
investors and funds.
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[Insert Table 2.5 Here]
2.6. Counterfactual Analysis
Section 2.5.2 documents substantial capital misallocation in the mutual fund industry. In
this section, we use our model to quantitatively study the importance of marketing expenses
and search costs in shaping the equilibrium fund size and expense ratios. We also investigate
how they affect allocational efficiency and investor welfare. First, we explore a counterfac-
tual equilibrium with no marketing.19 We then investigate the impact of changing search
costs on equilibrium marketing expenses. We focus on the most recent year in our sample
(2015) for these experiments.
2.6.1. Welfare measures
We first present how the welfare of different parties in the market are calculated. Fix a
year t (the time subscript t will be suppressed in this section). In our model, investor’s
utility consists of two parts, the expected indirect utility provided by the fund that investor
chooses and the expected total search costs the investor incurs in order to find this fund.
The welfare of investor i with search cost ci is given by
V (ci) =
∫ +∞
u¯(ci)
udΨ(u)
1−Ψ [u¯(ci)] − ci
Ψ [u¯(ci)]
1−Ψ [u¯(ci)] , (2.18)
where u¯ is the reservation level of indirect utility (detailed derivation of investor’s welfare
is provided in the appendix). For a higher level of reservation utility, the investor needs
to search more in order to find the desired fund. We see that the expected total search
cost ci
Ψ[u¯(ci)]
1−Ψ[u¯(ci)] is increasing in u¯. In the first term of equation (2.18), the numerator is the
expected indirect utility for the funds with higher than u¯ utility level. The denominator
adjusts for the fact that the investor will only pick the funds from this part of the distri-
19Recently the SEC considered a proposal to improve the regulation of mutual fund distribution fees, in
particular, by limiting fund sales charges as a way of protecting retail consumers from unnecessarily high
costs. Our counterfactual analysis can be viewed as analyzing welfare consequences of a policy that set the
marketing cap at zero.
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bution. The aggregate measure of investor welfare in this model is derived by integrating
across the search cost distribution:
U =
∫ +∞
0
V (ci)dG(ci). (2.19)
Fund profits is also part of the total welfare. These include the profits for both active funds
and index funds:
P =
N∑
j=1
(pj − bj)sj + s0p0. (2.20)
Here the first part is the total profits for the active funds, the second part is the total profits
for the passive funds. In the counterfactual analysis, we assume index fund price is fixed
and we resolve the equilibrium for the active funds’ prices and marketing expenses. In our
counterfactual we assume M stay the same.
If marketing expenses constitute pure payments to labor (e.g., broker commissions) rather
than dead weight costs, they should also be considered in the welfare analysis:
B =
N∑
j=1
bjsj (2.21)
Our measure of total welfare is the sum of the three components above: U + P +B.
2.6.2. Equilibrium with no marketing
In this simulation, we restrict marketing expenses to zero. We use year 2015’s data and the
benchmark parameters from column (1) in Table 2.2. Table 2.6 provides the comparison
between the currently observed equilibrium and the no-marketing equilibrium on some of
the key measures. First, the mean expense ratio drops by almost 77 basis points in the
counterfactual relative to the current equilibrium. This drop is larger than the decrease
in the average marketing expenditure. It indicates fiercer price competition between funds
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when they cannot attract investors through marketing. To further understand the price
changes across funds, we split the funds into four groups based on their marketing expenses
in the current equilibrium: (1) funds whose marketing is at the upper bound of 100 bps,
(2) funds whose is marketing is at the lower bound of 0, (3) funds whose marketing is
between 1 bp to 49 bps and (4) funds whose marketing is between 50 bps and 99 bps.
We plot the price differences for all funds between the current equilibrium and the no-
marketing equilibrium in Figure 2.4 panel A. We find that all the funds lower their prices
in the no-marketing equilibrium, but the magnitude of change varies substantially across
the four groups. Group (1) funds lower their prices by around 100 bps (i.e., roughly their
original marketing costs). The most interesting finding is that the group (2) funds in the
no-marketing equilibrium also lower their prices by around 30 bps, which necessarily has
to come from a reduction in profit margins since these funds do not have any marketing
expenses in the current equilibrium. This is mainly due to the effect of competition between
funds. A similar but weaker effect is present for most of the funds in groups (2) and (3).
[Insert Figure 2.4 Here]
Second, we find that the total market share of active funds drops from 74% to 68%. This
indicates that marketing is useful for steering investors towards active funds. When funds
cannot do marketing, they lose market share since they are less likely to enter investors’
information sets. The sampling probability of index funds increases. This is due to the
assumption that all the sampling probabilities sum to 1. When active funds cannot do
marketing, the index funds are more likely to be “found.” In the no-marketing equilibrium,
active funds’ profits drop by 15 basis points on average. This is resulting from both the
shrinking of the total market share and the fall of profit margins.
Investor welfare in the no-marketing equilibrium increases by around 57%. There are three
main contributing factors: lower prices, higher alphas, and lower search costs. As assets
under management decline, the average alpha of the industry increases from 37 bps to 41
bps, due to the effect of decreasing returns to scale. In Figure 2.4 panel B, we plot the
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difference in fund alphas between the no-marketing equilibrium and current equilibrium for
different groups of funds. We find that for funds in group (1) alpha increases consistently.
This is mainly because in the no-marketing equilibrium their assets under management fall
and so, due to decreasing returns to scale, their alphas increase. For other groups of funds,
some of the alphas increase, while others decrease.
[Insert Figure 2.5 Here]
We can compute the aggregate search cost incurred by the investors in the two equilibrium.
The aggregate search cost is given by:
∫ +∞
0
ci
Ψ [u¯(ci)]
1−Ψ [u¯(ci)]dG(ci). (2.22)
We find aggregate search costs are lower in the no-marketing equilibrium. In the model,
investors search until the expected benefit of finding better funds is smaller than the unit
search cost. If investor i has already found fund j with utility uj , then his incentive to
search hinges on both her search cost ci and the expected possible gain from continuing
the search. If there are not too many better funds out there, then investor’s incentive to
search is weaker. To show that this is indeed the reason why investors search less in the no-
marketing equilibrium, we plot the histogram of indirect utilities associated with individual
funds in the two equilibria in Figure 2.5. We find the standard deviation of utility levels in
the no-marketing equilibrium is substantially lower than in the current equilibrium. Since
the dispersion in available utilities is reduced, so are the expected benefits of searching and,
consequently, investors search less. Through the resulting reduction in search costs, investor
welfare increases by 17 basis points on average.
[Insert Table 2.6 Here]
When marketing is eliminated the size of active funds doesn’t drop drastically for two rea-
sons. First, there are characteristics in the sampling probability function, besides marketing
expenses, which ensure that all active funds sampling probabilities are positive. Second,
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lowering the size of active funds increases their performance. This effect makes active funds
more attractive.
2.6.2.1. Heterogeneous effect across investors
In our model, we assume different investors have different search costs. In this section, we
study the impact of eliminating marketing across investors with different levels of search
costs. We focus on the following dimensions for each investor: individual investor welfare,
total incurred search cost, gross alpha expected by investors, total expense ratios investors
pay, and marketing expenses that investors implicitly pay for as part of their chosen funds’
expense ratios (in expectation). Figure 2.6 panel A shows that for all the search cost levels,
in the no-marketing equilibrium, investors achieve a higher level of welfare on average. But
the biggest improvements come from the high search cost investors. Their welfare increases
roughly by 100 basis points. For the low search cost investors the increase is not very
large. This is because the low search cost investors always find the “best” funds available
in the market. Figure 2.6 panel B shows a somewhat non-monotonic relationship between
unit search cost and total search costs incurred. For the low search cost investors the total
search cost is not very high even though they search a lot since their unit search costs
are low. The high search cost investors find it too costly to conduct any search, so they
search infrequently, many stopping after the first (free) search. Consequently, high search
cost investors’ total search cost is also low. The intermediate search cost investors search
relatively aggressively and their search costs are non-trivial. So in total they incur the
largest total search costs. Comparing the two equilibria, we find that in the no-marketing
equilibrium, the intermediate search cost investors incur lower total search costs. This is
due to the fact that in the no-marketing equilibrium, average fund quality improves, so that
it is easier for investors to find funds that satisfy their reservation levels.
Focusing on Figure 2.6 panel C and panel D, we find that in general, high search cost
investors get lower alpha funds, pay high prices and high marketing expenses. This is
simply because high search cost investors don’t search very much. An interesting fact is
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that for the very low search investors, the funds they invest in have positive net alphas. In
Berk and Green’s model, since investors have zero search cost, in equilibrium, all the funds
have zero net alphas. But in our model, since all investors incur a positive search cost, the
low search investors are able to find funds that are both skilled and cheap, but not found by
enough other investors, so that their performance is not fully eroded by decreasing returns
to scale. At the same time, these high-skill funds do not find it optimal to increase their
expense ratios (and thus drive net alphas towards zero) because that would make these
funds less attractive to the more discerning (low search cost) investors, whose choices are
very sensitive to fees.
[Insert Figure 2.6 Here]
2.6.3. Allocational efficiency
It is also interesting to consider the consequences of restricting marketing on capital allo-
cation within the mutual fund sector. On the one hand, we see that average (gross) fund
alpha increases in the no-marketing equilibrium, suggesting that some highly skilled funds
might be “too small,” operating below their efficient scale. Indeed, since we show that in
the current equilibrium highly skilled funds benefit more from marketing, ceteris paribus,
it is reasonable to expect that without the ability to do any marketing these funds might
be disproportionately hurt by the imposed constraint. On the other hand, marketing is an
important driver of costs, which are in turn a major determinant of net alphas (and indirect
utilities) enjoyed by investors.
In keeping with our initial approach, we compare fund size distribution implied by the
frictionless benchmark in the style of Berk and Green (2004) and that generated by our
search model counterfactual. Figure 2.7 provides the comparison for the year 2015. Panel
A displays the direct analogue of Figure 2.1 restricted to the data for 2015: the BG-implied
values are computed using the posterior beliefs about fund alphas as well as their observed
expense ratios and the estimated decreasing returns to scale parameter (the fund size in the
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data is consistent with the search model by construction). Panel B presents the analogues
of these values in the counterfactual equilibrium with no marketing. That is, the “coun-
terfactual” plot uses the fund size computed under the counterfactual equilibrium, where
as the “BG-implied” values are recomputed using the expense ratios in the counterfactual
equilibrium.
We observe that in the no-marketing case the two lines are much closer to each other
than in the current equilibrium. This is true only in small part due to the steepening in
the relationship between log size and net skill, visible mostly in the middle of the skill
distribution. The changing BG-implied distribution plays a noticeably more important
effect. This is due to the fact that funds are charging substantially lower fees to their
investors in the no-marketing equilibrium. Thus the solid black line in the graph shifts
upward, closer to the blue line. The shift appears especially pronounced for the lowest-skill
funds, even though they are still “too big” in the counterfactual relative to the frictionless
model, where as for the highest-skill funds there is not much difference between the two
measures. Thus, the overall effect of eliminating marketing expenditures is to improve the
efficiency of capital allocation in the active fund industry, at least from the standpoint of
net abnormal returns to investors as emphasized in Berk and Green (2004).
2.6.4. Reducing search costs
Last, we examine the impact of search costs on equilibrium market outcomes with special
attention to marketing expenses. Because of search costs, competing on marketing could be
a potential profitable strategy for some funds, since they essentially just need to be sampled
by the least-discerning high-cost investors frequently enough. But with the emergence of the
Internet, advancement in search technologies (e.g., Google), more transparent comparison
(e.g., services like Morningstar and Lipper), and better investor education, we would expect
the search frictions to decline over time. In order to analyze the potential impact of new
technologies we consider a counterfactual equilibrium where we set the mean search cost to
35 bps or 20 bps. Given the new search cost, funds reoptimize their prices and marketing
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expenses. We find that as the average search cost decreases from 39 bps to 35 bps, mean
marketing expenses drop from 61 bps to 44 bps. But when the mean search cost further
drops to 20 bps, the equilibrium marketing expenses become zero. Notice that the regulatory
cap is still held at 100 bps. The intuition is as follows: low search costs render marketing less
profitable. In the model with high mean search cost, there exists a large fraction of investors
with very high search costs. A subset of funds specifically exploit these “unsophisticated”
investors. Those funds invest aggressively in marketing so as to enter more of the high
search cost investors’ choice sets. Since such investors will not search much, they do end up
investing with those funds even if they are not very skilled and quite expensive. But when
mean search cost drops to sufficiently low level, this strategy is no longer profitable, since
the model presumes there are fewer investors who find it too costly to continue searching
for a better fund. Therefore, when search costs are not very high, funds will not invest
in marketing and instead compete on price. This result provides a new perspective on
the recent evolution of the asset management industry documented by Stambaugh (2014):
declining fees charged by active funds coincident with the growth in passive index funds.
From the standpoint of our model, both trends can be seen as resulting from falling search
costs, due to a combination of information technology and growing investor sophistication.
[Insert Table 2.7 Here]
2.7. Concluding Remarks
The question whether actively-managed mutual funds exhibit skill - i.e., persistent outper-
formance - has a long history in financial economics, since it is central to the debate about
informational efficiency of securities markets in the sense of Fama. While there is still
substantial debate about the ability of an “average” fund manager to generate abnormal
returns (before or after fees are taken into account), perhaps one of the most robust findings
in the literature is that investors’ flows are much less sensitive to past bad performance than
to outperformance (Ippolito (1992), Carhart (1997), Chevalier and Ellison (1997),Sirri and
Tufano (1998b), etc.). This evidence hints that the market for mutual funds may not be
88
efficient at allocating capital across funds because bad funds aren’t punished sufficiently
for poor performance, and therefore underperforming managers control more assets than
justified by their level of skill. Capital misallocation in the mutual fund industry could
potentially lead to inefficiencies in capital allocation across firms, distorting real investment
(van Binsbergen and Opp (2016)). It is therefore important to understand quantitatively
how much capital is misallocated in the mutual fund industry. By estimating the Berk and
Green model, we find that in the the U.S. equity mutual funds data, from year 1964 to
year 2015, all but the best-performing decile of mutual funds are “too large” relative to the
optimal scale predicted by the BG model. These results indicate that there exist substantial
frictions in the market for mutual funds.
In our paper, we view mutual fund marketing expenses as purely informative (e.g., But-
ters (1977)). It is possible that a portion of these marketing expenses serves a persuasive
function in ways highlighted in the theoretical literature: e.g., firms may find it profitable
to steer investors toward non-price attributes (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer
(2008), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Carlin (2009), Ellison and Ellison (2009)). Separating
the informative effect from the persuasive effect of marketing one would require informa-
tion investors’ actual choice sets, which is generally not available. Thus, by making the
assumption that all marketing is informative, our welfare analysis results provide an upper
bound on the social value of mutual fund marketing.20 Relaxing this assumption in order
to understand the possible welfare loss from “persuasive” marketing is a fruitful venue for
future research.
20Even if marketing is purely informative, due to the externality of marketing in our model, marketing
investment can still be excessive. Fund i’s marketing investment could decrease fund j’s probability of being
known. In a Nash equilibrium, funds will not take the externality into consideration when deciding the
marketing investment levels. All of the funds might be better off if they agree on a lower level of marketing
investment - But of course, this agreement is fragile since deviation is profitable.
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Figure 2.1: Capital (mis)Allocation in Mutual Funds: Size vs. Net Skill
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This figure plots the mean of log fund size (measured in millions of dollars) for portfolios of funds
formed on net skill (defined as posterior belief about the fundamental skill level a˜ minus expense
ratio p). We compute fund size according to the generalized version of the Berk and Green (2004)
model that we estimate: log(sBGj,t ) =
a˜j,t−pj,t
η , where η captures decreasing returns to scale. The
black line plots the mean of the Berk and Green model-implied fund sizes for each portfolio (BG).
The blue line plots the mean of log fund size in the data for each portfolio. Portfolio 1 has the lowest
net skill while portfolio 10 has the highest net skill. 95 percentile confidence bounds are indicated
by dashed lines.
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Figure 2.2: Capital (mis)Allocation in Mutual Funds: Net Alpha vs. Net Skill
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This figure plots the average annual net alpha for portfolios of funds formed on net skill (defined
as posterior belief about the fundamental skill level a˜ minus expense ratio p). The black line plots
the Berk and Green (2004) model-implied net alpha for each portfolio (BG). The blue line plots the
mean of net alpha in the data for each portfolio. Portfolio 1 has the lowest net skill while portfolio
10 has the highest net skill. 95 percentile confidence bounds are indicated by dashed lines.
Figure 2.3: Marketing and Skill
This figure plots the relationship between fund’s skill a˜ and model-implied fund’s marketing expense,
for a fund in year 2015 that has average characteristics, ξ = 0, ζ = 0, and ω = 0. We vary the
posterior belief about its skill a˜ and calculate the associated optimal marketing expense, given the
choices of the other funds observed in the data.
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Figure 2.4: Price and Performance Differences: Current Equilibrium vs. No-Marketing
Equilibrium
Panel A plots the expense ratio reduction as a result of moving from the current equilibrium (which
allows marketing) to the counterfactual no-marketing equilibrium. The x-axis is fund size (here
we use log market share). The y-axis is the current equilibrium price minus the no-marketing
equilibrium price.
Panel B plots the differences in gross alpha between the current equilibrium and the no-marketing
equilibrium. The x-axis is fund size (here we use log market share). The y-axis is the gross alpha
changes.
We split funds into 4 groups based on their current marketing expenses. Group 1, indicated by
squares, marketing expenses of 100 bps. Group 2, indicated by asterisk, marketing expenses of 0 bp.
Group 3, indicated by diamond, marketing expenses between 1 and 49 bps. Group 4, indicated by
circle, marketing expenses between 50 and 99 bps.
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Figure 2.5: Indirect Utilities: Current Equilibrium vs. No-Marketing Equilibrium
The left panel shows the histogram of indirect utilities associated with funds in the no-marketing
equilibrium. The right panel shows the histogram of indirect utilities associated with funds in current
equilibrium (which allows marketing). The x-axis is utility level. The y-axis is frequency. Indirect
utility is defined in equation (2.5).
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Figure 2.6: Heterogeneous Effect Across Investors
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Panel A: Investor Search Cost and Welfare
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Panel B: Investor Search Cost and Total Search Cost
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Panel D: Investor Search Cost, Price and Marketing Expense
Total Fee in No-Marketing Equilibrium
Total Fee in Current Equilibrium
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Panel A plots investor welfare as a function of unit search cost levels. The x-axis is investor’s
unit search cost, ci in basis points. The investor welfare is in unit of bp. The y-axis is investor
welfare defined as indirect utility provided by chosen fund minus total incurred search cost. For the
expression of investor welfare as a function of search cost, please refer to equation (2.18).
Panel B plots investor’s expected total search cost as a function of unit search cost levels. Expected
total search cost is defined as ci
Ψ[u¯(ci)]
1−Ψ[u¯(ci)] , where ci is the search cost level, Ψ [u¯(ci)] is the probability
of sampling a fund that delivers the investor an indirect utility smaller or equal to u¯(ci) (detailed
derivation is in appendix.)
Panel C plots the gross alpha expected by investors as a function of unit search cost levels.
Panel D plots the expense ratios and marketing expenses investors incur as a function of the unit
search cost levels.
Solid line stands for the current equilibrium and dashed line stands for no-marketing equilibrium.
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Figure 2.7: Capital (mis)Allocation: Counterfactual
Panel A plots the mean of log fund size (measured in millions of dollars) for portfolios of funds
formed on net skill (defined as posterior belief about the fundamental skill level a˜ minus expense
ratio p) for the current equilibrium, using data on mutual funds in the year 2015.
Panel B plots the mean of log fund size (measured in millions of dollars) for portfolios of funds
formed on net skill for the no-marketing equilibrium.
We compute fund size according to the generalized version of the Berk and Green (2004) model that
we estimate: log(sBGj,t ) =
a˜j,t−pj,t
η , where η captures decreasing returns to scale.
The black line plots the mean of log fund size for each portfolio implied by the Berk and Green
(2004) model. The blue line plots the mean of log fund size in the data or in the counterfactual
for each portfolio. We construct ten portfolios based on the deciles of net skill. Portfolio 1 has the
lowest net skill while portfolio 10 has the highest net skill.
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Table 2.1: Investor Beliefs and Manager Skill Parameters
Parameters Description 1964-2015
η Decreasing returns to scale (%) 0.48
(0.04)
µ Mean of prior (%) 3.05
(0.25)
κ SD of prior (%) 2.41
(0.12)
δ SD of realized alpha (%) 7.62
(0.05)
ρ Skill persistence 0.94
(0.02)
Num of Obs 27,621
This table presents the estimates of the fund performance-related parameters. The decreasing returns
to scale parameter, η, the mean of manager’s ex ante skill distribution, µ, the standard deviation of
this distribution, κ, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic noise in the realized alpha, δ, and
the persistence of the manager’s skill, ρ. The standard errors are in the parentheses.
Table 2.2: Search Model Parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parameters Description Interior Lower Upper All
λ Mean search cost (bp) 39 39 39 39
(4) (4) (4) (4)
γ Alpha weight 0.415 0.415 0.416 0.415
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
θ Marketing effectiveness 113.11 111.22 133.18 122.56
(7.334) (7.291) (8.797) (7.397)
β1 Family size effect 0.4048 0.403 0.381 0.393
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
β2 Fund age effect 1.032 1.032 1.032 1.032
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the estimates of the structural search model. We use the data from 2001 to
2015. The four columns correspond to four sets of moment conditions as described in Section 2.4.
In column (1), we use the funds that are not constrained in their marketing expenses to estimate
the model. In column (2), we use only funds whose marketing expenses are 0 to estimate the model.
In column (3), we use the funds whose marketing expenses are 100 bps to estimate the model. In
column (4), we use all of the funds to estimate the model.
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Table 2.3: Change in Size when Marketing Expenses Increase by 1 bp
θ = 113.11 111.22 133.18
Panel A: Sort by Size
Big Funds 0.8735 0.8904 1.043
Intermediate Size Funds 0.8794 0.8965 1.050
Small Funds 0.9085 0.9261 1.085
Panel B: Sort by Skill
High Skill Funds 0.9670 0.9858 1.155
Intermediate Skill Funds 0.8987 0.9161 1.073
Low Skill Funds 0.8154 0.8311 0.973
Panel C: Sort by Original Marketing Expense
Binding at Lower Bound 0.9554 0.9739 1.141
Non-Binding 0.8990 0.9165 1.073
Binding at Upper Bound 0.8413 0.8575 1.004
This table provides the percentage changes in fund size resulting from a 1 basis point increase in
marketing expenses for various groups of funds using parameters from Table 2.2 column (1) except
θ. For θ, we use the estimated value of θ from columns (2), (1) and (3) respectively in Table 2.2. In
panel A, we sort funds by size. “Big Funds” are funds in the top decile. “Small Funds” are funds
in the bottom decile. “Intermediate Size Funds” are the rest. In panel B, we sort funds by skill
level. “High Skill Funds” are funds in the top decile. ”Low Skill Funds” are funds in the bottom
decile. “Intermediate Skill Funds” are the rest. In panel C, we sort funds by marketing expenses.
“Binding at Lower Bound” are funds with no marketing expenses. “Binding at Upper Bound” are
funds whose marketing are at the upper bound of 1%. “Non-Binding” are the rest.
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Table 2.4: Change in Profits when Marketing Expenses Increase by 1 bp
θ = 113.11 111.22 133.18
Panel A: Sort by Size
Big Funds -0.4317 -0.4150 -0.2645
Intermediate Size Funds -0.0311 -0.0143 0.1381
Small Funds 0.0850 0.1024 0.2602
Panel B: Sort by Skill
High Skill Funds -0.1267 -0.1081 0.0597
Intermediate Skill Funds -0.3358 -0.3186 -0.1634
Low Skill Funds -0.2128 -0.1972 -0.0567
Panel C: Sort by Original Marketing Expense
Binding at Lower Bound -0.2100 -0.1917 -0.0263
Non-Binding -0.1722 -0.1550 0.0006
Binding at Upper Bound -0.4180 -0.4019 -0.2569
This table provides the percentage changes in fund profits resulting from a 1 basis point increase in
marketing expenses for various groups of funds using parameters from Table 2.2 column (1) except
θ. For θ, we use the estimated value of θ from columns (2), (1) and (3) respectively in Table 2.2. In
panel A, we sort funds by size. “Big Funds” are funds in the top decile. “Small Funds” are funds
in the bottom decile. “Intermediate Size Funds” are the rest. In panel B, we sort funds by skill
level. “High Skill Funds” are funds in the top decile. ”Low Skill Funds” are funds in the bottom
decile. “Intermediate Skill Funds” are the rest. In panel C, we sort funds by marketing expenses.
“Binding at Lower Bound” are funds with no marketing expenses. “Binding at Upper Bound” are
funds whose marketing are at the upper bound of 1%. “Non-Binding” are the rest.
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Table 2.5: Quantifying the Importance of Sampling Probability Components
Specification ξ age num of family
funds
marketing skill price R2 Correlation between
sBG and sModel
(1) Y Y Y Y Y 0.5169 0.2988
(2) Y Y Y Y 0.2122 0.4988
(3) Y Y Y 0.1614 0.5698
(4) Y Y 0.1152 0.5947
(5) Y Y Y Y Y 0.9157 0.1456
(6) Y Y Y Y Y 0.9008 0.0301
(7) Y Y Y Y Y 0.9005 0.0776
Data 1 0.0901
This table presents results regarding quantifying the importance of various components in the sam-
pling probability in explaining the size distribution of funds. Our method is as follows: we first set
a particular component in the sampling probability equation (2.6) to equal zero. For example, by
setting all funds’ marketing expenses b equal zero, we are effectively removing all the explanatory
power of marketing expenses from the model. Then, we recompute the model-implied market shares
of all funds using equation (2.9) (we call them restricted model-implied fund size). Notice that here
we are not recomputing the whole equilibrium. We fix all other variables and parameters. Lastly,
we regress the log of market share of funds in the data onto model-implied log market shares and
report the R-squared. We also report the correlation between the restricted model-implied fund size
and the generalized Berk and Green model-implied fund size. “Y” indicates that we include this
component in the sampling probability. Blank means that we remove this component. The data
period is from 2001 to 2015.
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Table 2.6: Summary of Outcomes for Current Equilibrium and No-Marketing Equilibrium
Current No-Marketing
Mean price (bp) 160.27 82.96
Mean marketing (bp) 61.29 0
Mean alpha (bp) 37.24 41.07
Total share of active funds 0.74 0.67
Mean sampling prob (%) 0.085 0.078
Sampling prob for low price funds (%) 0.042 0.14
Sampling prob for index fund (%) 5.91 13.66
Investor welfare (bp) -140.72 -61.25
Active fund average profits (bp) 57.51 42.19
Index fund profits (bp) 2.32 2.86
Total welfare -37.37 -16.20
Aggregate investor search cost (bp) 29.09 12.15
This table provides various measures of the mutual fund industry under current and no-marketing
equilibrium. Mean price, mean marketing and mean alpha are the arithmetic average of price,
marketing expenses and alpha for all active funds, respectively. Total share of active funds is the
market share of all active funds. Sampling prob for low price funds is the mean sampling probability
for the funds whose prices are below average. Investor welfare is defined in equation (2.19). Active
fund average profits is the mean of price minus marketing expenses for all active funds. Index fund
profits are defined similarly. Total welfare is the sum of investor welfare, funds’ total profits and
total marketing expenses. Aggregate investor search cost is described in equation (2.22).
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Table 2.7: Summary of Outcomes for Different Search Costs
Low λ Mid λ High λ
20 bps 35 bps 39bps
Mean price (bp) 58.52 136.24 160.27
Mean marketing (bp) 0 44.78 61.29
Mean alpha (bp) 38.94 39.00 37.24
Total share of active funds 0.64 0.71 0.74
Mean sampling prob (%) 0.07 0.08 0.08
Sampling prob for low price funds (%) 0.15 0.04 0.042
Sampling prob for index fund (%) 13.66 7.16 5.91
Investor welfare (bp) -48.42 -118.41 -140.72
Active fund average profits (bp) 31.97 51.46 57.51
Index fund profits (bp) 3.15 2.58 2.32
Total welfare (bp) -13.98 -33.04 -37.37
Aggregate investor search cost (bp) 9.18 25.75 29.09
This table presents various measures of the mutual fund industry under different search costs dis-
tributions. In the top row, there are three levels of mean search costs: 20bps, 35bps and 39bps.
39 bps is our estimated value from the data. Mean price, mean marketing and mean alpha are the
arithmetic average of price, marketing expenses and alpha for all active funds, respectively. Total
share of active funds is the market share of all active funds. Sampling prob for low price funds is the
mean sampling probability for the funds whose prices are below average. Investor welfare is defined
in equation (2.19). Active fund average profits is the mean of price minus marketing expenses for all
active funds. Index fund profits are defined similarly. Total welfare is the sum of investor welfare,
funds’ total profits and total marketing expenses. Aggregate investor search cost is described in
equation (2.22).
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APPENDIX
A1. Appendix for Chapter 1
A1.1. Mutual Fund Manager’s Connections and Career Path
In this section, I investigate the relationship between the number of connections mutual fund
managers have and their career outcome, with a special focus on termination, promotion,
and demotion.
I follow Chevalier and Ellison (1999) by focusing on single-manager-managed funds. In
my sample, there are 19,993 fund-year observations. Notice that this sample is not at
the fund-manager-year level because one manager could manage more than one fund. To
compute fund manager age, I require the manager’s birth year. I obtain birth years in
the following ways: (1) Morningstar provides the birth year for a subset of fund managers
or (2) if Morningstar provides the manager’s BA year, I subtract 21 from the year to
get the birth year. For the performance of the fund, I use the Pastor, Stambaugh, and
Taylor (2016) method. I subtract the corresponding monthly index return from the fund’s
monthly gross return. Then I aggregate across months to obtain the annual outperformance.
This method allows me to avoid estimating the beta, and some studies show that this
method is better at controlling for risks than is the standard linear factor model. For
the investment category of the fund, I use the Morningstar category. To measure the
mutual fund managers’ connections to corporate I used two measures: (1) the number of
connected board members and (2) the number of connected firms. The connection definition
is CONNECTED(narrow). The dependent variable Terminationi,t is set to one if the
manager responsible for fund i in January of year t is no longer in charge of the fund at the
beginning of year t+ 1. I also construct a promotion dummy that equals 1 if the manager
managed more funds in year t than in year t−1 and a demotion dummy that equals 1 if the
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manager managed fewer funds in year t than in year t− 1. The specification is as follows:
Yi,t = β0 + β1Connection+ β2Alphai,t + β3Alphai,t × (MgrAgei,t −Age)
+β4Alphai,t−1 + β5Alphai.t−2 + β6MgrAgei,t + InvCatj + µt + i,t,
(A.1)
where Y is a dummy for termination, promotion, or demotion. InvCatj is the fund invest-
ment category fixed effects and µt is the time fixed effects. Since the dependent variable is
a binary outcome, I use a probit model to estimate it. Table A.14 presents the results. For
the three types of career outcomes, connections to the firm are not statistically significant.
This means that connections with board members are not important enough to affect the
career path of mutual fund managers .
[INSERT TABLE A.14 HERE]
A1.2. Connected Mutual Fund and Say on Pay Votes
The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that, starting from 2011, the management of public firms
should submit proposals about the top five executives’ compensation and shareholders can
cast advisory vote of “yes” or “no” on the pay of the company’s top named executives
during the prior fiscal year. Table A.15 reports the results. Connected mutual funds vote
in favor of management.
[INSERT TABLE A.15 HERE]
A1.3. Resistance to Hedge Fund Activism
Activists go after companies with vulnerabilities. Most companies have some vulnerabilities,
which could be related to financial performance, such as missing quarterly numbers, a
stagnant stock price, or comparatively weak revenue growth. Weaknesses, such as missing
quarterly numbers, could be a result of a firm engaging in long-term plans. But hedge funds
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could step in and “increase” the efficiency of the firm. The activists’ agenda usually includes
increasing leverage, returning excess cash to shareholders, selling off non-core corporate
assets, cutting operating costs, and demanding representation on the board. Some of those
procedures could be harmful to the firm’s long-term value such as innovation.
In this section, I check connected mutual fund’s trading behavior when facing hedge fund
activism. I find that during the period when hedge funds accumulate their shares, connected
funds stick with their equity in the firm, whereas non-connected funds tend to sell.
I obtain hedge fund activism data from Professor Wei Jiang. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and
Thomas (2008) provide details on how they construct the dataset. The current hedge fund
activism data I am using cover the period from 1994 to 2011. Following the literature, I use
the date that the hedge fund files a Schedule 13D as the event date. I aggregate data into
quarterly frequency. For a given firm, in a given quarter, if there is at least one hedge fund
targeting them, I label this quarter as an event quarter for the firm.1 In the final sample,
there are 1,822 hedge fund activism events affecting 1,452 different firms.
Table A.16 shows the results. In column (1), the dependent variable is the change in
ConHold from quarter t − 3 to quarter t, and, in column (2), it is the change in Non −
ConHold from quarter t − 3 to quarter t. Non − ConHold is the difference between
institutional holdings and ConHold. The dependent variable in columns (3) to (5) is the
difference between the above two variables. All the dependent variables are in basis points.
Hedge fund activism Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm in quarter t has a hedge
fund activism. Control variables include firm size, book-to-market ratio, and the previous
year’s total stock return. Industry refers to the Fama-French 12-industry classifications.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
In column (1), I find that connected holdings are not affected by hedge fund activism. This
means that when the hedge fund tries to accumulate shares in the firm, connected mutual
1In the data, there exists the case in which more than one hedge fund activism event occurred at a firm
within a quarter. There are only 63 cases.
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fund are less likely to sell. Meanwhile, for the non-connected funds, their shares significantly
decrease in the period before hedge fund activism actually happens. The difference between
the two types of funds trading can amount to 1% of a firm’s equity. Usually, hedge funds
accumulate around 5% of a firm’s equity before they initiate their activism. This means
that institutional investors who are not connected to the firm provide at least 1%. The
results are robust to include more control variables and industry and time fixed effects.
[INSERT TABLE A.16 HERE]
A1.4. Passive Funds in the Data
Table A.17 provides information about active and passive funds in my dataset. Passive
funds compose small amount of AUM in the data.
A1.5. Possion Model and Control Function Method
The basic assumption is that y’s distribution, conditional on all x, follows the Poisson
distribution. This is similar to the MLE world. We assume that, conditional on all the x,
y follows a normal distribution. Then for the Poisson distribution, it is as follows:
f(y|x) = exp[−µ(x)][µ(x)]y/y!,
where µ(x) decides the mean of the Poisson distribution. We can choose a parametric form
for the µ(x) = exp(xβ). This is because the µ(x) has to be positive all the time.
In my situation, because I assume ConHold is endogenous. I will use a control function
method to deal with the endogenity problem in the exponential regression setting.
First, assume the structural model follows:
E(y|z, ConHold, c1) = exp(z1δ1 + ConHoldγ1 + c1), (A.2)
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where c1 is the unobserved latent variable that affects innovation and potentially causes the
endogeneity problem. z1is a 1×L1subset of z containing unity. Here, we assume z contains
both an exogenous regressor, z1 (i.e., all the control variables), and instrument variables,
z2 (i.e., ConMFM). On the one hand, z is assumed to be uncorrelated with c1. On the
other hand, I allow the correlation between ConHold and c1. Further, I assume ConHold
has a linear reduced form satisfying the following assumption:
ConHold = zΠ2 + v2. (A.3)
This is exactly the first-stage regression in the IV analysis. In addition, I assume that
(c1, v2) is independent of z and
c1 = ρ1v2 + e1, (A.4)
where e1 is independent of v2. Note that ConHold is exogenous if and only if ρ1 = 0.
Then I can write the original structural model as
E(y|z, ConHold, c1) = exp(z1δ1 + ConHoldγ1 + v2ρ1), (A.5)
and estimating this equation using the standard quasi-maximum likelihood estimate (QMLE)
method could allow me to obtain consistent estimates for δ1, γ1, ρ1. In implementation, es-
timate expression (A.3) and then compute the residual vˆ2 = ConHold − zΠˆ2. Then plug
the residual vˆ along with z1 and ConHold into equation (A.5).
106
A1.6. Citation Adjustment Method
I use the patents filed between 1980 and 1990 as my sample for estimation. For each
technology class, I first compute the total number of citations. Then I aggregate the number
of citations a specific technology class patents receives in each subsequent year after being
filed. I divided each year’s citation number by the total number of citations to obtain
the adjustment factors, which are presented in Table A.11. Then I adjust the number of
citations that a patent currently has based on the number of years the patent has been filed
and the adjustment factors.
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Measures of innovation
PatCite Total number of citations received by the filed patents for firm i in
year t
PatApp Total number of patents filed (and eventually granted) by firm i in
year t
KPSS Total dollar value of innovation produced by firm i in year t, based on
stock market’s reaction to the patents granted news, scaled by firm’s
total asset
Measures of connected holdings and other control variables
ConHold Fraction of company i ’s equity held by connected mutual funds in year
t
Inst holding Calculated as the mean of the four quarterly institutional holdings
reported on form 13F
DED inst holding The institutional holdings by dedicated institutional investors.
Classification refers to Bushee (2001)
QIX inst holding The institutional holdings by quasi-indexer institutional investors.
Classification refers to Bushee (2001)
TRA inst holding The institutional holdings by transitory institutional investors.
Classification refers to Bushee (2001)
ROA Return-on-assets ratio defined as operating income before depreciation
(oibdp) divided by total assets (at)
Vol Firm i’s idiosyncratic volatility measured as the standard deviation for
the idiosyncratic part of firm return defined as r˜ = r − rm, where r is
firm’s daily return, rm is the daily market return
R&D stock Following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), this variable is
calculated using a perpetual inventory method: Gt = Rt + (1− δ)Gt−1,
where Rt is the R&D expenditure in year t and δ = 0.15, the private
depreciation rate of knowledge
PPE/Assets Property, plant, & and equipment (ppent) divided by total assets (at)
Leverage Book value of debt (dlc+dltt) divided by total assets (at)
Q Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value of equity (csho*prcc c) plus total
assets (at) minus book value of equity (ceq) minus balance sheet
deferred taxes (pstkl, set to 0 if missing), divided by total assets (at)
R&D/Asset Research and development expenditures (xrd+rdip) divided by total
assets (at), set to 0 if missing
Capex/Assets Capital expenditure (capx) scaled by total assets (at)
Age The number of years since initial public offering (IPO) (proxied by the
first appearance in Compustat)
Sale Firm’s sale
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Table A.2: Days between Patent Filing Date and Grant Date
Mean SD P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 N
1980–1989 728 387 246 337 518 671 854 1,275 2,002 235,577
1990–1999 714 385 235 316 495 652 854 1,289 1,925 352,370
2000–2010 1,141 561 292 433 732 1,037 1,453 2,171 2,828 730,670
This table reports the days between patent filing date and patent grant date in the dataset
for the period from 1980 to 2010. Here, I only include patents granted to public firms.
(Other type of entities, for example, universities, also have patents, but are not included).
Means, standard deviations, and key percentiles are provided in the table.
Table A.3: Number of Connections
Broad connection: Same university Narrow connection: Same univ/degree/time
Harvard University 3,977,753 Harvard University 49,273
University of Pennsylvania 2,524,600 University of Pennsylvania 40,600
Columbia University 1,269,328 University of Chicago 19,530
University of Chicago 1,263,519 Stanford University 15,968
New York University 1,177,280 University of California, Berkeley 13,150
Stanford University 954,470 Columbia University 11,166
University of California, Berkeley 839,847 University of Wisconsin, Madison 10,940
Northwestern University 579,842 Princeton University 10,284
University of Michigan 490,253 University of Michigan 9,980
University of Wisconsin, Madison 377,480 Yale University 9,360
Cornell University 374,640 University of Virginia 9,175
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 362,230 University of Illinois 9,169
University of Texas at Austin 326,298 Cornell University 9,099
Yale University 317,646 New York University 8,566
University of Virginia 311,120 Dartmouth College 7,823
This table reports the number of connections for the top 15 educational institutions ac-
cording to two definitions: broad connection broad, that is, mutual fund managers and corporate
board members attend the same school, and narrow connection, that is, mutual fund managers and
corporate board members attended the same school for the same type of degree at the same time.
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Table A.4: Top 10 Most Connected University
Connected firms Connected funds
Harvard University 780 Harvard University 178
University of Pennsylvania 344 University of Pennsylvania 172
Stanford University 330 University of Chicago 115
Columbia University 257 Columbia University 110
Yale University 237 New York University 105
New York University 226 University of Wisconsin, Madison 78
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 196 Stanford University 71
Princeton University 194 Yale University 67
University of Michigan 182 Northwestern University 65
University of Chicago 180 University of California, Berkeley 62
This table reports the time-series average of connected firms and connected funds for the
sample from 1980 to 2003. Connected means board members and fund managers obtained
degrees from the same university.
Table A.5: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Full sample
Variable Mean SD P5 P25 P50 P75 P95
PatCite 74.373 321.398 0 0 0 0 320.396
PatApp 4.078 18.000 0 0 0 0 16
KPSS 0.027 0.122 0 0 0 0 0.135
ConHoldbroad(%) 0.401 1.743 0 0 0 0 2.509
ConHoldnarrow(%) 0.020 0.251 0 0 0 0 0
Inst holding(%) 18.556 23.822 0 0 6.238 32.549 69.019
DED inst holding(%) 2.663 5.624 0 0 0.000 2.905 13.671
QIX inst holding(%) 11.304 15.281 0 0 2.972 19.227 44.016
TRA inst holding(%) 4.119 7.355 0 0 0.092 5.511 19.840
ROA 0.049 23.593 -0.425 0.015 0.108 0.171 0.278
Vol 0.608 1.964 0.044 0.124 0.279 0.630 2.037
R&D stock 44.448 619.595 0 0 0 0 47.201
PPE/Assets 0.306 0.231 0.032 0.121 0.248 0.440 0.782
Leverage 0.240 0.213 0 0.049 0.207 0.369 0.646
Q 1.990 1.813 0.725 1.019 1.365 2.147 5.582
R&D/Asset 0.011 0.046 0 0 0 0 0.070
CAPX/Asset 0.074 0.078 0.004 0.024 0.049 0.093 0.237
Observations 113,503
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Panel B: Samples Sorted by Connected Holdings
ConHoldnarrow > 0 ConHoldnarrow = 0
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
PatCite 403.563 758.187 62.164 285.736
PatApp 22.344 42.523 3.401 16.004
KPSS 0.132 0.293 0.023 0.109
ConHoldbroad(%) 5.320 4.672 0.219 1.188
ConHoldnarrow(%) 0.566 1.208 0.000 0.000
Inst holding(%) 60.895 19.023 16.985 22.498
DED inst holding(%) 8.475 7.019 2.448 5.448
QIX inst holding(%) 37.327 13.062 10.339 14.484
TRA inst holding(%) 14.689 9.798 3.727 6.946
ROA 0.142 0.124 0.046 0.238
Vol KPSS 0.265 0.306 0.621 1.998
R&D stock 508.795 2070.772 27.226 480.464
PPE/Assets 0.287 0.205 0.307 0.231
Lev 0.223 0.185 0.241 0.214
Q 2.553 1.952 1.970 1.804
R&D/Asset 0.035 0.062 0.010 0.045
CAPX/Asset 0.065 0.057 0.074 0.078
Observations 4,059 109,444
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the full sample of variables constructed based
on the sample of U.S. public firms from 1980 to 2003. Panel B separately shows statistics
for those with positive CONNECTED(narrow) holdings (left) and those with no CON-
NECTED(narrow) holdings (right). Table A.1 provides variable definitions.
Table A.5: Age distribution
Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Fund manager 47.04 10.16 35 40 45 54 62
Board member 54.16 9.90 42 47 54 61 67
This table displays the distribution of fund manager and board member age in my dataset
as of year 2003.
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Table A.6: Connected Holdings and Innovation (Poisson Model)
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable PatApp PatCite
ConHold 362.32*** 465.44***
(74.50) (79.76)
Year FEs yes yes
Firm FEs yes yes
Control variables yes yes
Observations 113,503 113,503
Table A.1 lists variable definitions. Control variables include annual institutional holdings,
log sale, log firm age, R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, leverage, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. The
estimated model is the Poisson model with firm and year fixed effects, and robust stan-
dard errors are calculated and provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table A.7: Connected Holdings and Innovation Controling for CEO FE
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Ln˜PatApp Ln˜PatCite LnK˜PSS
ConHold 37.41*** 66.91** 9.13***
(14.49) (27.84) (2.86)
Year FE yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
University FE yes yes yes
CEO FE yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes
R-squared 0.89 0.83 0.68
Observations 29,219 29,219 29,219
This table reports the results of regressions of the innovation outcomes on connected hold-
ings and other control variables. The difference between this table and Table 1.2 is that
in this table, I also control for CEO fixed effects. Table A.1 provides variable definitions.
Control variables include annual institutional holdings, log sale, log firm age, R&D/Asset,
PPE/Asset, leverage, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. University FE are defined in Section
1.3.2.2. The estimated model is two-stage least-squares model with firm and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors were calculated and are provided in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A.8: Connected Holdings (Management Only) and Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senior management connection Board member connection (baseline)
Dependent variable Ln ˜PatApp Ln ˜PatCite LnK˜PSS Ln ˜PatApp Ln ˜PatCite LnK˜PSS
ConHold 50.32** 82.50** 10.88*** 42.26*** 59.47*** 8.83***
(20.56) (36.80) (3.52) (12.83) (22.60) (2.10)
Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
University FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.84 0.77 0.50 0.84 0.77 0.59
Observations 110,663 110,663 110,663 110,663 110,663 110,663
This table reports the results of regressions of innovation outcome on connected holdings and
other control variables for two types of connection definitions. Table A.1 lists the variable
definitions. Control variables include annual institutional holdings, log sale, log firm age,
R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, leverage, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. University FEs are defined
in Section 1.3.2.2.The estimated model is a two-stage least-squares model with firm and
year fixed effects, and robust standard errors are calculated and provided in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table A.9: Connected Holdings (Broad) and Innovation
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Ln˜PatApp Ln˜PatCite LnK˜PSS
ConHoldBroad 5.45*** 4.95** 0.53***
(1.25) (2.08) (0.15)
Year FE yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
University FE yes yes yes
CEO FE yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes
R-squared 0.85 0.77 0.63
Observations 110,663 110,663 110,663
This table reports the results of regressions of the innovation outcomes on connected hold-
ings and other control variables. The difference between this table and Table 1.2 is that in
this table, I use broad connections to compute connected holdings. Broad connection means
board members and mutual fund managers went to the same school. Table A.1 provides
variable definitions. Control variables include annual institutional holdings, log sale, log
firm age, R&D/Asset, PPE/Asset, leverage, Q, ROA, and CAPX/Asset. University FE
are defined in Section 1.3.2.2. The estimated model is two-stage least-squares model with
firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors were calculated and are provided in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table A.10: Connected Holdings versus Institutional Holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable ln ˜PatApp ln ˜PatCite lnK˜PSS ln ˜PatApp Ln ˜PatCite lnK˜PSS
ConHold 42.26*** 59.47*** 8.83***
(12.83) (22.60) (2.10)
Inst holdings 0.031 0.133** -0.018*** 0.079*** 0.201*** -0.008***
(0.031) (0.062) (0.004) (0.029) (0.058) (0.003)
Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
University FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.84 0.77 0.59 0.82 0.74 0.58
Observations 110,663 110,663 110,663 110,663 110,663 110,663
Table A.11: Citation adjustment factors
XXXXXXXXXXXAge
Tech class
1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0.0083 0.0059 0.0047 0.0071 0.0061 0.0058
1 0.0442 0.0303 0.0259 0.0384 0.0350 0.0324
2 0.1049 0.0735 0.0609 0.0931 0.0871 0.0798
3 0.1725 0.1252 0.1051 0.1559 0.1480 0.1345
4 0.2403 0.1832 0.1540 0.2201 0.2097 0.1911
5 0.3083 0.2450 0.2067 0.2834 0.2724 0.2492
6 0.3733 0.3092 0.2627 0.3447 0.3326 0.3067
7 0.4365 0.3749 0.3212 0.4035 0.3912 0.3642
8 0.4954 0.4394 0.3810 0.4596 0.4465 0.4199
9 0.5521 0.5012 0.4414 0.5127 0.5006 0.4740
10 0.6072 0.5611 0.5033 0.5639 0.5548 0.5285
11 0.6589 0.6191 0.5641 0.6151 0.6076 0.5835
12 0.7094 0.6747 0.6241 0.6645 0.6592 0.6380
13 0.7577 0.7278 0.6873 0.7144 0.7114 0.6908
14 0.8042 0.7801 0.7482 0.7633 0.7612 0.7439
15 0.8479 0.8297 0.8042 0.8110 0.8108 0.7964
16 0.8864 0.8728 0.8553 0.8560 0.8571 0.8455
17 0.9213 0.9117 0.8988 0.8986 0.8984 0.8922
18 0.9517 0.9455 0.9364 0.9370 0.9355 0.9319
20 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
This table provides the citation adjustment factors. Technology classes are defined in Hall,
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). More specifically, technology class: 1, Chemical (excluding
Drugs); 2, Computers and Communications (C&C); 3, Drugs and Medical (D&M); 4, Elec-
trical and Electronics (E&E); 5, Mechanical; and 6, Others. See appendix 1 in Hall, Jaffe,
and Trajtenberg (2001) for more details. Age is the number of years the patent has been
filed. I make the assumption that a patent accumulates all its citations after 20 years.
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Table A.12: Daily Trading Volume and Connected Holdings
Daily Trading Volume ConHoldnarrow ConHoldbroad Inst Holding
Mean P25 P75 Mean Mean Mean Observations
1990 0.0050 0.0026 0.0061 0.0041 0.0147 0.5242 38
2000 0.0099 0.0053 0.0116 0.0054 0.0579 0.5993 469
2003 0.0097 0.0112 0.0055 0.0064 0.0672 0.6897 593
This table reports daily trading volume for stocks with positive ConHoldnarrow. Daily
trading volume is defined as the daily stock sold divided by The total shares outstanding.
For each stock in each year, I compute the annual average. I also report the 25th and 75th
percentile of the daily trading volume for a given stock in a given year. Table A.1 provides
all variable definitions.
Table A.13: Summary Statistics for Termination and Connectedness
Variable Mean SD Median
Termination 0.105 0.307 0
Promotion 0.069 0.255 0
Demotion 0.036 0.186 0
No. connected firm 22.329 28.707 12
No. connected director 18.307 21.920 10
No. fund managed 1.576 1.049 1
Performance 0.019 0.115 0.006
Mutual fund manager age 45.633 8.874 45
Observations 3,416
The data are at the fund-year frequency. I only include single manager- managed fund.
Termination is a dummy equaling 1 when either the fund manager stops managing the fund
or when the fund exits. Promotion is a dummy equaling 1 if a manager manages more
funds in the next year than in this year. Demotion is a dummy equaling 1 if a manager
manages fewer funds in the next year than in this year. According to the definition of
CONNECTED(narrow) , the number of connected firms is the number of connected firms
to funds in that year. A similar definition for the number of connected directors. There are
cases in which one manager could manage more than one fund, so I count the number of
funds managed. Alpha is calculated as the difference between a fund’s gross return and its
corresponding index return.
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Table A.14: Relationship between Termination and Connectedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Termination Promotion Demotion Termination Promotion Demotion
No. connected firms -0.000120 -0.000235 -0.00210
(0.00125) (0.00136) (0.00191)
No. connected directors -0.000516 -0.000359 -0.00247
(0.00164) (0.00178) (0.00247)
Alphat -0.585 0.376 -0.0934 -0.583 0.376 -0.0929
(0.384) (0.416) (0.581) (0.384) (0.416) (0.581)
Alphat ∗Age 0.0357 -0.0547 0.0687 0.0361 -0.0546 0.0679
(0.0353) (0.0390) (0.0499) (0.0353) (0.0389) (0.0500)
Alphat−1 -0.477 0.529 -0.870 -0.478 0.528 -0.875
(0.375) (0.390) (0.579) (0.375) (0.390) (0.578)
Alphat−2 -0.987** 0.667* -0.210 -0.986** 0.667* -0.215
(0.387) (0.403) (0.542) (0.387) (0.403) (0.542)
Age -0.0110** 0.00631 0.00123 -0.0110** 0.00628 0.000870
(0.00447) (0.00487) (0.00616) (0.00445) (0.00486) (0.00614)
Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Investment category FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
This table reports the probit model estimations of equation A.1. Standard errors are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table A.15: Connected Mutual Fund Votes on “Say-on-Pay” Issue
Dependent variable = 1
if vote with board
recommendation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Connected(broad) 0.0366 0.0386 0.1085** 0.1083**
(0.0338) (0.0342) (0.0435) (0.0438)
Control variables no no yes yes
Industry FEs no yes no yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.0000 0.0175 0.2885 0.2918
Observations 249,205 249,205 249,205 249,205
Marginal effect on
Connected(broad)
0.0061 0.0063 0.0124 0.0122
In this table, the sample is restricted to “say-on-pay” proposals. Each observation represents
the vote of a mutual fund on a proposal made at a company’s shareholder meeting. The
dependent variable equals 1 if the mutual fund’s vote follows the board’s recommendation.
Connected(broad) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mutual fund manager went to the
same university as at least one of the firm’s board members . Control variables include ISS
recommendation, firm size, book-to-market ratio, the previous year’s total stock return,
fund size, fund turn ratio, fund expense ratio, and fund family size. Industry refers to
the Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Standard errors clustered at firm level are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table A.16: Mutual Fund Trading and Hedge Fund Activism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ConHold Non− ConHold Diff Diff Diff
Hedge fund activism -0.3539 -105.8*** 105.49*** 79.94*** 99.69***
(0.9923) (24.10) (24.13) (27.46) (31.17)
Controls no no no yes yes
Fixed effects no no no no yes
Observations 274,510 274,510 274,510 164,755 164,755
The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in ConHold from quarter t−3 to quarter
t, and, in column (2), it is the change in Non − ConHold from quarter t − 3 to quarter
t. Non − ConHold is the difference between institutional holdings and ConHold. The
dependent variable in columns (3) to (5) is the difference between the above two variables.
All the dependent variables are in basis points. Hedge fund activism is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the firm in quarter t has a hedge fund activism. Control variables include
firm size, book-to-market ratio, and the previous year’s total stock return. Industry refers
to the Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Standard errors clustered at the firm level
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Table A.17: Active Funds versus Passive Funds
Number of funds Total AUM
Active Passive Passive/Total (%) Active Passive Passive/Total (%)
1980 279 1 0.35 49.42 0.018 0.03
1985 440 3 0.67 130.5 0.863 0.65
1990 801 14 1.71 259.4 1.480 0.56
1995 1,449 37 2.48 1,155 6.212 0.53
2000 2,589 76 2.85 3,186 27.43 0.85
2005 3,204 95 2.87 4,376 71.65 1.61
2010 3,031 93 2.97 5,117 115.8 2.21
This table shows the number of funds and total AUM (in billions) for active funds and
passive funds in my sample. Passive funds are defined as funds that contain “Index” or
“index” in their fund name.
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Figure A.1: Total Number of Patent Applications
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This figure displays the total number of patent applications (that are eventually granted)
in the dataset by years. A censor problem shows up from year 2002 or 2003 until the end
of the sample.
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Figure A.2: Growth Rate of the Total Number of Patent Applications
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This figure displays the annual growth rate of the total number of patent applications
(defined as the current year’s total number of patents divided by last year’s total number
of patents) in the dataset from 1980 to 2010.
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Figure A.3: Total AUM of Domestic Active Funds as a Fraction of All Funds
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The graph displays the total AUM of mutual funds that exclusively hold domestic stocks
as a fraction of the total AUM of all matched mutual funds. The data series covers quarter
1 of 1980 to quarter 4 of 2003.
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Figure A.4: Histogram of Distance between Funds and Firms
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This histogram plots the distance in miles between the headquarters of mutual fund com-
panies and the headquarters of public firms. The vertical red line indicates 100 miles.
According to Coval and Moskowitz (2001), if the distance between the headquarters of mu-
tual fund companies and that of public firms is smaller than 100 km (which is less than 100
miles), the holdings will be defined as local holdings.
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A2. Appendix for Chapter 2
A2.1. Investor beliefs
We use the Kalman filter to derive investor belief about manager skill. Let yj,t ≡ rj,t +
D(sj,t; η). By (2.1), we have
yj,t = aj,t + εj,t.
We can treat this as the measurement equation in a state space representation. The state
equation is a simple AR(1) process for aj,t as specified in (2.2). Obtaining Equation (2.3)
and (2.4) is simply a matter of applying the Kalman filter. In particular, a˜j,t is the one
period ahead prediction of the state, and σ˜j,t is the variance of that prediction.
A2.2. Optimality of cut-off strategy
Here, we provide a few details on how to derive the optimal search strategy for the investors.
Fix an investor in a period. For notational simplicity, we suppress the subscript i and
subscript t. The Bellman equation for the dynamic problem is
V (u∗) = max
{
u∗, −c+
∫ +∞
−∞
V (max{u∗, u}) dΨ(u)
}
.
Consider a cutoff strategy that stops at any u > u¯. With such a strategy, V (u∗) = u∗ for
all u∗ > u¯. On the other hand, the value for u∗ ≤ u¯ should be given by
V (u∗) =
+∞∑
t=0
Ψ(u¯)t [1−Ψ(u¯)]
[∫
(u¯,∞) udΨ(u)
1−Ψ(u¯) − (t+ 1)c
]
=
+∞∑
t=0
Ψ(u¯)t
∫
(u¯,∞)
udΨ(u)− c [1−Ψ(u¯)]
+∞∑
t=0
Ψ(u¯)t(t+ 1)
=
1
1−Ψ(u¯)
∫
(u¯,∞)
udΨ(u)− c [1−Ψ(u¯)] [1 + 2Ψ(u¯) + 3Ψ(u¯)2 + 4Ψ(u¯)3 + ...]
=
1
1−Ψ(u¯)
[∫
(u¯,∞)
udΨ(u)− c
]
. (A.6)
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On the right side of the first line, Ψ(u¯)t [1−Ψ(u¯)] is the probability that the investor does
not stop for t periods and then stops. Multiplying this probability is the expectation of the
sampled u that triggers the stop minus the incurred search costs of t+ 1 periods.
Most importantly, notice that (A.6) is a constant that does not depend on u∗. In addition,
we must have V (u¯) = u¯. Equating (A.6) with u¯ gives us the expression for u¯ that we gave
in the main text:
c =
∫
(u¯,∞)
(u− u¯)dΨ(u).
With u¯ thus defined, the value function can be written as
V (u∗) = max{u∗, u¯}.
We can verify that it satisfies the Bellman equation, as for u∗ ≤ u¯,
−c+
∫ +∞
−∞
V (max{u∗, u}) dΨ(u) = −c+
∫ +∞
−∞
max{u, u¯}dΨ(u)
= −c+ u¯+
∫
(u¯,∞)
(u− u¯)dΨ(u)
= u¯,
and for u∗ > u¯,
−c+
∫ +∞
−∞
V (max{u∗, u}) dΨ(u) = −c+
∫ +∞
−∞
max{u, u∗}dΨ(u)
= −c+ u∗ +
∫
(u∗,∞)
(u− u∗)dΨ(u)
< u∗.
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A2.3. Market shares
To facilitate subsequent derivations, here we define a fund-specific cutoff fj , j = 0, 1, ..., N ,
where
fj =
N∑
k=0
ψk(uk − uj) · 1{uk > uj}.
Notice that uj = u¯(fj). So, if ci > fj , then uj > u¯(ci). In other words, if an investor’s
search cost is larger fj , he will stop searching once he finds fund j. With these funds’ specific
cutoffs, we can derive closed-form expressions for market shares: first, for the fund with the
lowest utility, then, for the fund with the second lowest utility, etc. Let τ be a permutation
on {0, 1, ..., N} such that uτ(0) ≤ uτ(1) ≤ ... ≤ uτ(N). As a result, fτ(0) ≥ fτ(1) ≥ ... ≥ fτ(N).
Any investor who has a search cost that is higher than fτ(0) will not make a second search
beyond the free search. Then, among all of these investors, with ψτ(0) probability, they will
find fund τ(0) (the “worst” fund). Nevertheless, they will invest in fund τ(0). No one else
will invest with fund τ(0). So the market share for fund τ(0) is
sτ(0) = ψτ(0)
[
1−G(fτ(0))
]
,
where G is the c.d.f. for the distribution of ci in the population.
Two kinds of investors will buy fund τ(1). The first kind is the investors with ci > fτ(0)
that find fund τ(1) in the free search. They have no choice but to invest. The second kind
is investors with fτ(0) ≥ ci > fτ(1). For these investors to invest in fund τ(1), they could
have found it in the free search, or have found τ(0) in the free search and τ(1) in the second
search, or have found τ(0) in the first two searches and τ(1) in the third search, and so
forth. The total probability of these events is ψτ(1) +ψτ(0)ψτ(1) +ψ
2
τ(0)ψτ(1) + ... =
ψτ(1)
1−ψτ(0) .
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So the market share for fund τ(1) is
sτ(1) = ψτ(1)
[
1−G(fτ(0))
]
+
ψτ(1)
1− ψτ(0)
[G(fτ(0))−G(fτ(1))]
= ψτ(1)
[
1 +
ψτ(0)G(fτ(0))
1− ψτ(0)
− G(fτ(1))
1− ψτ(0)
]
.
We can follow this line of deduction to obtain closed-form expressions for the market shares
of all funds. For j ≥ 2,
sτ(j) = ψτ(j)
[
1 +
j−1∑
k=0
ψτ(k)G(fτ(k))(
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k−1)
) (
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k)
)
− G(fτ(j))
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(j−1)
]
.
A2.4. Investor welfare
The previous section provides the proof that the optimal search strategy is a cutoff strategy.
In this section we compute investor i’s welfare for a given search cost ci. First, we denote
u¯(ci) as the reservation level of utility for the investor i. Investor i will only accept the funds
which provide utilities higher or equal to u¯(ci), so the expected utility for the potentially
accepted funds is ∫ +∞
u¯(ci)
udΨ(u)
1−Ψ [u¯(ci)] .
As to the search cost, the probability that the investor will conduct t searches beyond the
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free search is (1− Φ)Φt, so the expected total search cost is
c [1−Ψ(u¯)]
+∞∑
t=0
Ψ(u¯)tt = c [1−Ψ(u¯)] {[Ψ(u¯) + Ψ(u¯)2 + Ψ(u¯)3 + ...]+
[
Ψ(u¯)2 + Ψ(u¯)3 + ...
]
+ ...}
= c [1−Ψ(u¯)] { 1
1−Ψ(u¯) +
Ψ(u¯)
1−Ψ(u¯) + ...}
= c
Ψ(u¯)
1−Ψ(u¯)
where u¯ is u¯(ci). Combining the two parts together, we have the expression for investor’s
expected welfare.
A2.5. Frictionless case
Here we derive the limiting case of our model when the search costs go to zero, λ→ 0. We
fix a time period t and suppress the subscript t throughout the derivation.
First, notice that the active funds must provide the same utility, uj = u
′ for some u′ for
all j ∈ {1, ..., N}. To see this, suppose that some j has a utility that is strictly smaller
than another fund. Because the investors do not incur search costs, no one will buy j. This
means sj → 0, which under the log specification of the decreasing returns to scale implies
that uj → +∞, a contradiction. By the same argument, one can show that u′ ≥ −p0.
Let us first look at the case that u′ > −p0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., N}. The outside good will have
zero market share. So
N∑
j=1
sj = 1.
In addition, from the utility specification (2.5), we have
sj = e
1
η
a˜j− 1ηγ (pj+u′).
Putting the two above equations together, we can find the solution for u′ and plug it back
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into the last equation to obtain:
sj =
e
1
η
a˜j− 1ηγ pj∑N
k=1 e
1
η
a˜k− 1ηγ pk
. (A.7)
Next, consider the case where u′ = −p0. The size of an active fund will be at the point
where the decreasing returns to scale drives its utility to be the same as the index fund:
this is the key idea of Berk and Green (2004). From the utility specification (2.5), we have
sj = e
1
η
a˜j− 1ηγ (pj−p0). (A.8)
For this case, we must have
∑N
j=1 sj ≤ 1, which translates into
−p0 ≥ ηγ log
(∑N
k=1
e
1
η
a˜k− 1ηγ pk
)
. (A.9)
In other words, if this condition on the prices holds, then the market shares are given by
(A.8), otherwise the market shares are given by (A.7).
We can derive the pricing behavior of funds given these market share equations. Each fund
chooses pj to maximize sj(pj − bj −mcj). Suppose that condition (A.9) holds so that sj
is given by (A.8), then the first order condition implies a uniform markup of ηγ across the
active funds, or
pj = ηγ + bj +mcj .
If these prices satisfy condition (A.9), then we have a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in which
the index fund has a positive market share.
A2.6. Uniqueness of the fixed point
In this section, we show that the fixed point defined as
F t [pt, bt, a˜t − η log (Mtst) ,xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ] = st
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is unique. For notational simplicity, we suppress the subscript t. We use a result from
Kennan (2001), which provides the uniqueness of a fixed point under R-concavity and the
quasi-increasing condition. We first need to show that F [p, b, a˜− η log (Ms) ,x, ξ, p0; Θ]−s
as a function of s is strictly R-concave, i.e., for any 0 < z < 1, we have
F [p, b, a˜− η log (Ms) ,x, ξ, p0; Θ] > zs. (A.10)
Notice that a˜−η log (zMs) = a˜−η log (Ms)+η log(z−1), which increases the utility for all
the active funds by the same amount η log(z−1). This is equivalent to lowering the utility of
the outside good (i.e., index fund) by η log(z−1). So in the following, we show that lowering
the utility of the outside good increases the market share of every active fund. This will
imply (A.10).
Recall that we have for j = 0, 1, 2, ..., N , the market share for τ(j) equals the summation
of j + 1 terms:
Fτ(j) = ψτ(j)[1−G(fτ(0))] +
ψτ(j)
1− ψτ(0)
[G(fτ(0))−G(fτ(1))]+
...+
ψτ(j)
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(j−1)
[G(fτ(j−1))−G(fτ(j))].
where
fj =
N∑
k=0
ψk(uk − uj) · 1{uk > uj}.
Suppose that there is a small incremental on u0. Formally, let u
′
0 = u0 + ∆, u
′
j = uj for all
j 6= 0. Consider the case where u0 is not equal to any uj , j 6= 0. Then we can take ∆ small
enough such that the ranking of {uj}Nj=0 and the ranking of {u′j}Nj=0 are identical, which
means that the same permutation τ can be used. Let k be such that τ(k) = 0, i.e., the
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index fund is ranked at the kth position. We have
f ′j =

fj + ψ0∆, if uj < u0;
fj , if uj > u0;
f0 − (1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k))∆ if j = 0.
Then, for a general j 6= k, F ′τ(j) is the summation of j + 1 terms:
Fτ(j)
′ = ψτ(j)[1−G(fτ(0) + ψ0∆)] +
ψτ(j)
1− ψτ(0)
[G(fτ(0) + ψ0∆)−G(fτ(1) + ψ0∆)] + ...
+
ψτ(j)
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k−1)
[
G(fτ(k−1) + ψ0∆)−G
(
fτ(k) − (1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k))∆
)]
+
ψτ(j)
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k)
[
G
(
fτ(k) − (1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k))∆
)−G(fτ(k+1))]+ ...
+
ψτ(j)
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(j−1)
[G(fτ(j−1))−G(fτ(j))].
Hence,
lim
∆→0
F ′τ(j) − Fτ(j)
∆
= −ψτ(j)G′(fτ(0))ψ0 +
ψτ(j)ψ0
1− ψτ(0)
[G′(fτ(0))−G′(fτ(1))] + ...
+
ψτ(j)
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k−1)
[ψ0G
′(fτ(k−1)) +G′(fτ(k)) · (1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k))]
+
−ψτ(j)
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k)
G′(fτ(k)) · (1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k)).
Combining the last two terms, we have
lim
∆→0
F ′τ(j) − Fτ(j)
∆
= −ψτ(j)ψ0G′(fτ(0)) +
ψτ(j)ψ0
1− ψτ(0)
[G′(fτ(0))−G′(fτ(1))] + ...
+
ψτ(j)ψ0
1− ψτ(0) − ...− ψτ(k−1)
[G′(fτ(k−1))−G′(fτ(k))].
Under the exponential specification of G, we know that (i) G′ > 0; (ii) G′(fτ(k−1)) −
G′(fτ(k))¡0. With these two facts, it is easy to see that lim∆→0
F ′
τ(j)
−Fτ(j)
∆ < 0. So we have
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essentially shown that when u0 does not equal the utility of any other fund,
∂Fj
∂u0
< 0, ∀j = 1, ..., N.
Because there are only finite points at which u0 becomes equal to the utility of some other
fund, the above result implies that Fj is strictly decreasing in u0 for all j 6= 0. In words,
lowering the utility of the outside good increases the market share of every active fund,
which is what we started out to show.
The second condition that we need to show in order to apply the result in Kennan (2001) is
that F [p, b, a˜− η log (Ms) ,x, ξ, p0; Θ], as a function of s, is strictly radially quasiconcave.
That is, for any s and s′ where sj = s′j but s
′
k ≥ sk for all k 6= j, we have
Fj
[
p, b, a˜− η log (Ms′) ,x, ξ, p0; Θ] ≥ Fj [p, b, a˜− η log (Ms) ,x, ξ, p0; Θ] .
In other words, we need to show that when the utilities of all but one active fund decrease,
the market share of this one active fund increases. To prove this, we only need to apply a
similar argument as above to show that
∂Fj
∂uk
< 0, ∀j, k = 1, ..., N and j 6= k.
except for possibly a finite set of points.
Lastly, by Theorem 1 from Kennan (2001) we show that if a positive fixed point exists, it
is unique.
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A2.7. Computation and estimation
Let sj,t be the observed share for fund j in period t. Given a set of parameters, we can find
the ξt by matching our model predicted shares with the observed shares:
Hj,t(pt, bt, a˜t,xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ) = sj,t, (A.11)
where a˜t is obtained from (2.3) using the parameter values estimated in Section 2.4.1.
Solving for ξt can be done in a similar fashion as the contraction mapping in Berry et al.
(1995). However, because Hj,t requires fixed-point iteration to evaluate, this is computa-
tionally costly. Instead, solving for ξt from
Fj,t [pt, bt, a˜t − η log(Mtst),xt, ξt, p0,t; Θ] = sj,t (A.12)
is generally faster, because Fj,t has closed-form expressions as derived in Section 2.2.3. This
amounts to plugging the observed st in to the left hand side and searching for the value ξt
that makes Fj,t equal to the observed sj,t for each j. Given the definition of Hj,t in (2.10),
solving (A.11) and solving (A.12) are equivalent.
A2.8. Components of sampling probability
There is a way to see the impact of various components of our model on capital misallocation.
We redraw Figure 2.1 but remove each of the components (one at a time): ξ, fund age, fund
family size, and marketing expenses. The solid black line is the BG model-implied “efficient”
fund size. The blue line is the data. The dashed line plots the new fund size as predicted by
the “restricted” model (in the sense of eliminating a particular heterogeneity but keeping
the current equilibrium, i.e., without re-solving for all the funds’ best response strategies).
In the first figure, all the portfolios shift upwards in parallel. This is due to the noise
introduced into fund size, which raises the log size on average (by the Jensen’s inequality).
In the second figure, all the portfolios’ average sizes shift downwards because fund age is
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useful for informing investors. In the third figure, we can see the counterfactual is similar
to the data, this means that fund family size is not very important in affecting fund size.
The last figure plots the counterfactual fund size when there is no marketing. Interestingly,
we see that the dashed line becomes steeper than observed in the data and thus closer to
the “efficient” allocation. This means that marketing helps less skilled funds attain larger
market share than they would otherwise.
[Insert Figure A.10 from Online Appendix Here]
A2.9. Standard errors
The standard errors can be computed by parametric bootstrap. The only element that we
have to take as exogenous in the simulation is the existence of the funds over time (we do not
have a model of entry and exit). The shocks that we need to generate include νj,t, εj,t, ξj,t,
ζj,t, and ωj,t. The latter two shocks are highly correlated (as explained in Section 2.4.2,)
and each shows persistence over time. One way to incorporate these is by using a VAR
process. We can start at year t = 1, first take the a˜j,1 as the prior beliefs, then compute the
equilibrium prices, marketing expenses, and market shares, given the prior beliefs and a set
of randomly drawn ξj,1’s. After this, we can move on to t = 2, first compute the belief a˜j,2
based on the simulated rj,1 and sj,1, then compute the equilibrium given these beliefs and
a set of ξj,2’s, and so on until the last period T . This provides us with a panel of simulated
data on which we can apply our estimation algorithm. We run Monte Carlo experiments to
verify that our estimator is able to recover the “true” parameters.
A2.10. Search model parameter sensitivity
In order to verify that our model estimation is well-specified, we report sensitivities of our
parameter estimates to two key moments using a local measure developed in Andrews,
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2017). This measure helps us assess how much the parameters
change if moment conditions are violated. Many of the results in this paper rely on correctly
estimating the demand effects of price and marketing. In our estimation, the demand
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elasticities of price and marketing are identified from two behavioral assumptions (equation
(2.14) and (2.15)). These two moment conditions require that on average mutual funds are
setting their expense ratios and marketing expenditures given these price and marketing
elasticities. The latter of the optimality conditions, in particular, might be violated on
average if either the upper or the lower limit on the marketing expenditure is binding. Here
we show how the parameter estimates will change if there are small systematic deviations
from these optimal behaviors.
The results are provided in table A.21. The numbers can be interpreted as the percentage
bias of the parameter estimates if a moment is violated by 1% of the standard deviation of
ω or ζ. For example, if the average ζ is not equal to zero but rather to 1% of the estimated
standard deviation of ζ, then the estimate for λ would be downward biased by 0.65% from
its true value, approximately. Overall, we find that the mean search cost λ and the weight
of gross outperformance in the utility function γ are somewhat sensitive to the violations
of the pricing moment condition (with sensitivities of −0.64 and −0.54, respectively, when
using all funds in the sample). The other parameters are insensitive to the violations of
this moment condition. The effect of marketing expenditure on sampling probability θ is
also somewhat sensitive to the violation of marketing moment condition (with sensitivity
of 0.32), while other parameters are not.
The latter sensitivity can be used to assess the degree to which bounds on marketing
expenditures effect our parameter estimates. When funds are constrained in their ability to
market by the SEC-imposed cap on 12b-1 fees (so that
∑
ωj,t > 0), but the econometrician
(mistakenly) assumes the moment condition holds with equality, the demand effects of
marketing will be exaggerated, which manifests in the model as a smaller coefficient in
front of the marketing expenses. However, this effect is not very large, as a 1% of the
standard deviation increase in the moment condition translates into roughly one third of
a percentage point increase in the marketing coefficient. More importantly, the effect is
essentially the same for funds that are not at the upper bound (and similar for those at
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the lower bound of zero), suggesting that the impact of the binding constraints on the
estimation of search model parameters is small.
[Insert Table A.21 Here]
135
A2.11. Data Appendix
In this appendix, we describe our dataset construction procedure. The raw data come from
CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US mutual fund dataset and Morningstar.
A2.12. Matching between CRSP and Morningstar
Our goal is to merge CRSP mutual fund dataset with Morningstar dataset. The identifiers
that are common across these two datasets are ticker and CUSIP. However, in CRSP, the
unique identifier is crsp fundno and in Morningstar, it is secid. Both identify a unique
share class not a fund (for example, C share class of X fund). In this section, we create the
one-to-one mapping between crsp fundno and ticker;, crsp fundno and CUSIP; secid and
ticker; secid and CUSIP. We follow Berk and van Binsbergen’s (hereafter BB) procedure as
close as possible.
A2.12.1. crsp fundno and ticker mapping
We download the annual fund summary dataset from CRSP through Wharton Research
Data Service (WRDS). The data spans from Jan 1961 to Dec 2015. There are 505,073
observations.
1. Out of 505,073 observations, there are 400 observations with same {crsp fundno, year}
as other observations. These duplications happen due to multiple reports in the same
year. Out of the 400 observations, there are 200 distinct crsp fundnos. We keep the
observation with non missing expense ratio information and delete the others. Now
we have 504,808 observations. After this step, we don’t have any observations with
identical crsp fundno and year.
2. Out of 504,808 observations left, we have 86,793 obs for which ticker is missing. We
follow BB’s steps to fill those. First, we identify all the unique pairs of {crsp fundno,
ticker}. Here we first delete the observations with missing tickers. Then, we delete
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the observations with duplicated pairs of {crsp fundno, ticker}. We got 53,278 unique
pairs. We find that there are 5,425 pairs of which have the same crsp fundno but
more than one ticker. We follow BB’s procedure: we keep the latest ticker which is
the ticker with the most recent year. Then, we back fill all the previous ticker with
that tickers. This step gives us 2,595 additional unique pairs of {crsp fundno, ticker}.
Then, we add back the pairs from the non duplicated case, we have 50,448 unique
{crsp fundno, ticker} pairs.
3. Up to this point, for each crsp fundno, there is only one ticker. But for each ticker
there could be multiple crsp fundnos. Now we identify the tickers that have multiple
crsp fundnos. There are actually 4,343 of them. We follow BB to treat those pairs as
missing. Now we get 42,436 unique pairs of {crsp fundno, ticker}.
Feature: our dataset have one-to-one mapping between crsp fundno and ticker.
A2.12.2. crsp fundno and CUSIP mapping
According to Pstor, Stambaugh and Taylor 2015 (hereafter PST), CUSIP can match a lot
of Morningstar funds to CRSP funds in addition to tickers. So we also clean the CUSIP in
CRSP. In general, we conduct the exact same procedures as we did with the ticker. So in
the following, we only report some key statistics.
1. Out of 505,073 observations, there are 120,837 observations with missing CUSIPs.
After we do the back fill, the number of observations with missing CUSIP is reduced
to 29,436.
2. Next, we identify the CUSIPs that have been used by multiple crsp fundno. There
are 494 such CUSIPs. We set them to missing.
3. Lastly, we have 53,297 unique pairs of {crsp fundno, CUSIP}.
Feature: our dataset has one-to-one mapping between crsp fundno and CUSIP.
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We merge the above two datasets together and keep all observations. Now a fund at least
has a ticker or a CUSIP. It could have both. This leaves us with 54,911 unique crsp fundnos.
A2.12.3. Morningstar data
We start from the fund ops file that we have gotten from Morningstar. This dataset contains
the Morningstar Category, Fund Family name and other information. It has 55,571 obs.
We only keep the domestic well-diversified equity mutual funds. We follow the method
provided in PST data appendix in identifying this type of funds.
1. We first identify the observations with duplicated fund name and delete them. We
also delete the funds with no Morningstar category which corresponds to additional
661 funds.
2. Then, we identify the bond fund, international fund, sector fund, target date fund,
real estate fund, other non-equity fund. The definition and method are provided in
PST. Now we are left with 23,592 funds.
3. We delete the funds with neither a ticker nor a CUSIP. We are left with 21,580 funds.
A2.12.4. Merge between CRSP and Morningstar
Our goal is to get one-to-one mapping between crsp fundno and secid through ticker or
CUSIP. For details on secid, please check PST.
We use the CRSP dataset that has unique pairs between crsp fundno and ticker or CUSIP
to merge with Morningstar. First, we merge on ticker. We get 12,412 matches.
A small issue in the Morningstar dataset is that the CUSIP is 9 digit while in CRSP, the
CUSIP is 8 digit. Following the instruction on WRDS, we get rid of the last digit of CUSIP
in Morningstar dataset.
Then, we merge on CUSIP. We get 17,488 matches.
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Finally, we take the union of the two types of matches and we delete the duplicated pairs
of {crsp fundno, secid}. We have 17,658 unique crsp fundno and secid pairs.
A2.13. CRSP dataset clean
We merge the above identified 17,658 unique observations with annual CRSP Fund Sum-
mary dataset and keep the merged observations. We denote this dataset as the baseline
dataset. It has 169,488 observations at fund share class/year level.
A2.14. Correct TNA
As pointed out in PST, before 1993, a lot of the funds in CRSP dataset report their as-
sets under management (AUM or TNA, same meaning) at a quarterly or annual frequency.
Meanwhile, most of the funds report their returns at monthly frequency. When we aggre-
gate variables such as returns and expense ratios across share classes, we need the monthly
TNA information. Starting from the raw dataset of mutual funds monthly returns down-
loaded from WRDS, we merge it with the 17,658 unique crsp fundno and keep the merged
observations. This gives us 2,149,498 observations (covers year from 1962 to 2016). Then
we do the following correction:
1. If there is no TNA information for a given fund for any month in a year, we delete
this year.
2. For the funds who report TNA at an annual frequency (with only one non-missing
TNA per year), we replace the other 11 month’s TNAs with the non-missing TNA.
3. For the funds who report their TNA at quarterly frequency (with only one non-
missing TNA per quarter), we replace the missing values of TNA with the TNA in
that quarter. For example, if a fund reports TNA at month 3 for quarter 1, we replace
month 1 and month 2 TNA as month 3 TNA.
4. We delete the observations where TNA is zero, negative.
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5. We delete the observations with missing TNA or monthly return.
6. We also delete duplicated observations for the same crsp fundno in the same month.
After this correction, we have 2,018,242 observations with non missing monthly return and
TNA. (In the data appendix, we use TNA and AUM interchangeably.)
A2.14.1. Inflation adjustment
To make the TNAs comparable across time, we take inflation into consideration. We down-
load the Consumer Price Index from FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data provided by
St. Louis Fed. The series we used is Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All
Items2. This series is at the monthly frequency and it is seasonally adjusted. We convert it
to annual frequency by keeping each year’s December’s value as this year’s value for CPI.
Then, we use year 2015 as the baseline year to adjust all other year’s TNAs. For example,
the CPI value in 1970 is 39.6 and the CPI value in 2015 is 238.3. Then, all the monthly
TNAs in 1970 are multiplied by 6 (= 238.3/39.6) to make them comparable to TNAs in
2015.
A2.15. Vanguard Index Fund
As proposed in BB, index funds from Vanguard are the most accessible index funds to the
average investors. In our paper, we use all the equity index funds from Vanguard, combined,
as the outside good. Within baseline dataset, we first drop all the institutional share classes:
drop the funds if inst fund== Y, sharetype == ”Inst” or fund name contains ”Institutional
Shares” or ”Institutional Class”. Then, we identify passive funds from Vanguard following
two steps: 1 find all the index funds. 2 find out the Vanguard index funds.
In order to identify index funds, we use a simple two-step procedure following PST:
1. If either CRSP or Morningstar indicates the fund is an index fund, we label this fund
2The url is https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL
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as index fund.
2. If a fund’s name contains words such as ’Index’ or ’index’, we label this fund as index
fund.
Then, we check whether the fund name or the fund sponsor’s name contains ”Vanguard”.
There are 552 such observations, i.e., 552 Vanguard index fund observations.
We fill the missing value of expense ratio using the fund’s life time average. Then, we delete
the observations with missing expense ratio. This gives us 494 share class/year observations.
We merge it with fund monthly dataset which gives us 6,279 share class/month observations.
In each month, we get the total assets under management (inflation adjusted, for details see
section “Inflation adjustment”), asset weighted mean of management fees, returns, expense
ratios, turnover ratios, and 12b-1 fees. Then, for each month we only keep one observation
for the Vanguard index fund. Then, for each year we keep first month’s value as the the
Vanguard fund’s annual variable. We have 40 observations from year 1976 to 2015.
A2.16. Active Funds Cleaning
From the baseline dataset, we drop all the institutional share classes.
Then, we drop all the index funds. For methods, please check section ”Vanguard Index
Fund”. Further we only keep the funds with the following Morningstar categories: Large
Blend, Large Growth, Large Value, Mid-Cap Blend, Mid-Cap Growth, Mid-Cap Value,
Small Blend, Small Growth, Small Value and Aggressive Allocation. We call this dataset
Active Fund dataset. It has 87,842 observations at share class/year level.
A2.16.1. Front Load
To construct “effective” 12b-1 fees, we need information about fund’s front load. We down-
loaded the front load dataset from CRSP. The total number of observations is 101,848.
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1. In CRSP mutual fund front load dataset, for each crsp fundno there is a pricing
schedule for the front load (i.e., for certain amount of initial investment, the fund will
charge certain percentage of front load. Generally, the more the investment, the lower
the front load.). For each pricing schedule we only keep the maximum level of front
load.
2. Then, we delete the observations with front load equals 0. That leaves us with 19,626
observations.
3. We delete observations with front load smaller than 0. There are 30 of them.
4. There are 288 cases that a fund has more than one change in front load in one year.
We delete them.
5. We expand the front load dataset to a crsp fundno year style3. This step gives us
108,818 observations.
Next, we merge the above front load data set with the Active Fund dataset. We set missing
front loads to zero..
A2.16.2. “Effective” 12b-1 fees and expense ratio adjustment
We combine fund’s 12b-1 fee and front load to create an item we call “effective” 12b-1 fee.
For the fund share class with missing value of expense ratio or 12b-1, we use the time series
mean of the expense ratio or 12b-1 to replace the missing value4. We set the missing 12b-1
fee to 0 and replace the observation with 12b-1 fee larger than 1% to 1%.
For fund j in year t, if a C share class exists, we replace all the other share classes’ expense
ratios and 12b-1 fees with the C share class’s data. The C share class is the class that
charges no front load fees but has higher expense ratios and 12b-1 fees. We replace other
share classes’ expense ratios and 12b-1 fees with the C share class’s data on the assumption
3Because in the raw dataset, each entry has start year and end year.
4The expense ratio or 12b-1 fee smaller than 0 or equals -99 was set to missing before the replacing.
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that mutual fund investors are indifferent towards different share classes. This assumption
is valid if all investors have the same investment horizons. If no C share class exists in the
fund, then for all the other share classes, we take the sum of the share class’s 12b-1 fees
and the annualized front load for that share class and use it as the effective 12b-1 fees. For
this case, we also increase the expense ratio by the amount of the annualized front load.
Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we annualize the front load by dividing it by 7, implicitly
assuming that it is amortized over 7 years.
The way to identify whether some share classes belong to the same fund is by using
MS fundid from Morningstar. Also we make sure that the “effective” 12b-1 fee is not
larger than 1%. We also did the same adjustment to expense ratio. Finally, we drop the
observation with expense ratio greater than 5% and we drop the observations with expense
ratio smaller than the sum of 5bps and “effective” 12b-1 fee. We only keep the observations
later than 1964 (include 1964).
In Figure A.7 panel A, we plot the ratio of marketing expenses to total fees for active funds.
We can see that this ratio is relatively stable from 1992 to 2015, at around 41%. Figure
A.7 panel B plots the aggregate time series of the total amount of marketing expenses in
billion dollars. The mean is around 8.5 billion dollars per annum. Marketing expenses are
substantial both in absolute terms and relative to the industry’s total revenues.
[Insert Figure A.6 Here]
[Insert Figure A.7 Here]
A2.16.3. Construct monthly return dataset
Starting from Active Fund dataset, we merge the monthly return dataset into it. Here the
monthly TNAs are already corrected in the ”Correct TNA” section. We also convert TNA
into real terms using the procedures described in section “Inflation adjustment”.
The gross return for each share class is the sum of net return (mret) and one twelfth
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of expense ratio. (Here the expense ratio we use is from raw data instead of the one we
generated in the previous section. We replace the missing value of expense ratio by the time
series mean. Expense ratio smaller or equal to zero are treated as missing. The reason why
we use this unadjusted expense ratio is because we want our gross return to be comparable
to other papers which study mutual fund performance in this fashion.)
We aggregate the gross return, net return, 12b-1 fee and expense ratio to fund level by
using each share class’s TNA as weight. We use MS fundid as the identifier for a fund (not
a share class). For each fund, each month, we only keep one observation.
We also clean the turnover ratio and management fee using the same procedure (in this
section) as we clean the expense ratio. Here we further impose that expense ratio is larger
than 20 bps. PST uses 15 bps as the lower bound for the expense ratio for active funds.
After this step we have 516,849 observations.
A2.16.4. General cleaning
Starting from the dataset in the previous step, we keep the the observations with TNA¿15
million dollars (this is the threshold used in PST). Then, we keep only the cases where
the fund in a given year has 12 observations. Next, we keep month 1’s observation (to
convert the dataset from monthly to annual.). We check whether there is a gap in this
annual dataset. For example for fund j, suppose it has the annual data from 1996 to 2000
and 2002 to 2010. Then, we will delete this fund, i.e. all the 14 (=5+9) observations. We
also drop the active funds from Vanguard since Vanguard is organized as a client-owned
structure which might not be properly described by profit maximization which is what we
have in the model. Now for all the active funds, we have 27,621 observations. It is at
fund/year level. Now we append the Vanguard Index Fund data into the above dataset.
There is additional 40 fund/year observations. This almost finishes all the data cleaning
part. We call it almost there dataset.
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A2.16.5. Performance adjustment
Starting with the almost there dataset, we merge the monthly return dataset from section
“Construct Monthly Return Dataset”. We keep the merged observations which is 331,452.
To adjust for risk exposure, we use various versions of asset pricing models. The monthly
factor returns are downloaded from Ken French’s website. Then, we use the following models
to adjust the returns: CAPM, Fama-French 3 factor model, Fama-French-Carhart Model,
Fama-French 5 factor model. The dependent variable is fund’s excess return which is the
difference between gross monthly return of the fund and monthly risk free rate. To increase
the accuracy of beta estimation, for each fund we use all the fund’s returns to estimate the
betas. Then, we subtract the predicted return (betas multiplied by the factors’ returns)
from the fund’s excess return. This gives us the monthly alphas.
Then, we aggregate alphas together by sum across 12 months to get annual alphas. And
we merge the annual alphas to the almost there dataset to get our final dataset.
A2.16.6. Variable calculation
Total market is the sum of AUM for all the funds (active and passive) in a given year.
Market share is ratio between fund’s AUM and Total market.
Index fund price is the expense ratio of the Vanguard index fund.
Family size is the number of funds in the same fund family. Fund family is identified by
using Family variable from Morningstar. Fund age is the number of years since the fund
first shows up in the dataset.
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Figure A.5: AUM and Price of Vanguard Index Funds
Panel A plots the total assets under management (AUM) of all the Vanguard equity index
funds. The data series starts from 1975 when Vanguard launching its S&P 500 index fund.
In year 2015, the total AUM reaches 600 billions of dollars. We find all Vanguard funds by
fund names (contains ’Vanguard’ or ’vanguard’). We manually screen out the non equity
index funds by checking fund’s prospectus. The funds’ assets under management are inflated
to 2015 dollars by using Consumer Price Index downloaded from FRED.
Panel B plots the asset weighted mean expense ratio for all the Vanguard equity index
funds. The unit is in basis point. This series covers the period from 1975 to 2015. We can
see a significant drop from over 60 bp in 1975 to under 10 bp in 2015.
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Figure A.6: Histogram of Effective Marketing Expenses
The figure plots the histogram of effective marketing expenses for the main sample covering
1964 to 2015. We define the marketing expenses in the following way: for fund j in year
t, if a C share class exists, we replace all the other share classes expense ratios and 12b-1
fees with the C share class’s data. If no C share class exists in the fund, then for all the
other share classes, we take the sum of the share class’s 12b-1 fee and the annualized front
load for that share class and use it as the effective 12b-1 fee. For this case, we also increase
the expense ratio by the amount of the annualized front load. Lastly, within a fund, across
share classes, we aggregate the effective 12b-1 fee by the AUM of each share class to get
the fund level effective 12b-1 fee. About 45.7% of the observations are binding at the upper
bound, 1% level. And about 23.7% of the observations are binding at 0%.
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Figure A.7: Total Marketing
Panel A plots the ratio between total marketing expenses and total expense ratios for active
funds.
Panel B plots the total marketing expenses (in billions dollars) for all the active equity
mutual funds in the U.S. from 1992 to 2015. The funds’ assets under management are
inflated to 2015 dollars by using Consumer Price Index downloaded from FRED.
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Figure A.8: Prior Distribution of Management Skill
The figure presents the prior distribution of management skill (a). The vertical line marks
the mean of expense ratio in our data, 1.66%. Approximately 71% of funds have man-
agement skills higher than the mean expense ratio. The parameter values are µ = 0.0305
(mean of prior) and κ = 0.0241 (std of prior).
Figure A.9: Capital (mis)Allocation in the No-Marketing Equilibrium: Size vs. Net Skill
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The figure plots the mean of log fund size (fund size is measured in million dollars) for
portfolio of funds formed on net skill for the no-marketing equilibrium. The expense ratio is
outcome of the counterfactual experiment. We compute fund size implied by the generalized
Berk and Green (2004) model using the ratio between net skill and the degree of decreasing
returns to scale (BG). The black line plots the mean of log fund size implied by BG. The
blue line plots the mean of log fund size generated by our search model in the counterfactual
equilibrium for each portfolio. The purple line plots the mean of log fund size generated by
our search model in the counterfactual equilibrium with no foc errors for each portfolio.
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Figure A.10: Counterfactual (restricted model)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Portfolios formed on net skill
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
M
ea
n 
lo
g 
siz
e
Data
BG
No \xi
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Portfolios formed on net skill
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
M
ea
n 
lo
g 
siz
e
Data
BG
No age
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Portfolios formed on net skill
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
M
ea
n 
lo
g 
siz
e
Data
BG
No family
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Portfolios formed on net skill
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
M
ea
n 
lo
g 
siz
e
Data
BG
No marketing
The four figures plot the mean of log fund size (fund size is measured in million dollars)
for portfolio of funds formed on net skill (defined as fund skill level a˜ minus expense ratio
p). We compute the Berk and Green model implied fund size using the ratio between net
skill and degree of decreasing returns to scale. The fund skills are estimated using our
generalized Berk and Green model. For more details, please check section 2.2.1. The black
line plots the mean of log Berk and Green model implied fund size for each portfolio. The
blue line plots the mean of log fund size in the data for each portfolio. The purple dashed
line plots the mean of log restricted model implied fund size for each portfolio. In top left
figure, purple line plots fund size when there is no ξ. In top right figure, purple line plots
fund size when there is no age. In bottom left figure, purple line plots fund size when there
is no fund family size. In bottom right figure, purple line plots fund size when there is no
marketing. The ten portfolios are formed on net skill. Portfolio 1 has the lowest net skill
while portfolio 10 has the highest net skill.
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Table A.18: Data Definition
Variable Definition
Fund AUM Fund’s total net assets under management at the beginning of each
year, in unit of millions of dollars
Fund expense ratio The ratio between operating expenses that shareholders pay to the
fund and the fund’s AUM
Actual 12b1 Reported as the ratio of the AUM attributed to marketing and
distribution costs
Management fee The ratio of the AUM attributed to fund management costs
Fund turnover Minimum (of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities),
divided by the average 12-month AUM of the fund
Total market Sum of all funds’ AUM including both active funds and index fund
Market share Ratio between fund’s AUM and total market in the same year
Age Number of years fund is in the sample prior to given year
Family size Number of funds in the same fund family
CAPM α Outperformance estimated by CAPM
FF3 α Outperformance estimated by Fama French 3 factor model
FFC α Outperformance estimated by Fama French and Carhart model
FF5 α Outperformance estimated by Fama French 5 factor model
New Dummy which equals 1 if fund is new in the current period
Index fund price Fund expense ratio of the index fund
This table presents the data definition of all the variables used in the paper. For detailed
data construction process, please check the data appendix.
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Table A.19: Summary Statistics
Percentiles
Num of Obs Mean Stdev 25% 50% 75%
FF5 α (%) 27,621 0.54 7.98 -3.47 0.07 3.79
Fund AUM (million $) 27,621 1339 4791 82 254 886
Fund exp ratio (%) 27,621 1.66 0.53 1.23 1.75 2.05
Marketing expenses (%) 27,621 0.61 0.44 0.01 0.89 1.00
Market share 27,621 0.0018 0.0066 0.0001 0.0002 0.0009
Age 27,621 11.46 10.3 4 8 16
New dummy 27,621 0.0827 0.2755 0 0 0
Family size 27,621 12.08 13.15 3 7 17
Index fund price (%) 27,621 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.19
Total market AUM (trillion $) 27,621 1.54 0.75 1.26 1.77 2.13
Family AUM (million $) 27,621 27,826 77,700 729 4,920 15,787
FFC α (%) 27,621 0.55 7.86 -3.41 0.25 3.97
FF3 α (%) 27,621 0.65 8.13 -3.39 0.25 4.09
CAPM α (%) 27,621 0.97 9.68 -3.76 0.45 4.92
This table presents summary statistics for our sample of U.S. equity mutual funds. For detailed variable
definitions see table A.18. The sample period is from 1964 to 2015. Our unit of observation is fund/year.
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Table A.20: Summary of Outcomes for Current Equilibrium and No-Marketing Equilibrium
Current No-Marketing No-Marketing
(no foc errors)
Mean price (bp) 160.27 82.96 79.85
Mean marketing (bp) 61.29 0 0
Mean alpha (bp) 37.24 41.07 34.55
Total share of active funds 0.74 0.67 0.66
Mean sampling prob (%) 0.085 0.078 0.078
Sampling prob for low price funds (%) 0.042 0.14 0.20
Sampling prob for index fund (%) 5.91 13.66 13.66
Investor welfare (bp) -140.72 -61.25 -66.26
Active funds average profits (bp) 57.51 42.19 48.45
Index fund profits (bp) 2.32 2.86 3.01
Total Welfare -37.37 -16.20 -14.79
Investor’s Search Cost (bp) 29.09 12.15 10.48
This table provides various measures of the mutual fund industry under current and no
marketing equilibrium. Additionally, we provide those measures for the no marketing equi-
librium with no foc errors. Mean price, mean marketing and mean alpha are the arithmetic
average of price, marketing expenses and alpha for all active funds, respectively. Total share
of active funds is the market share of all active funds. The rest of the market share belongs
to index fund. Sampling prob for low price funds is the mean sampling probability for the
funds whose prices are below the mean price. Investor welfare is defined in equation 2.19.
Active funds average profits is the mean of price minus marketing expenses for all active
funds. Index fund profits is defined similarly. Total welfare is the sum of investor welfare,
funds’ total profits and total marketing expenses. Investor’s search cost is the average total
incurred search costs.
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Table A.21: Sensitivity of Parameter Estimates to Moments
Interior Lower Upper All
Parameter Description ζ ω ζ ω ζ ω ζ ω
λ Mean search cost (bp) -0.65 -0.01 -0.53 -0.01 -0.59 -0.01 -0.64 -0.01
γ Alpha weight -0.55 0.01 -0.45 0.01 -0.50 0.01 -0.54 0.01
θ Marketing effectiveness -0.01 0.31 -0.03 0.28 0.02 0.33 0.01 0.32
β1 Family size effect 0.08 -0.10 0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.13 0.08 -0.11
β2 Fund age effect -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
In this table, we provide the sensitivity of parameter estimates to two moment conditions: for
fund pricing (
∑T
t=1
∑
j∈t ζj,t = 0) and marketing expenditures (
∑T
t=1
∑
j∈t ωj,t = 0), for four
subsamples that we use to estimate the model. “Interior” subsample includes only funds that are
between the upper and the lower bounds on the marketing expenditures. in their marketing expenses.
“Lower” includes only funds whose marketing expenses are zero. “Upper” refers to the funds whose
marketing expenses are at 100 bps. “All” refers to all of the funds in our sample. The magnitudes
can be interpreted as the percentage bias of a parameter estimate if a moment is violated by 1% of
the standard deviation of the corresponding moment condition error, ω or ζ. For example, if the
average ζ is not zero but instead equals to 1% of the estimated standard deviation of ζ, then the
estimate for λ would be downward biased by 0.64% from its true value (if all funds are used).
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